

THE FUTURE TOP EXECUTIVES OF IRAN:
THEIR EFFECTIVE DIMENSIONS
IN A DECENTRALIZING
ADMINISTRATIVE ENVIRONMENT

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mittee, and approved by all its members, has
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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY



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DEDICATION

To my friend, colleague, and wife

Mehrnaz

and to our daughter

Shahzad

who gave a final impetus to this work.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|--|-----|
| DEDICATION | ii |
| ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS | iii |
| LIST OF FIGURES | ix |
| CHAPTER | |
| 1. INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 1 | 9 |
| 2. THE DIMENSIONS OF EFFECTIVE EXECUTIVES | 10 |
| The Dimensions of British Executives. | 12 |
| The Administrative Class | 15 |
| The Executive Class | 18 |
| The Dimensions of the United States' Executives | 20 |
| The Political Appointees | 22 |
| The Career Administrators | 24 |
| FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 2 | 30 |
| 3. THE PAST ADMINISTRATIVE ENVIRONMENT OF IRAN | 33 |
| The Impact of Sociocultural Factors on the Past Administrative Environment of Iran | 41 |
| The Impact of History | 42 |
| The Impact of Family | 43 |
| Individualism | 44 |
| Subjectivity | 45 |

CHAPTER

| | | |
|----|---|------|
| | The Characteristics of the Past | |
| | Administrative Environment | 46 |
| | Administrative Centralization | 47 |
| | Administrative Inflexibility | 47 |
| | Administrative Laxity | 48 |
| | The Characteristics of the | |
| | Past Executives | 49 X |
| | FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 3 | |
| 4. | THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATIVE ENVIRONMENT | |
| | OR IRAN | 54 |
| | The Characteristics of the Present | |
| | Administrative Environment of Iran | 63 |
| | Administrative Flexibility | 64 |
| | Administrative Decentralization | 66 |
| | The Characteristics of the Present | |
| | Executives | 68 X |
| | FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 4 | 73 |
| 5. | THE DIRECTORS GENERAL: THE STUDY OF ROLE | |
| | PERCEPTION AND PROBLEM APPRAISAL OF DIRECTORS | |
| | GENERAL ON THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR | 75 |
| | Theoretical Framework | 75 |
| | Methodology | 83 |
| | Description of the Participants | 83 |
| | Procedure and Instruments | 84 |
| | Results and Discussion | 89 |
| | FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 5 | 108 |
| 6. | THE DEPUTY MINISTERS: THE STUDY OF ROLE | |
| | PERCEPTION AND EXECUTIVE TIME SPENDING OF | |
| | THE DEPUTY MINISTERS OF THE IMPERIAL | |
| | GOVERNMENT OF IRAN | 110 |
| | Theoretical Background | 111 |
| | Methodology | 117 |

CHAPTER

| | | |
|----|---|-----|
| | Description of the Participants . . . | 117 |
| | Procedure | 120 |
| | Instruments | 121 |
| | Results and Discussion | 122 |
| | Analysis of Deputy Ministers' Executive Role Perception. | 122 |
| | Analysis of Deputy Ministers' Use of Time. | 132 |
| | FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 6 | 142 |
| 7. | THE MINISTERS: A VIEW OF IRANIAN MINISTERS ON DECENTRALIZATION AND FUTURE TOP EXECUTIVES | 144 |
| | Theoretical Perspective | 145 |
| | Methodology | 148 |
| | Description of the Participants . . . | 148 |
| | Procedure | 149 |
| | Instrument | 150 |
| | Results and Discussion | 150 |
| | FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 7 | 162 |
| 8. | SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION OF THE STUDIES OF DIRECTORS GENERAL, DEPUTY MINISTERS, AND MINISTERS | 164 |
| | FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 8 | 180 |
| 9. | THE FUTURE TOP EXECUTIVES OF IRAN | 181 |
| | The Future Administrative Environment . . | 182 |
| | The Future Top Executives of Iran | 188 |
| | The General Dimensions Wheel of Future Top Executives | 192 |
| | A Model of Specific Dimensions for Future Top Executives. | 199 |
| | Summary and Conclusion. | 211 |

CHAPTER

| | |
|--|-----|
| Implications of the Model for Action . . . | 213 |
| Executive Recruitment. | 214 |
| Executive Selection. | 214 |
| Developing Executives' Skills. | 216 |
| FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 9 | 223 |
| 10. RECAPITULATION | 226 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 239 |
| APPENDIXES | 252 |
| APPENDIX A. STRUCTURED INTERVIEW I | 253 |
| APPENDIX B. OPINION SURVEY FORM | 255 |
| APPENDIX C. TWENTY-FIVE PROBLEMS AND THEIR PRIORITIES | 269 |
| APPENDIX D. PROBLEMS, DRIVING FORCES, RESTRAINING FORCES, AND ACTION OPTIONS | 279 |
| APPENDIX E. STRUCTURED INTERVIEW II | 301 |
| APPENDIX F. STRUCTURED INTERVIEW III | 310 |

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE

| | | |
|----|--|-----|
| 1. | Force-Field Analysis | 82 |
| 2. | A Schematic Representation of Deputy Ministers' Role Perception | 126 |
| 3. | The Responsibility Triangle | 129 |
| 4. | The General Dimensions of the Future Top Executives of Iran | 191 |
| 5. | A Grid Representing the Relationships of the Three Studies to the Specific Dimensions of the Future Top Executives | 200 |
| 6. | A Model for the Specific Dimensions of the Future Top Executives of Iran | 202 |

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In a duration of a short time period, Iran has witnessed the occurrence of an economic revolution, moving from manpower excess to manpower shortage, from simple development goals to highly complex development goals, from aid and loan receiving to aid and loan giving,¹ from passive international role to active international role, and from an underdeveloped country to an ever-developing nation.

Development in Iran is moving forward; such development is reflected in expansion of social welfare schemes, in increase in agricultural and industrial production, and an increase in urbanization projects.

These drastic changes have principally been accentuated by a phenomenal boom of Iran's skyrocketing oil revenues, which have made possible ambitious and successful development efforts.

This situation has attracted multinational corporations, foreign investors, and other governments to participate in various development projects being planned and implemented in Iran.

All the changes and development efforts, aforementioned, have been conducive to an ever-increasing complexity of the administrative work of the Iranian Government, and have shown that the administrative structure and practices have not been generally responsive to the developments in Iran.

With an excess in the quantity of work and a change in the quality of functions and responsibilities, the previously centralized system of Government administration proved to be increasingly inadequate. Taking into account the many problems associated with excessive centralization, the Government adopted the policy of decentralization.

Since decentralization has been adopted as a national policy, Iran has been taking wide strides toward greater progress in delegating authority and responsibility to the lower echelons of the Government administration, namely, Governors General, Governors, and Field Directors General. The objective is to eliminate advance approval of Government action in favor of broad delegation of authority to those who are closer to information and who are at the operational levels.

At the present time, Iran is in a transitional period of administrative reform. The transition should take place in a methodical and calculated manner by Government executives who perform the role of change agents and

leaders. Directors General, Deputy Ministers, and Ministers, due to the nature of their functions and responsibilities, become of crucial importance in initiating and implementing change expediently and effectively.

The role of Directors General is significant in the context of decentralization mainly because they are policy advisors, field officials, chief administrators and coordinators of general divisions, and serve as articulators between policy formulating and implementing bodies.

The Deputy Ministers also play a critical role in the ministries and government organizations in Iran. Their role is important because they are at the level of decision making and policy formulation and provide a linkage between the Government's top decision makers (the Ministers) and actual implementors (the Directors General).

The Ministers' role is also of great importance because they are at the top position of decision making and policy formulation and are directly and actively involved in the implementation of the decentralization policy.

What becomes of extreme significance is what dimensions are needed in order for these three top-positioned executives to be effective in a future decentralizing administrative environment of Iran. This is the main concern in this dissertation.

To gain insight and understanding into the dimensions of effective future top Government executives, three studies were conducted at the level of Directors General, Deputy Ministers, and Ministers in the Government of Iran.

Based on the thesis that the behavior of executives as well as their dimensions are an artifact of a number of major and fundamental factors such as administrative, personal, environmental and task, the three studies were designed to provide further insight into the factors that affect the behavior of the effective future executives in the decentralizing administrative environment of Iran.

The study of Directors General was designed to find out role perception, possible problems, and interpersonal relations of Directors General with their superiors and subordinates.

The second study on Deputy Ministers was conducted (1) to provide data on their role perceptions, values, and expectations, their personal as well as interpersonal relations with their superiors and subordinates, their skills, functions and responsibilities, and finally their management styles, communications modes, and their attitudes toward participation, trust, and cooperation; and (2) to examine Deputy Ministers' use of their executive time in the context of their role perception.

The study of Ministers was conducted, predominantly, because a more pervasive and profound understanding of the task requirements and environmental factors affecting effective executives in a decentralizing administrative environment were perceived as insightful and essential in the overall prediction of the dimensions of future top executives.

In addition to these three studies conducted by the author, the dimensions of effective top executives within the administrative context of Britain and the United States were examined, with the objective of establishing a framework for studying the dimensions of effective future top executives in Iran.

The choice of the administrative systems of Britain and the United States was based upon the following criteria:

1. The administrative system of the United States is characterized as expert and specialist in nature, whereas the administrative system of Britain is viewed as more generalist and nonexpert.

2. In contrast to the British administrative system, which is less decentralized, the administrative system in the United States presents a more decentralized system.

3. The trend indicates that most Iranians, who function at the higher levels of the administrative

structure in Iran, are usually educated in the Western countries, especially the United States and Britain.

Considering that Iran is moving from a centralized to a more decentralized administrative environment, and toward an environment which might emphasize specialization at certain levels and nonexpertise at other levels of the administrative structure, it is hoped that the experience of the two aforementioned administrative systems can give further insight and understanding to the present study.

Based on the data provided by the three studies aforementioned, as well as the insight gained from studying the trend in the Government of Iran and the review of literature on the dimensions of effective executives, especially in Britain and the United States, the specific dimensions for effective executives in the future decentralizing administrative environment of Iran were presented in a model of behavior constructed by the author.

On the ground that the trait model to delineating the dimensions of effective executives is too simplistic and unrealistic, and that effectiveness of executives is in part attributed to their functions and task requirements, it was proposed that dimensions of effective executives should be based not only on their general dimensions which will not be situation-specific, but also on their more specific dimensions that will be directly related to their

functions, responsibilities, expectations, and role behaviors.

The general dimensions of effective future top executives were represented by the author in a wheel and were called the General Dimensions Wheel for the Future Top Executives. In this Wheel, the leadership behaviors, value orientations, decision-making behaviors, knowledge and skills, and personal qualifications of effective executives were included.

A model was constructed by the author and named the Model for Specific Dimensions of the Future Top Executives of Iran. In this model, four skills, namely, technical, perceptual, conceptual, and integrative, were considered for executives at different levels of the Government hierarchy.

The present study, which is hypothesis-generating, represents the first attempt of its kind to examine three levels of the Iranian Government and their interrelationships. Determination and prediction of the general, as well as the specific dimensions for effective top executives in the future, as the main concern in this dissertation, are significant in identification, selection, and recruitment of the appropriate manpower and give further credence to human resources management.

The study is also significant because it stimulates actions and provokes thought about the future administrative environment and the dimensions of effective executives within it. Thus, it can provide a base for planning and programming and increase the opportunity to profoundly understand the alternatives and thus to influence and manage the future.

FOOTNOTE TO CHAPTER 1

¹John W. Macy, Jr., "Summary of Conclusions: Iran Public Sector Project," in Phase I Report: Iran Public Sector Project (Tehran: Development and Resources Corporation, May, 1975), p. 3.

CHAPTER 2

THE DIMENSIONS OF EFFECTIVE EXECUTIVES

For the purpose of clarification, it is appropriate, at the outset, to indicate what is meant by the term "executive." In this dissertation, the term refers to the administrators, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, deputy ministers, department heads, and individuals who are expected by virtue of their position and their knowledge to make decisions that have significant impact on formulation and implementation of plans and policies that have important consequences for a country. These individuals, because of the nature of their positions, have functions and responsibilities which require appropriate and high dimensions and qualifications for effective formulation and execution of plans and policies.

A number of divergent views have been expressed regarding the role (Cowperthwaite, 1971; Curcuru and Healey, 1972; Mann and Doig, 1965; Mintzberg, 1973; Northcote and Trevelyan, 1954; Odiorn, 1969; Pfiffner and Presthus, 1967; Ridley, 1968; and Stanley, 1964) and the dimensions and qualifications (Bassett, 1969; Boddewyn, 1970; Brunson, 1972; Chapman and Cleveland, 1975;

Chitwood and Harmon, 1971; Cleveland, 1972; Copeman, 1971; Corson, 1952; Corson and Paul, 1966; DeVille, 1973; Drucker, 1966; Filley and House, 1970; Hampton, 1973; Hobbs and Power, 1971; Johnson, 1970; Katz, 1955; Mann and Doig, 1965; Patton, 1967; Presthus, 1964; Ridley, 1968; Rowe, 1974; Scheips, 1973; Self, 1967; Sherwood, 1970; Slish, 1971; and Sommer, 1973) of effective executives.

"Dimensions" in this dissertation refers to innate traits, aptitudes and characteristics and skills, capacities and behaviors acquired through maturation, learning, and experience.

Since one can learn from the experience of other countries, the British and the American Government administrative environment can provide a basis for analyzing two different administrative orientations, namely, the generalist versus the specialist and the dimensions emphasized by these two systems.

The generalist orientation to administration, mostly, prevalent in Britain, and the specialist orientation to administration, more closely identified with the United States, represent two different philosophical and administrative ideals and approaches. The emphasis on the generalist suggests that administration is an art, and that training and experience on the job can prepare a person to deal with any problem. In the United States,

however, administration is a science and is viewed as a managerial technique rather than a quasi-political activity. It involves specialized knowledge of procedures, in addition to knowledge of the substantive field of specialization.

Within the context of these two different orientations to administration, "generalists" refers to those who have a nonvocational education and are recruited to positions mainly because of training and experience. Thus, the general administrator or the generalist is not a specialist and his responsibilities are not restricted to some special organizational affairs or a special body of knowledge or training. "Specialists," on the other hand, refers to those who are recruited because of their professional, technical, or other specialist qualifications.

In the following, the dimensions of effective government executives within the context of the administrative environment of Britain and the United States will be examined in an effort to provide a framework for analysis of effective dimensions for future Government executives in Iran.

The Dimensions of British Executives

Up to the seventeenth century, the development of the all-round man through a general literary education

and simultaneously locating the craftsman in low positions were emphasized throughout the world.¹

The generalist educational tradition, which stressed that the education of those who were called upon to rule and lead others had to be the broadest and most general, started to give way gradually to the counter-influence in favor of specialized education during the last three centuries, along with the progress in science. In Britain, however, the generalist tradition was given a rejuvenation of life in the seventeenth century mainly through the influence of John Locke.

Locke's ideas on a gentleman's education had great influence on British education. He emphasized general knowledge and education and especially moral and political knowledge. Thus, he suggested that areas which more immediately belong to the gentleman's education are those which treat of virtue and vice and of civil society and the arts of Government, and will also take in law and history.²

Locke's propagation of the ideal of a gentleman or generalist, therefore, stopped the driving forces which were against a purely general education and provided an educational foundation for the breeding of the lay minister and the general administrators.

During the eighteenth century, the British government, marked by the enlargement and reform of the administrative structure (decentralization) and the development

of modern political parties, created more administrative and political responsibilities for the Minister who, therefore, had to seek assistance. This assistance came from individuals who spoke the same general language and who finally formed the general administrators.

In 1854, the Northcote-Trevelyan Report³ recommended a division of the service into intellectual and routine work. The university graduates were to be recruited for intellectual and nongraduates for routine work.

During the last decades of the nineteenth century, and especially the early 1900s, attention was diverted to the recommendations made by the Northcote-Trevelyan Report. After World War I, the British Civil Service established the Administrative, Executive, and Clerical Classes. University education was identified with the Administrative Class, and secondary school with the Executive Class, and a lower level of education with the Clerical Class.

Since in this study we are concerned with the higher echelons of administration, the Clerical Class, which consists of individuals who perform routine clerical jobs such as filing and keeping accounts and records,⁴ will not be considered in this dissertation. Attention will thus be focused mainly on the Administrative Class which is responsible for policy making and the higher

ranks of the Executive Class which serves as advisors on policies.

The Administrative Class

The Administrative Class represents the highest class of civil servants in the British administrative system. With regard to this class, du Sautoy writes:

. . . the higher ranks of which, namely the Permanent Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries, and Undersecretaries, are advising ministers and planning the coordination of government activities.⁵

Other positions in the Administrative Class include Assistant Secretaries, in charge of divisions of ministries, Principals, who are in charge of particular sections, and Assistant Principals, who represent the lowest grade in the Administrative Class. Assistant Principals are staffed by the new entrants, either by direct entry from university graduates, by examination or by promotion from below.⁶

Tasks of the British Administrative Class center around intellectual and literary processes. Their work consists mainly of processing policy reports which often bear upon parliamentary discussion or ministerial policy.⁷ When entering the Administrative Class, they are involved in reading and writing reports, and filing records. After performing these tasks for years, and following a gain in general knowledge, they are promoted to higher positions, and thus become department heads, and serve as advisors

on policy and consultant to the Minister. This indicates that the British administrative system emphasizes training on the job. Such an emphasis is further supported by Sisson who suggests that administrators are thought of as best trained by apprenticeship, and administration is thought of as something only to be learned by doing it.⁸

Self writes:

The British administrator is still selected for general qualities of intelligence and character. His university degree will often be in a sphere of knowledge quite unrelated to his subsequent work It has long been a point of pride within the service that administration is then learnt pragmatically on the job⁹

With regard to the administrative generalists' educational background, Pfiffner and Presthus mention:

A liberal arts education with a major in political science, including courses in public administration, prepares one to be an administrative generalist. This means that he is equipped with a certain flexibility of mind and ability to think objectively, to be at home with a wide variety of problems Above all, he has some basic knowledge about how to coordinate diverse people, groups, and projects.¹⁰

A review of the literature indicates that in the Administrative Class functions do not depend on any single form of technical experience and that the specialist, therefore, has no particular pertinence and advantage for this sort of work. The generalist dimension is emphasized, however; other dimensions are also stressed. These dimensions include: a broad knowledge based on educational background and experience obtained on the job.

In addition to knowledge and experience, Self indicates that a person in the Administrative Class should have a number of other dimensions. These include: flexibility of attitudes, ease of relationships, and smoothness of decision making.¹¹ Other dimensions of effective executives include having a liberal education augmented by certain personal qualities of character, such as pose and leadership, which provide the best basis for dealing with complex problems of modern government and industry.¹² Wilkinson suggests that an effective executive should have all-around ability "including personality, power of leadership and keenness for games."¹³ He states, "A boy who, though not brilliant, is a good all-around type with character and sense of responsibility is likely to be an acceptable candidate."¹⁴ The Northcote and Trevelyan report indicates that possession of sufficient independence, character, ability, and experience, ability to advise, assist, and to some extent influence superiors, constitutes dimensions of effective administrators.¹⁵

Theoretically, all of the dimensions and qualifications of the Administrative Class are based upon a general and nonexpert qualification. The validity of this orientation is also substantiated by Ridley who states that a member of the Administrative Class is recruited for abilities which are a prerequisite of administration

in all fields. A good honors degree in any subject, combined with balanced judgment, a cooperative spirit, and initiative and leadership, should be reasonable evidence of intelligence of a general executive.¹⁶ Thus, leadership is viewed with regard to the person, his behavior, ability, dynamism, perceptions and attitude.¹⁷

In short, the available literature indicates that "education," "experience," "character," and "ability" are viewed as dimensions or qualifications for an effective executive in the British system with its orientation toward viewing administration as an art and the administrator as a generalist.

The Executive Class

The second class in the British civil service is the Executive Class, which encompasses professionals and experts who carry out the work of different specialist branches of the service, and advise the Administrative Class on policy matters.

The difference between the Administrative Class and the Executive Class is basically that the former formulates policy and the latter carries it out.¹⁸

The Executive Class consists of the middle grade of the service. The positions in the Class include: Head of Major Executive Establishment, Principal Executive Officer, Senior Chief Executive Officer, Chief Executive

Officer, Senior Executive Officer, Higher Executive Officer, and Executive Officer.¹⁹ Their primary functions vary from one ministry to another and require the ability to deal with matters which are not entirely routine and demand the exercise of "judgment, initiative and resources."²⁰

The duties of the Executive Class, according to Ridley,

. . . comprise the placing of Government contracts for a vast range of equipment and supplier, for research and development, and for building and civil engineering works; the control and issue of stores and the organization of transport; the work of Government accounting and the internal auditing functions of Government Departments; and a wide range of case work arising from the interpretation and application of law and regulations. The development of the Welfare state and the creation of large local office organizations have involved the Executive Class in a vital role in social administration and have placed it in direct contact with the general public. In the Departments concerned with the trade and industry and with the oversight of nationalized industries, members of the Executive Class have become increasingly involved with the economic and industrial life of the country. With the widening of Government responsibilities, it is the Executive Class which has provided the link between Whitehall and the community.²¹

To perform these duties and functions effectively, the members of the Executive Class, in addition to professional, scientific, technical, judgmental and initiative dimensions, should have interest in knowledge and learning in a particular field of human activity, interest in setting for themselves a high standard of intellectual and

ethical integrity in the service of the community, and a great interest in and an aptitude for their vocation.²²

In short, the Executive Class seems to be mainly organized for expert and specialized functions which are supportive to the Administrative Class. The generalists in the Administrative Class have overall responsibility for policy making, whereas the specialists, as a member of the Executive Class, serve as expert advisors to the generalists.

The Dimensions of the United States' Executives

In the United States, civil service became a reality in 1883 with the passage of the Pendleton Act. The administrative machinery which was established was a Civil Service Commission rather than an executive department or agency under the direct control of the President.²³

As a new nation, the United States concentrated right from the start on developing its natural resources. When the principal goal was settled, a premium was laid on those who could move towards it. The practical specialist, and in particular the engineer, became the national hero in the United States.

The inclination toward pragmatism and specialization was revitalized during the early part of the twentieth century by the rising idea of Scientific Management. Prior

to and during the scientific management era, the private enterprise played a crucial role in the task of development in the United States. The private entrepreneur and the engineer in collaboration built up the structure of American industry. The entrepreneur, having the functions of owner as well as manager, was prepared to consult with and take advice from the engineer. This continuous association of the two brought about mutual understanding as well as appreciation. It was thus characteristic of the United States of America that the first great writer on Scientific Management was Fredrick Taylor, a former engineer. It was characteristic, too, of America that for quite some time the scientific management movement was in the hands of engineers. The precedent was also firmly laid down in a manager.

American government in its early stages did not employ many scientists, but when it started recruiting them in large numbers in this century, it had before itself a well-established precedent in industry of grooming them for management. Thus, in the United States, the majority of political appointees such as Undersecretaries, Assistant Secretaries, and other career administrators and Bureau Heads are essentially specialists with an education in law or the applied sciences.

In the following, roles, functions and dimensions of executives for both the political appointees and career

administrators in the United States will be considered. First, the Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries, and second, the career administrators' case will be discussed.

The Political Appointees

Appointive positions in the federal government of the United States cover a wide range of activities and responsibilities, but those at the undersecretary and assistant secretary level are a relatively coherent group. Those who fill them are identified with the party and the administration of the President they serve. They are presumed to speak for the Secretary and the administration, and are expected to give leadership to the government. Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries, to a large extent, share with the department and agency heads the functions of political leadership in the executive branch.²⁴

To perform these roles and functions, a special utilization of individuals, who have some unusual assortment of qualities, is an essential requirement. Considering that Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries are generally not career government executives and are in charge of a position for a limited period of time, they should possess experience and specialized background. Mann and Doig indicate that it has been a common practice for some time to recruit men with a reasonable mastery of their subject for specific posts in the Treasury and

Justice Departments.²⁵ This specialized dimension is also a requirement for other Departments, including Defense, Commerce,²⁶ State, and Labor.

Other than the specialized dimensions, other dimensions have been considered as important requirement.

Appleby, discussing the top-level executives' qualifications, categorizes these qualities into three broad dimensions, namely, "the quality of philosophy," "the quality of governmental sense," and "the quality of public-relations or political sense."²⁷ By the quality of philosophy he means, "a capacity to see public policy in tens of thousands of different actions and to relate these actions to each other in terms of public and government interest."²⁸ This suggests that they should have an ability to integrate issues and matters of concern. The second quality is governmental sense, which is:

. . . the ingrained disposition to put the public interest first and thus to recognize the great, essential, and pervasive difference that distinguishes public administration from the management of private.²⁹

Related to the governmental sense is the third quality, which is public-relations or political sense. This quality:

. . . involves, on the one hand, an appreciation of the necessity for government officials and government action to be exposed to the citizens and the public affected by them and on the other, an ability to anticipate probable popular reaction and make allowance for it. It also includes the capacity to act swiftly in introducing minor administrative adjustments when such

action will relieve public irritation and the ability to sense major political shifts in the early stages of their development and gradually to modify the program of the agency accordingly.³⁰

With regard to the dimensions needed for Political Appointees, Mann and Doig state:

Regardless of the functions an assistant secretary or undersecretary performs for any one assignment, he can never afford to overlook the political nature of his role as a government organization man. This means that as an efficient subcabinet officer, he should meet certain minimum--extremely stiff--general requirements.³¹

The general requirements, emphasized by Mann and Doig, include: a high capacity to master and understand complex programs; skills which are effective in a large organization; being acceptable to party officials, important interest groups, and certain congressional leaders; having a charismatic appearance; and having integrity as a person.³²

Literature reviewed indicates that the specialized qualifications still dominate the main dimension for Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries, however, there is a trend toward demanding more generalized dimensions for effective performance.

The Career Administrators

The career administrators' roles require more specialization than those of the Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries, because their job is to keep the

Government operating as effectively as possible at all times, and more importantly, because they have the primary function of execution.

The specialization of career civil servants is very much emphasized in the government and is apparent in the literature. Carson and Paul state that three of every ten civil servants who serve in the upper echelons of the federal career service practice a profession, and are physical scientists, life scientists, actuaries, engineers, and lawyers.³³ Warner, Van Riper, Martin and Collins suggest that "Government at the higher levels is a world dominated by professionally trained men who have gone through a long period of specialization."³⁴

The picture of the higher civil service of the United States, therefore, is one which puts a premium on individuals whose dimensions of effectiveness within the administrative system require specialist competence as a prerequisite to administrative functions, responsibilities, and roles.

An executive in the position of higher civil service, such as a program manager who is a link between the permanent staff and undersecretaries and assistant secretaries and who serves as bureau chief, office head, and division director,³⁵ needs to be well prepared for the role which is complex and covers a wide area of

responsibilities. He is looked upon as an advisor to the superior in conferences and meetings involving the superior and others from either inside or outside the agency.³⁶ He serves the superior as an administrator who devotes time to see, for example, that the subordinates are effectively selected, trained, and supervised, and that funds are properly disbursed. An executive is usually held responsible by his superior for maintaining harmonious relations with other governmental agencies, with special interest groups, and with the Congress--its members and its committees."³⁷

Analyses of federal executives reveal that other than the aforementioned roles and functions, they are engaged in a continual effort with their subordinates in planning, in periodically taking stock of accomplishments, in appraising methods and procedures, and thus in gaining concurrence on improvements. The executive must understand and communicate a rich understanding of issues and technology. What he actually does involves the grit and grime of substantive problem-solving. Yet, he must participate so as to better equip his staff members to handle problems with which they will cope. He has the function of continuing coordination with his peers in other agencies, the resolution of differences among them, and recurring attempts to reach consensus on issues that affect them.

He has the responsibility to be available as a source of information and advice, likewise he is responsible for the prestige his presence may bring to his agency. In an effort to be effective, he plays the role of a persuader, a negotiator, and a representative.³⁸

In a study, Smith indicates that out of sixty-three bureau chiefs, twenty-six were trained as engineers, scientists or technicians, nine were economists, eight were lawyers, and the rest came from administrative or business backgrounds.³⁹ The study presents the very clear conclusion that, with a few exceptions, bureau chiefs were in these jobs because of their education and specialties.

In a study, Warner and his colleagues indicated that from a sample of 7,640 career civil servants in higher grades, 78 per cent were university graduates. Of these, one-third were graduates of engineering, one-fourth were graduates of the physical or biological sciences, one-sixth obtained university degrees in business and public administration and education, sixteen per cent were graduates in the behavioral sciences, about nine per cent had degrees in humanities, and the rest had pre-law or pre-medical degrees.⁴⁰

A further study by Warner et al. showed that of career civil service executives who participated in the study, 9.3 per cent studied humanities, 15.7 per cent

behavioral sciences, 23.4 per cent physical and biological sciences, and 47.6 per cent applied fields including engineering.⁴¹ Another significant finding of the study is that political executives also concentrated heavily (33.1 per cent) in the applied fields.

In a study of 16,000 executives and professionals of the higher civil service, Stanley indicated that, from those who were college graduates, 24 per cent were in engineering, 21.9 per cent in law, 14.1 per cent in the social sciences, 13.4 in physical sciences, and the rest were distributed among business, biological sciences, education and other fields.⁴²

From the above-mentioned studies and a number of others (Corson, 1952; Corson and Paul, 1966; Price, 1965), it is quite apparent that in the United States specialist competence is regarded as a prerequisite dimension to administrative efficiency and effectiveness, especially for Career Administrators.

Specialization, however, is not the only dimension of effective executives. Specialists, according to Corson, must possess other dimensions such as the ability to formulate policies which will govern the entire nation. Since their concern is comprehensive and complex, they must be capable of interpreting and reinterpreting their plans and policies constantly. They must be capable of functioning

effectively within the arena of politics. They must be capable of popular leadership and be able to coordinate and manage simultaneously the work of numerous organizational units. They must have the vision and skill that enables them to stimulate the minds and liberate the energies of the individuals who make up these organizational units. They must also be able to think in terms of public policy and to anticipate the effects of a governmental action. They must have an ingrained disposition to put the public interest first. And finally, they must have a sense of public relations or political sense.⁴³

Stanley indicates that when executives and professionals of the higher civil service were asked about the factors that contributed to success, they replied that mental qualities as well as analytical keenness, depth of judgment, and imagination are important. They also mentioned that technical experience and training, energy, drive, willingness to work hard and long, and ability to communicate and to work well with others by dedication to public service are of crucial importance.⁴⁴ Thus, in addition to specialization, which is the most important dimension and qualification in the administrative system of the United States, there are other dimensions and qualifications which are viewed as crucial for effectiveness in the United States' administrative system.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 2

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CHAPTER 3

THE PAST ADMINISTRATIVE ENVIRONMENT OF IRAN

Since this study is not mainly concerned with the historical perspective of administration, but rather with the future administrative phenomenon, the evolutionary approach is used to provide a comprehensive perspective for the present and future administrative environment.

To analyze and understand the future, it is appropriate to start from the period in which the administrative system in the Government of Iran started to build its administrative infrastructure. Thus, the starting evolutionary point is the second half of the nineteenth century.

During that period, under the Qajar dynasty, the establishment of separate ministries took place, however, since the scope of government functions and overall activity was limited, the number of ministries was few.¹ The role of government became gradually complex with the technological, economic, and industrial developments taking place in Western Europe and the United States. The Government became increasingly cognizant of economic and

societal demands as well as social problems. Thus, accordingly, the national goals and objectives broadened in scope and increased in number. To fulfill the goals and objectives, the numbers of ministries and government organizations and agencies increased to meet the challenge.

But nevertheless,

Administration under the Qajar dynasty was largely concerned with the needs of the royal family and the court. Public revenues became a part of the Shah's treasury. Service to the people of the country was not a guiding principle in the performance of administration. Administrative organization and practices were highly personalized and, because of the weakness of the Shah as well as the strength of a number of tribes, administration was decentralized.²

During that period, the Government was unable to function properly because of lack of leadership and existing incompetency. In this regard, an Iranian observer states that the government was nevertheless powerless in the discharge even of its normal functions because of lack of the proper administrative institutions and organization, and domination by a selfish ruling class.³ Domination of ruling class and nepotism were very much among the principle characteristics of the Qajar administration. Practically most of the top government posts were occupied by "an oligarchy of the sons and relatives of the Shah, who looked upon office as a means for self-enrichment."⁴

In the late nineteenth century, because of corrupt, selfish attitudes, and incapacibilities of government top executives, the Iranian condition was characterized as stagnant and backward. It was in such conditions of neglect, idleness, and procrastination that the Iranian constitutional movement took place. Thus, the autocratic and absolute authoritarianism was to give way to the rule and constraints of law and popular consent and participation.

Ironically, with the approval of the Constitution on December 3, 1906, and the creation of the Majlis, the ruling class and aristocrats from various provinces gained new instruments to impose their power upon the people.

This exercise was continued up to the early 1920s. At that time, people became increasingly aware and dissatisfied with the incapability, incompetency and corruption of the Government, and felt a resentment toward the extraneous political pressure and economic control.

After Reza Shah attained power, he "reformed, modernized and centralized the government and administration, collecting all reins of authority in Tehran."⁵ The centralization took place because of loss of control of provincial government, lack of mutual and national goals and objectives, and nationalistic objectives of Reza Shah.⁶

Reza Shah preserved the appearance of parliamentary democracy as prescribed by the Constitution, and for

the first time, exercised some of the administrative provisions of the Constitution. "On December 12, 1922, the fourth Majlis enacted the first law regulating civil service in Iran."⁷

The first law which was based upon Western models and the generalist approach to administration instituted age, nationality, general education, and character dimensions for expected civil servants. Similar to both the British and American systems, competitive entrance examination was to be the principal criterion for recruitment of civil servants. But, as the activities of the government increased and became complex and as the civil service grew, a special training for public servants was demanded. Thus, in early 1932, "the Ministry of Interior was empowered to establish special classes for the training of civil servants."⁸ To promote the idea of specialization, a law was passed in January, 1933 which waived the customary three months of trial service without pay in the case of the graduates of the special classes.⁹

During the late 1930s and early 1940s, the administrative system of Iran expanded both in quantitative and qualitative perspectives. Since Reza Shah had come to power by his own effort and endeavor and had no large and influential dynastic family whose members could lead a section or a province of the country, he depended upon the

individuals who did not come from royal family. Thus, royal princes were not at the top of the ministries, and the overall civil service personnel had little resemblance to the previous civil service personnel of the Qajar period. Educated individuals from the middle-class socioeconomic status usually constituted the higher echelon of administration during the reign of Reza Shah.

During the eighteen years that Reza Shah was in power, he achieved a great deal toward building a constructive and more responsive administration, and was cognizant of the significant and determining role of the Government in development. Under his leadership, the central administrative system played a very active role in all aspects of the Iranian development. During his reign, education was considered as one of the dimensions for recruiting the civil servants. At the beginning, general educational background was emphasized, and as the development and change became more complex and manifold, attention was given to more specialized educational qualifications.

In sum, Reza Shah developed a harmonized national administrative system obligated to perform the governmental affairs within the framework and context of the Iranian Constitution. The new administrative system improved greatly, but nonetheless, some of the prevailing socio-cultural characteristics combined with rapid change and

political turmoil did not allow a complete reform of the administrative system.

During the 1940s and early 1950s, the responsibilities of the government, compared to the 1930s, were of higher magnitude and thus required executives with thorough experience and background. Thus, although the administrative system had taken a relatively profound shape by the early 1930s, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the administrative system was still incapable of taking a tremendous responsibility, which was greatly demanded by Iran's condition at that time.

In a report by Overseas Consultants, Inc., a number of problems were identified and recommendations were made regarding improvements in the government administration. Two of the administrative problems that were identified included:

High degree of centralization of authority
and concentration of activities in the capital;
Relative scarcity of trained and qualified
manpower within the administration.¹⁰

In an effort to eliminate centralization and train individuals for Government, the need for an educational institution in public administration was brought to the attention of officials of the Iranian Government and the University of Tehran by the American experts. In June, 1954, the University of Southern California signed a contract with the Foreign Operation Administration providing

for assistance to the University of Tehran to strengthen the educational, research and consulting programs of the University in the field of public administration.¹¹ After a thorough study, in January, 1955, the Institute was officially opened. The specific goals of the Institute included:

The provision of service to ministries and agencies in the fields of education, training, research and publications, and consulting assistance in the science of organization, administration, and management.

The development of a reservoir of trained personnel within the ministries and agencies, as well as within the framework of the university, which in turn, will provide and expand these direct services on a continuing basis.

The development of a corps of collegiate-level personnel equipped to assume the work of the Institute and continue it under University sponsorship.

The development of a general awareness of the need for and value of such management skills, techniques, education, training, and service which the Institute is prepared to offer. This means the creation of a new field of knowledge and Persian literature in administration and management, as well as a broad applied research program.¹²

The first group began classes in a graduate program leading to the Master of Arts Degree in Administration.¹³ The Public and Business Administration studies later included four parts: Certificate Program, Licentiate Program, Master's Degree Program, and Doctoral Program. The Certificate and Master's programs were the responsibility of the Law Faculty but included options which permitted specialization in the field of administration.¹⁴

The flexibility of arrangements provided new educational opportunities for both public and private officials and employees.

During the period of the late 1950s and early 1960s, about thirty Iranian Government officials and university professors studied public administration at the University of Southern California and mostly received doctorate degrees in public administration. The purpose of this on-campus program was to obtain knowledge and academic experience and use them as a solid foundation for the reform and improvement of the administrative system in Iran.

Another significant event which took place in this era was the agreement signed on April 21, 1956 by the Iranian Government and the United States Operations Mission to Iran.¹⁵ The agreement called for a project for administrative reform in almost all major aspects of government administration. "The American experts with their Iranian counterparts began a systematic but rather fruitless effort for improvement at all levels, including the Prime Minister's Bureau."¹⁶ Nonetheless, one of the outcomes of this joint project was to recognize the significance of the deputy minister's role. Subsequently, "on April 2, 1958, a bill was passed which established positions of Permanent Undersecretary in the Prime Minister's Bureau and in each of the ministries."¹⁷ In addition to

. . . introduce continuity in the direction and supervision of administrative functions and to attempt to diminish political influence in the selection and appointment of officials charged with top-level administrative responsibilities,¹⁸

the importance of the role of the deputy minister was appreciated and, more significantly, delegation of authority and responsibility which is the crux and fundamental principle of the decentralization process started to bloom.

Impact of Sociocultural Factors on the Past Administrative System of Iran

The aforementioned endeavors, in addition to other governmental efforts for progress, were impeded because of severe inflexibility of the government executives and other prevailing sociocultural characteristics. Some of those characteristics are still in existence in the present administrative environment, and there is a struggle by the more educated and younger generation of executives to overcome the impeding bottlenecks in the administration.

The past administrative environment of Iran has been characterized by Benedick,¹⁹ Gable,²⁰ and Untereiner,²¹ as one in which the influence of the history, family and religion has been conducive to the emergence of a number of behaviors which reduce the effectiveness of executives.

Considering that the administrative environment is an aspect of the entire sociocultural ecology, a number of sociocultural factors considered to be of importance

in understanding the dynamics of the past Iranian administrative environment is discussed under the following headings: the impact of history, the impact of family, individualism, and subjectivity.

There is no doubt that such an analysis involves generalities of a group which is not homogeneous. However, in studying the institution of family, history, and other sociocultural aspects, we find that there is an identifiable pattern of sociocultural factors, which can be studied for their implications on administrative processes and executive effectiveness in the Government of Iran.

Sociocultural factors correspond to the dominant human attitudes, values, beliefs, and the way they influence the motivation, behavior, and performance of individuals in a given society.

The Impact of History

It was noted by Benedick that the Iranian society is enormously dominated by a sense of history and that Iranians tend to look backward far more than they view the future.²² This characteristic was in line with the past time orientation prevalent in Iran and had an aversive impact upon long-range planning. The executives had a concern for short-term profits and outcomes to the detriment of long-term planning. Most of the executives believed in a traditional philosophy of immediate advantage and

turnover and had little concern for long-term planning. Thus, long-term commitment had little positive value for the Iranian executive, and the personal qualities associated with long-range commitment such as dependability, efficiency, patience, and accuracy, likewise, had minimal positive value in Iranian interpersonal relations and government action.

The Impact of Family

The institution of family has long been a determining element in the life of the Iranians. It was suggested by Gable that the Iranians' traits were a product of the family with other institutions reinforcing rather than altering family influences.²³

According to Gable, the role of the father as head of the family fostered prolonged, dependent relationships because he assumed a responsibility for the welfare of his family members. Consequently, attitudes were developed that limited the initiative and potentiality of individuals.²⁴

The authoritarian role performed by the father in the family was usually conducive to emergence of two kinds of ambivalent attitudes and behaviors in the child. First, a dominating behavior was developed which was conducive to an uncooperative behavior. Second, the dependency on

the family and especially on the father reinforced administrative patterns of avoiding responsibility and postponing decisions. The consequence of this behavior was that decisions were made by the top executive, who was usually unaware of the problems and did not have adequate information.

Not only was cooperation limited on an individual level, but it was also circumscribed at interdepartmental and interorganizational level; even when cooperation existed between individuals or organizations, it was closely guarded and limited to narrow and rather specific areas.

Such an authoritarian and paternalistic family orientation had an important impact on how one perceived superiors and subordinates. It led to dominant patterns of administrative authoritarianism and control by superiors who usually viewed subordinates as incapable of making decisions and carrying out policies.

Individualism

The patterns of attitudes and actions toward other colleagues and people tended to be much more individualistic than group-oriented. Gable with regard to Iranian individualism stated that this individualism was unique and lacked a strong emphasis on personal integrity.²⁵

Untereiner noted that a belief in freedom was missing and personal responsibility, initiative and independence were not encouraged.²⁶

Due to this predominance of the individualistic personality pattern, the average Iranian executive was not highly effective as a working associate or in developing patterns of cooperative and group effort. He usually viewed his superiors with a mixture of awe and fear and his predominant concern was to keep the superior feeling favorable toward him by being obedient, ingratiating or at least appearing to be obedient. If he disagreed with the superior, he was likely not to say so, because in the Iranian culture, frankness and directness in communication was not expected from the subordinate toward the superior.

The impact of such individualistic and noncooperative attitude and characteristic of the past executives on government activities and national development has been profound. The development that needed a sense of community and cooperativeness, thus, progressed very slowly.

Subjectivity

In light of the family orientation, the impact of history, and the overall culture, the average Iranian tended to be more people- and consideration-oriented than object- or task-oriented.

According to Gable, the average Iranian viewed life in a highly subjective fashion²⁷ and this colored his perception in a variety of ways. For example, criticism was usually perceived as personal and, therefore, felt as much more offensive and insulting. Iranians, on the average, did not perceive criticism and evaluation in a constructive and productive manner, and overlooked the self-corrective element of criticism. Usually, this was conducive to frictions and divisions in friendships and collegial relationships, and reduced the longevity of relationships and cohesion in groups.

The consequence of subjectivity for administration was that government organizations were unsystematic, lacking in rational structure and highly personal. Administrative practices and procedures as well as recruitment and training were based, to a large extent, on nepotism and favoritism, and objectivity did not seem to guide policy or administrative procedures.

The Characteristics of the Past Administrative Environment

A number of noteworthy characteristics prevailed in the past Iranian administrative system. Some of these features have disappeared and some are still in existence.

Administrative Centralization

In the past, considerable centralization characterized the administration of Iran. Administrative structures had pyramidal shapes and they were not based upon a rational division of work and systematic identification of differing levels of responsibility. The communication system was one way and from the top down. Authority was concentrated at the apex of the pyramid and thus did not allow the occupants at the lower levels of the organization hierarchy to make decisions. Delegation of authority was rarely practiced either because the subordinates were unable and unqualified to carry out the decision-making process, or the executives were ambivalent of losing their control and prestige. In short, the participative approach to decision making in which a leader delegates a decision to his subordinates was rarely in existence.

Administrative Inflexibility

Another notable characteristic of the past Iranian administrative system was inflexibility and rigidity, which was partially attributed to the emphasis on formal procedures and legalism. Executives usually perceived of administration as an application of the formally stated law that allowed them little interpretation and discretion. They conceived of their job as one which required him to reply to questions about law.

Bureaucratic inflexibility, which resulted from centralization of the administrative system, was aggravated further by the formal framework in which government officials worked. Administration was complex and complicated as a consequence of this formal orientation. One of the outcomes of this orientation was formal communications which demanded everything to be in written form for the purpose of records. The unnecessary formal communication was usually conducive to delaying progress plans and misinterpreting the contents of the written communication.

In short, following formal procedures and legalism exclusively led not only to creating a rigid and inflexible administrative system, but also served as an impediment in development projects.

Administrative Laxity

Centralization of the administrative system and administrative inflexibility and rigidity were joined by administrative laxity. Due to centralization and inflexibility, and for the purpose of creating more security, high government executives usually avoided responsibility. The laxity of superiors made it possible for subordinates and low-ranking government executives to avoid responsibility. The consequence of this avoidance was delay in the decision-making process and slowness in the conduct of the administrative activities and procedures.

Avoiding responsibility accompanied by unwillingness to delegate authority by top government executives developed a proclivity to bypass the formal chain of command and to contact the top executive directly. This practice led the top government executives to spend time on some unimportant matters and kept them away from the more significant role of policy formulation and strategic decision-making.

In short, in addition to the aforementioned characteristics of the past administrative environment, the administration was also characterized by irrationality and lack of objective basis for administrative decisions. Subjectivity rather than objectivity often seemed to be dominating the process of formulation of policies and procedures and the overall decision-making process.

Decisions were usually made based on inadequate and unsophisticated information. Research did not seem to be of interest either in policy formulation or planning. Thus, factual data rarely played a significant role in the process of decision-making and strategy and policy formulation.

The Characteristics of the Past Executives

To the aforementioned discussions we should add that the executives of the past usually coerced their

people, which consequently created conflict, apathy, and resistance. They were not educated for administrative positions and if they were educated, they had only a vague notion of administration and management. As it is true of the generalist executives of the British system, the past executives did not view administration as a managerial technique but rather a quasi-political activity that did not depend on any single form of technical expertise. This indicates that, unlike the specialists in the American administrative system, the past executives were not concerned with the specialized knowledge of procedures in administration. They usually distrusted new concepts and techniques and had an unfavorable attitude toward the scientific method for problem-solving and decision making. Therefore, they relied very heavily on intuition and judgment, which was quite often colored by pure emotion or mysticism. They were inflexible and struggled to preserve old methods and procedures. They cared little for their subordinates and their problems, and human relations, as a positive factor in job performance, was not of their concern. Delegation of authority was seldom viewed as a form of job performance, rather, jobs were performed by measures of intimidation.

The past executives were usually not devoted to their work and conceived their own welfare and interest

as the most important in the organization, and expected personal loyalty from subordinates rather than organizational loyalty.

In conclusion, the administrative system of a nation, as was previously mentioned, is influenced by many environmental factors. The values, attitudes, beliefs and behavior of its people; the economic, political and social systems; the religious and educational backgrounds, all incorporate and form a culture which in turn surrounds and affects the administrative system.

With a strong and deep cultural background, Iran was not able to overcome the administrative impediments completely. A tradition of non-rational, authoritarian attitudes and behavior prevailed in Iran leading to an inflexible and rigid administrative system. These characteristics of the past administrative system incorporated with those of the past executive, such as subjectivity, pessimism, traditionalism, and paternalism, worked against development and progress. It was fortunate that the Government became cognizant of such impeding factors and adopted measures to rectify them through administrative reform.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 3

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CHAPTER 4

THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATIVE ENVIRONMENT OF IRAN

In the early 1960s, the movement for reform and change in all aspects of development received new impetus, spirit and vitality by the support and leadership of His Imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shahanshah Aryamehr of Iran. In January of 1963, under the White Revolution, which later became known as the Shah and People's Revolution, His Imperial Majesty suggested a series of far-reaching reforms for a national referendum. The referendum was conducted on January 6, 1963, and the six points of reform¹ were overwhelmingly approved by the people. When those six reforms were carried out, three more points were added.²

The six points of the Shah and People's Revolution, incorporated with unprecedented and novel economic and social progress and change, created a more centralized and complex administrative environment. To manage the existing change effectively and to eliminate red tape and corruption, an increasing need for competent and devoted executives, for new administrative and management procedures

and techniques, and for development of philosophies compatible with the goals and objectives of the Shah and People's Revolution became apparent.

To meet these new needs and demands, the Shahanshah, on October 6, 1967, announced three new points for the Revolution,³ of which the twelfth point was concerned with the administrative and educational revolution. In announcing this important point of the Shah and People's Revolution, the Shahanshah declared:

This point means that all the individuals who have a duty entrusted to them in the country's administrative and governmental organizations--no matter how small that duty might be, should try to perform it in utmost sincerity and conscientiousness and with a feeling of responsibility. Wasting time and red tape bureaucracy should leave our offices. Each official should know that his duty, first and foremost, is to hasten to perform the requests of the public. This includes the correct and unbiased execution of administrative functions to facilitate and expedite the administration of the country's affairs. Public officials should not forget that it is the people who provide funds by paying taxes to pay their salaries.⁴

And with reference to administrative decentralization, HIM stated:

On the other hand, unjustified and excessive concentration of the affairs in the capital city should be ended and all the provinces and townships in the country should be given a chance for initiative and a bigger measure of responsibility in the affairs which concern them. It is even fitting that service in the various parts of the country should become complementary with tours of duty in the capital and other large cities.⁵

This pronouncement stressed the elimination of bureaucratic red tape, decentralization of government functions and planning the implementation of a thorough renovation of government ministries and affiliated organizations, and laid the foundation for an Administrative Reform Congress which was held in February, 1968 and was attended by delegates drawn from virtually every part of the country, representing private firms and institutions as well as the Government. After twelve days of deliberation, the Congress presented a set of resolutions which were conveyed to all government organizations throughout the country. The resolutions, among other things, sought an amendment to the civil service regulations, a better and more responsive financial deal for civil servants, elimination of red tape and redundant formalities, and application of principles of management and efficiency and training.⁶

As a permanent extension of the Congress, the Government established a high echelon council responsible for supervising the implementation of various reform programs. Permanent committees of administrative reform were also set up within each ministry and government organization in the provinces to continuously study and recommend means of increasing efficiency, improving the effectiveness of ministries and government agencies, expediting public affairs, and modifying the complex laws and regulations of the Government.

In years that followed, the Government, as was recommended, formulated various teams for evaluation and inspection of its ministries and organizations. Nonetheless, the activities and efforts of the government did not generate the results that were expected. As a result, objections and questions were raised by both the executives and the opponents of the government with regard to stagnation in the administrative part of the Shah and People's Revolution. The main objection and criticism was concerned with lack of progress in the administrative regulations⁷ and procedures, and lack of adherence to and compliance with the more responsible and respectable administrative practices. Thus, on October 29, 1973, the press and radio

publicized a new directive containing four points given to the government by the Shahanshah towards administrative reform. The importance given the directive by the government and the new media was indicative of the extent of such shortcomings in the government administration.⁸

In conveying the Royal Directives to the Prime Minister, it was stated that

at a time when a major development plan is being carried out and the world economic situation is most unsettled, it has become more imperative to economize in expenditures and to observe honesty and integrity in all affairs of the state.⁹

Thus, four Royal Directives were given to all officials and employees of the government including ministers and top executives. The implications of the Royal Directives were as follows:

(1) Some senior officials in government ministries, agencies and companies, and even lesser officials in key positions, have developed their personal private business for their own gain; (2) some government appointments were based not on personal qualifications or merit but on favoritism gained through influence-peddlers; (3) some officials have not been scrupulously observing the rules and regulations concerning government transactions through tender bidding; or have completely abandoned tendering in government deals, thus dispensing favors or making personal gain; and (4) some government officials have been paying out money to newspapers in order to gain their support or praise, or to avert their criticism.¹⁰

The Prime Minister, conveying the message, told the cabinet:

Every government employee must develop his public spirit and dedication, and must be prepared to accept some restrictions on personal and material gain. Furthermore, future appointments must be based solely on qualifications and merits, not family connections or favoritism.¹¹

What was apparent from statements made by the high government leaders was a total support and encouragement at the higher echelon of government for an administrative reform, which was long overdue. In spite of this support for administrative reform, many problems and impediments were apparent. The Government, cognizant of the difficulty and significance of such an administrative reform, in an administration which is extremely culture-bound, continued to support and inspire the process of the revolution. Therefore, in November, 1974, the Government of Iran asked the Development and Resources Corporation (D and R), an American consulting firm, to undertake

a diagnostic review of Iran's public sector to discover its capacity to meet the dynamic and challenging goals and objectives and to recommend administrative reforms and modifications to the Government of Iran. Since that time, D and R, in collaboration with the State Organization for Administration and Employment (SOAE), has been strenuously working with other ministries and government organizations and agencies to bring them the counsel that is essentially needed for the amelioration of the present administrative environment. The consultation provided by D and R has been in all aspects of administrative and managerial functions such as: organizational structure, personnel management, employee compensation, planning and budgeting, financial management, manpower requirements and development, training and education, decentralization, regionalization, and local government.

Since the request by the Government of Iran, D and R administrative and management experts have evaluated many ministries and government organizations, and have pro-
pounded various proposals to constructively modify the administrative system within the context of the major government policy of decentralization of administrative functions. In the following, some of the significant proposals which have been recommended by the D and R experts, in regard to reforming the administrative structures and practices, are considered:

Delegation of authority for operational decision making to the management level nearest to the public to be served, with delegation withheld only for purposes of planning, coordinating, supervising and evaluating.

Decentralization of national operations with requisite managerial staff and financial resources to provincial, district and municipal levels.

Dispersal of concentrated national operations from Tehran to other urban centers.

Devolution of power to local government entities to secure meaningful citizen participation and local administrative involvement.

Formulation of Regional Development Authorities, on a selective basis, independent of existing governmental jurisdictions and with multiple development goals.

Deconcentration of government activities through broader but more precisely defined enterprises, corporations, or institutions which can take advantage of marketplace conditions and independent management.

Assigning of policy and standard setting, coordination and evaluation functions to central agencies to support the delegation of operational authority, and simplification of current rigid controls on program performance through relaxation of centralized constraints.

Government reorganization to reflect an environment in which new conditions necessitate change and where reform opportunities can be fostered and promoted.

Design and administration of more effective means for translation of planned goals into programs and projects and for the monitoring of progress by accountable ministries.

Massive expansion of training efforts to increase the supply of qualified manpower for the public sector at all levels.

Critical inquiry into the deficiencies of higher education in meeting the public sector's needs for well-educated graduates in management and the professions.

Reorganization of the personnel management functions and initiation of new programs to revitalize the public service.

Reorganization of the critical importance of top administrators and high professionals through the design and creation of a special personnel system with appropriate salary, benefit, career development and recognition features.

Revision of compensation policies to permit greater involvement of and flexibility for operating managers in rate determination, to increase incentives for service outside Tehran, to match market competition through regularly collected wage and salary data, and to relate pay levels more closely to performance.

Revision of certain fringe benefits and the development of new incentives and recognition devices in order to attract and retain quality civil servants, encourage service outside Tehran and stimulate achievements in the nation's interest.

Generation of greater managerial capacity at top ministerial levels with appreciation of the administrative importance of the achievement of development goals and with commitment to change in the public sector.¹²

The D and R has been giving assistance to the government officials in the implementation process of the aforementioned recommendations, in the continuing exploration for novel modifications, and in evaluating progress and achievement in the administrative revolution. The D and R experts have been serving as monitors, expeditors, catalytic agents, and in some cases, as direct

consultants,¹³ but the actual implementations have been performed mainly by government officials with collaboration of other private and international experts.

It is evident that presently the Government of Iran is vigorously and energetically pursuing administrative reforms. As every administrative reform and organizational-development process need the support and commitment of top leadership, the administrative system of Iran has had that type of encouragement and devotion. Presently, energy, time, and money are being spent by the government to modify the prevailing public administrative structure, practices, and philosophies, which have not been totally responsive to the needs and requirements of present-day Iran and have been inadequate to cope with the country's rapid progress to a caliber that is conducive to the achievement of the national aspirations of the present Iran.

Transformation of the administrative system of such a country such as Iran with its strong cultural and traditional heritage is not an ordinary job, but rather a great challenge. One must realize that to change the administrative culture requires neither an empirical-rational nor a power-coercive strategy of change, but rather a normative-re-educative strategy,¹⁴ which emphasizes that change in a pattern of practice or action will

occur only as the individuals involved are brought to change their normative orientations to old patterns and develop commitments to new ones. The normative-re-educative process involves modifications in attitudes, values, skills, and relationships of people and is not solely concerned with changes in knowledge, information, or intellectual rationales for action and practice. This process of change cannot take place within a few years, rather, it is a long process of transformation which requires patience, devotion, loyalty, commitment, knowledge, creativity, and more importantly, understanding of administrative reform.

The Characteristics of the Present
Administrative Environment
of Iran

The period from 1963 to the present time has been an era of great significance to Iran and its history. The Shah and People's Revolution awakened and stimulated people to participate more democratically in the process of social, economic, political, and administrative development. Although some of the development programs started slowly, they received an impetus in 1973, when a dramatic change occurred in the affairs of the Iranian oil industry. Not only did Iran get the opportunity to completely manage and control all of her oil installation, but she also gained complete sovereignty and freedom of action

in production and export of her oil. Because of these conditions and the high estimated oil revenues of coming years, the Government of Iran reviewed its Fifth Development Plan and increased its capital investment and expanded its projects. Therefore, Iran got more financial and consequently economic power to try to ameliorate her condition and approach its aspirations to fulfill the high promise of her people.

Despite these important events and efforts, the administrative environment still possesses a number of characteristics which do not allow the progressive development plans to take place rapidly and effectively. In spite of these, comparative progress has been made, and it seems that the entire administrative environment will have a prosperous future, predominantly because of an emerging administrative flexibility and decentralization.

Administrative Flexibility

In the era since 1963, the administrative system has gone through a number of reforms and modifications which have contributed to a reduction in rigidity and the appearance of a higher degree of flexibility in the totality of public administration.

During this short period of time, some of the legal constraints and misinterpretations which had led to inflexibility were reformed. The modification efforts

have continued, and at the present time, many of the administrative rules, regulations, methods, and procedures are being studied for proper adjustments and revisions.

Since 1963, the education and overall knowledge of government servants have improved considerably. A large number of government officials who had received their education in various fields, especially public administration during the late 1950s and early 1960s, have joined the government ministries and organizations, bringing with them new modes of administrative thinking, practices and overall management philosophies, and have thus contributed to more flexibility in the entire administration. These executives have also created an atmosphere of initiation, participation, and decision making for other government officials at the lower echelons of the organizations.

From an organization structural point of view, there have been a number of revisions, redesigns, and even mergers in the organizational designs of ministries and government agencies. New ideas, such as project management and matrix organizational structure, have been considered and implemented. Four ministries have been merged into two. The Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Finance merged into the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, and the Ministry of Health united with the Ministry of Social Welfare, to create the Ministry of

Health and Social Affairs. By these mergers an effort is being made to eliminate some of the administrative redundancies prevailing in the system, allowing less bureaucratic red tape and delays.

In short, administrative flexibility is gradually replacing the administrative rigidity and inflexibility which existed in the past administrative environment of Iran. This flexibility has been concurrent with the gradual increase in the knowledge, education, and overall expertise of government officials, as well as understanding of fundamental theories of administration, management, and leadership by top government executives.

Administrative Decentralization

Since the Shah and People's Revolution, great progress has been made on many fronts in social, economic, political and administrative development. The economic boom of the early 1970s created a situation of simultaneous and rapid reforms and transformations in all aspects of the country. The consequences are evident: higher per capita income, better housing and living standards, higher educational aspirations, and, more significantly, development of a feeling of international pride, dignity, and self-esteem which was absent in Iranians for centuries.

The increased developments led to further centralization in the functions and responsibilities of the

central government and thus created an administrative over-centralization in the capital. This overcentralization in the capital created a large distance between the people and the government agencies and made the government less responsive to the needs of the people throughout the country. It led to inefficiencies in the command system, and created bottlenecks and delays in the government plans and programs and overall accomplishments.

The Government of Iran, realizing its high development goals and the limitations of overcentralization, adopted a new policy of administrative decentralization. It is noteworthy that a number of attempts had been made to bring about functional administrative decentralization prior to this, but such efforts had been ephemeral.

At the present time it is evident that the administrative system has been moving in a gradual and evolutionary fashion toward greater decentralization. Recently, a pronounced and emphasized move toward implementation of decentralization process, both in the general government departments and in certain of the functional ministries, has become apparent. More authority is being delegated to provincial governments (the Ostans) and the Governors General (the Ostandars) for decision making, and an effort is being made to strengthen the technical and administrative capacities of the administration of the provinces.

Other government ministries, such as the Ministry of Interior and government organizations such as the Plan and Budget Organization, have started to delegate more authority to their officials in different provinces to make appropriate decisions at the lower levels of operation.

In short, decentralization of administrative functions of the government is being implemented in various government ministries and organizations. This process will unquestionably take a long period of time and will encounter a number of problems. Nonetheless, decentralization is most certainly an indispensable process which must be implemented in the totality of the administration of Iran in an effort to overcome administrative overcentralization, which is ill-equipped in coping with the present economic and social changes taking place in Iran.

The Characteristics of the Present Executives

It is obvious that the present progress, development, and overall accomplishments of the recent years required executives with characteristics different from those of past executives. In the new administrative environment, the dimensions and qualifications of past executives are no longer functional. The total environment has been changing at an accelerated pace, requiring executives with more innovative and group-oriented characteristics.

More decisions are being made by more executives that influence the entire administration. Although the responsibility for decision rests with the head of the organization, the decision itself is the product of multiple tastes and judgment.

Education and especially knowledge play a fundamental role in the understanding of issues by the executives. Most executives are cognizant that knowledge and skill are the key to success and achievement, and that is why education is very much emphasized. Today, executives are comparatively more knowledgeable and skilled and somewhat more specialized than the past executives, both in national and international affairs.

With the complexity that has been brought about by progress and development, the executives have started to prepare themselves educationally by gaining more specialization in different areas.

The idea of the generalist executive, which was strongly emphasized during the past administrative environment, has been gradually disappearing and in turn the more specialized executives are gradually replacing the generalist executives. The past overconcentration on fields of law and political science has been vanishing and more attention is given to other disciplines such as public and business administration, engineering, education, and management.

The government has provided and facilitated the process of gaining specialization in these fields either by establishing colleges and universities in Iran or by conducting intensive programs and seminars. The government has also been offering scholarships, especially to those individuals who like to be specialized in a certain field. The program designed to produce more specialization has been intensified in recent years predominantly because administration has become more complex and multifaceted.

The present Government executives can thus be characterized as somewhat more specialized than the executives of the previous era with more capacity and capability in the conduction of important executive roles. The executives of today are comparatively younger, more educated, energetic, and interested in their work. Their appointments are not based solely on their social inheritance and personal connection, but rather based, to a larger extent than before, on their personal capacity and success. In this regard, Alimard and Elahi state:

. . . one of the most important changes in Iranian politics, at all levels of the political system, is this powerful trend toward elite recruitment based on individual achievement rather than social inheritance. Even though some individuals, due to their social [i.e., class] background, wealth or personal relations, may still occupy a few important positions of influence . . . despite this hold of the past, in the

mainstream of Iranian politics, property, birth and social class can no longer effectively compete with achievement as the major criterion for elite recruitment.¹⁵

The past individualistic characteristics are gradually replaced by a more people- and group-oriented attitude, which is within the contextual framework of the Government policy on decentralization.

In short, the present Government executives are going through a transitional stage. The change in the characteristics of the present executives seem to be more in accord with the contextual factors presently prevailing in the Government of Iran. The Iran of today is a nation state undergoing rapid transition and change, however, she is learning to adjust herself to the modernism, technological and industrial advancements, and all facets of development. This adjustment is evidenced by the changes that are made in organizational structure and Ministries and Government Organizations, in the type and formulation of Government policies, and in the overall changes that are taking place in the administration of the Government.

The present executives, compared to their counterparts in the past administrative environment, occupy substantially different roles in Ministries and Government Organization. Their role has become more complex and indeed critical in carrying out the crucial responsibilities. This has generally been conducive to an adjustment

in the executives' patterns of leadership behaviors, from a more authoritarian pattern to a more humanistic and participative approach.

In an effort to gain more insight and understanding into the dimensions of effective top executives in the future administrative environment of Iran, three studies were conducted by the author at three levels of the Government hierarchy, namely, levels of Directors General, Deputy Ministers, and Ministers. In the ensuing chapters, these studies will be discussed in detail.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 4

¹The first six points of the White Revolution included: the land reform; nationalization of forests; sale of government factories to support implementation of land reform; participation of labor in production profits; amendment of electoral laws; and creation of the Literacy Corps.

²The seventh, eighth, and ninth points of the White Revolution included: Creation of the Health Corps; creation of the Extension and Development Corps; and creation of the House of Equity.

³The three more measures, announced on October 6, 1967, were comprised of: Nationalization of water resources of the country; reconstruction of the country; and administrative and educational revolution.

⁴H.I.M. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the opening speech of the new term of Parliament on October 6, 1967.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Iran Almanac (Tehran, Iran: Echo of Iran, 1972), p. 138.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Iran Almanac (Tehran, Iran: Echo of Iran, 1974), p. 113.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Development and Resources Corporation, Phase I Report: Iran Public Sector Project (Tehran: Development and Resources Corporation, 1975), pp. 6-7.

¹³Ibid., p. 19.

¹⁴Robert Chin and Kenneth D. Benne, "General Strategies for Effecting Changes in Human Systems," in Tomorrow's Organizations, edited by John S. Jun and William B. Storm (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1973), pp. 310-330.

¹⁵Amin Alimard and Cyrus Elahi, "Modernization and Changing Leadership in Iran," in Iran: Past, Present, and Future, edited by Jane W. Jacqz (New York: Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 1976), p. 221.

CHAPTER 5

THE DIRECTORS GENERAL: THE STUDY OF ROLE PERCEPTION AND PROBLEM APPRAISAL OF DIRECTORS GENERAL IN THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

Theoretical Framework

It is not an overstatement or magnification to mention that Directors General, as career civil servants and permanent administrators, are the kingpins in the administrative environment of the Government of Iran. Similar to their counterparts in Britain, "Principals," and in the United States "Office Heads and Division Directors," the Directors General are career civil servants and permanent administrators. They mostly gain their experience and specialization within a certain area by spending a great part of their administrative career in one ministry or government organization moving up in the organizational hierarchy to this position.

The Directors General are most often the highest career civil servants, who have had the greatest experience in the ministries and government organizations. This

extensive experience provides the ministries with individuals who as policy advisors can contribute relevant and valuable knowledge and suggestion for the existing problems, issues, and policies within the organization.

The Directors General are actually the field officials who serve as linkages between the decision-making and policy-formulating bodies of the organization, as well as actual implementors of plans and projects. Thus, their role is crucial and decisive. They provide the Deputy Ministers and the policy makers with adequate and valuable information and data, and are responsible in transferring the decisions down the hierarchy for implementation process.

Directors General also perform the role of monitors¹ who constantly seek information about the ongoing projects and feed them back to upper levels for modifications and improvements. Thus, what is apparent is the critical role that Directors General play in various ministries and government organizations as policy advisors, field officials, articulators between policy-formulating and implementing bodies, and chief administrator and coordinator of different departments.

Due to the significant role that Directors General perform, in the present and future administration of the Iranian Government, the author, using the methodology of

action training and research and the analytical tool of force-field analysis, conducted a study at the third level of the Government hierarchy in order to identify and appraise the problems that the Directors General encounter in the administrative environment of the Ministry of Interior.²

Considering that the Ministry of Interior was involved in the administrative transition of decentralization, it was felt that an examination of the issues and problems within the context of this transition could provide insight and understanding into the nature of the future administrative environment and help in delineating the dimensions (qualifications) that will be effective for executives of the future.

Prior to discussing the method of action training and research, some of the theoretical skeletons on which this "strategy of 'peaceful'"³ and participative change is based will be considered.

Although there have been contributions by many people, the work of two individuals, Kurt Lewin and Carl Rogers, has been the most influential in formulation of the theoretical base for such a methodology. Lewin's work provided a great deal of knowledge about tension, energy, need, levels of aspiration, substitutions, satiation, valence and force, all of which were later

incorporated in his field theory and his concept of force-field analysis.

Field theory postulates that a person's behavior is derived from a totality of coexisting facts. The multitude of data from any event provides a dynamic field in which all facts are interdependent with all others Behavior, as Lewin emphasized so often, is a function of the person and environment. Both person and environment are interdependent variables. Lewin thinking in mathematical terms, converted his statement into the formula, $B = f(p,e)$ --that is, behavior is the function of person and environment.⁴

Elaborating on the concept of field theory of Lewin, Gardner writes:

The task of explaining behavior becomes identical with finding scientific representation of life space and determining the function which links the behavior to the life space. In examining the life space three important areas should be understood: (1) channeling--the process and path of the delivery of needed goods, services, or psychological resources; (b) gate keepers--the person or persons who influence cognitive structure, motivation (including values, needs, and obstacles); and (c) conflict in the decision situation. To move toward change it is necessary to deal with these three factors of life space through substitutability, availability of alternatives, psychological values, change of potency of the frame of reference, and belongingness.⁵

The amalgamation of Lewin's field theory and Rogers' theories and propositions regarding personality and behavior has understandably developed a new "normative-reeducative strategy of change."⁶

Rogers' theory of personality as "humanistic phenomenology" calls attention to his respect for human beings

as persons who have, as their most basic nature, a willingness to strive for growth and fulfillment and who must be understood in terms of their conceptualizations of reality. Rogers feels that if people are freed from restrictive and corruptive social influences, they can achieve a high level of personal and interpersonal functioning and can avoid the reality distortions that prevent the achievement of ever-greater growth, fulfillment and actualization and self-enhancement.⁷

The Rogerian notion that human beings will strive for self-enhancement on terms that they understand is most important to the strategies used in action training and research. It involves a process of involvement, and the development of "ownership" of the product of the activity because the individual perceives the proposed activity to be enhancing to the perceived self.⁸

One of the conclusive remarks derived from the marriage of Lewin and Rogers' theories is that people are most willing to change if they participate in investigating the rationale, methods, and consequences of change. This is fulfilled in the action training and research process of change.

Action training, Gardner describes, is training specifically designed to help responsible persons comprehend and translate program concepts into operational reality.⁹ It is designed to give people specific skills and knowledge to execute job responsibilities, carry out

new policies, and activate new programs. Action training is used as a means of converting new policy and program ideas into services actually delivered. According to Gardner, action training calls for:

1. Focus on objectives.
2. Developing an understanding of the context in which the proposed action is to take place.
3. Either overcoming the resistance to the proposed action by developing an understanding of the change itself and the reasons behind it; or failing this, influencing the elimination or modification of the proposed action.
4. Helping persons who have implementation responsibilities to acquire needed knowledge and skills to be effective in the implementation process.¹⁰

Action training is often utilized in conjunction with action research. French and Bell define action research as

the process of systematically collecting research data about an ongoing system relative to some objective, goal, or need of that system; feeding these data back into the system; taking actions by altering selected variables within the system based both on the data and on hypotheses; and evaluating the results of actions by collecting more data.¹¹

Gardner defines action research as

. . . research that is diagnostic, involves as participants those persons who will be affected by research outcomes, is sometimes but not always empirical, is experimental and as a result of its conscious problem solving thrust leads to commitment and acceptable action.¹²


Holmen¹³ has suggested that it might be better to call "action training and research" "action reserach and development" or "action training and development" since its goal is more often to strengthen a group (or interaction between groups) rather than develop unconnected individuals.

In short, action research is a dynamic problem-solving procedure that involves the researchers and the clients, all participating in formulating the issues and problems, gathering data, developing experimental solutions, evaluating those solutions and taking actions.¹⁴

As was previously mentioned, force-field analysis is an analytical tool which is used in action training and research. As Figure 1 illustrates, in force-field analysis an attempt is made to identify driving forces, which support change and restraining forces, which oppose change, to uncover hidden allies that were not recognized, and to better understand the situation before trying to change it. When the driving and restraining forces are known, attention will be focused on either strengthening and increasing the driving forces and/or weakening and removing the restraining forces. (See Figure 1)

Because action training and research and force-field analysis provide a powerful strategy for research and action, they were used as a methodology in appraising

Figure 1: Force-Field Analysis



the problems in the Ministry of Interior of the Government of Iran.

Methodology

Description of the Participants

Eighteen Directors General were selected from twenty Directors General from the Ministry of Interior. The choice of the Ministry of Interior was based on the following criteria:

1. The Minister and the top executives' intention and interest in improving the administrative environment of the Ministry of Interior.
2. The Ministry of Interior's direct relationship with the Governors General (Ostandars), Governors (Farmandars), and the mayors (Shahrdars), who will be involved in the decentralization process.
3. The Ministry of Interior's direct and active involvement in the decentralization effort.
4. The Ministry of Interior's size. This Ministry is administratively the largest Ministry in the Imperial Government of Iran.

The composition of the participants was as follows.

1. Age. In an effort to better understand perspectives, issues, and problems in the Ministry of

Interior, Directors General were selected from different age groups. Age of the Directors General ranged from 30 to 57 years, with a mean age of 43.0 years.

2. Experience. Participants had a wide range of experience. Their administrative experience ranged from 11.5 to 36 years, with a mean of over 19 years. With regard to their present position, range of experience was from three months to seven years with an average of 2.5 years.

3. Education. The Directors General had different educational backgrounds and degrees. Eleven (61 per cent) had Bachelor's degrees in fields such as history, judiciary, accounting, literature, and economics; five (28 per cent) had Master's degrees in political science, health administration, and history; and two (11 per cent) had doctorate degrees in agri-economics and sociology.

Procedures and Instruments

To conduct this study, the following steps were taken.

Developing the Interviewing Approach. After the approval of the study by the State Organization for Administration and Employment (SOAE) and the Ministry of Interior of the Government of Iran, the author began to train six members of the Planning Training Division of the

State Organization for Administration and Employment, using "action training and research." The principles of interviewing were discussed in depth and role playing, as a method for training, was used.

Based on the objective of the study, which was to make a diagnostic appraisal of the problems confronting Directors General in the Ministry of Interior, seven open-ended questions (see Appendix A) were formulated by the author. These questions were fully discussed by the research group and, with some refinement and modification, the final questionnaire was prepared.

Interviewing the Directors General. To conduct the interviews, the research group contacted the coordinator from the Ministry of Interior, who then arranged the interview schedules with all Directors General. This process took seven days.

The interviewers, after the completion of their interviews, transferred the information to 3 x 5 cards at the end of each day. Attempts were made to present one issue or item per card. Following this, cards were sorted into categories, each representing one subject matter.

Developing the Opinion Survey Form (Appendix B). From the initial interview, the research group identified 300 items. These were categorized into twenty-five

different subject matters by the research group. A questionnaire item was then written to reflect the thoughts in each category. The 25 items, which are listed in the Opinion Survey Form (see Appendix B), were intentionally not formulated in the form of questions, but rather simple statements.

Respondents were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement and to assess the level of importance of each item on a scale of one to five, with one indicating little or no importance, two indicating minor importance, three indicating medium importance, four indicating considerable importance, and five indicating the item to be of greatest importance.

Completing Opinion Survey Forms. The second interview was conducted after the Opinion Survey Form was prepared with each member of the research group taking the form to the respondents he/she had interviewed earlier.

Tabulating Opinion Survey Forms by the Research Group. In order to prioritize the importance of problems, the research group, according to the planned method, tabulated the results. Taking into consideration that positive values indicate agreement and negative values indicate disagreement, the total weight (weight refers to the weighted score achieved by multiplying the number of

persons responding by the "importance" score), degree of intensity (the intensity score was derived by subtracting the weighted score of the disagrees from the agrees), and the mean (the arithmetic mean of the scores) for each statement were calculated.

To find out the priority of the issues, first, the mean (M) of each of the issue and then the grand total mean (GTM) were determined (see Appendix C). Based on this procedure, 13 problems with means located above the grand total mean were selected as being the most important problems in the Ministry of Interior.

Partial Force-Field Analysis by the Research Group.

To conduct a force-field analysis, first the format of statements on the Opinion Survey Form was changed into questions by adding the word "how" in front of each statement.

After formulation of questions, each newly formulated question was thoroughly discussed, refined, and approved by all the members of the research group.

Using "brainstorming" as a technique for creative problem solving, the research group determined three driving and three restraining forces for each problem.

Determining Partial Action Options (Solutions).

To determine action options, the research group took into

consideration those action options which would strengthen and increase the driving forces and weaken and decrease the restraining forces. For this purpose, the method of "brainstorming" was used. Then, the research group discussed all possible action options, and the most appropriate ones were selected by the group.

Force-Field Analysis and Action Options Formulation by Directors General. In order to complete the process of force-field analysis and action options formulation, the research group conducted the third and final interview with the Directors General.

Since responding to 13 questions was time-consuming and beyond the time limitation of each Director's General work load, the research group divided the questions, their driving, and restraining forces, as well as their action options among the Directors General. By randomly selecting each Director General and each question, each Director General responded to five questions. This process took six days and was greatly instrumental in the formulation of final driving and restraining forces and action options.

Selecting the More Appropriate and Practical Action Options. After the completion of the questionnaire by the Directors General, the members of the research group discussed the force-field analysis and action options

of the Directors General in conjunction with their own force-field analysis performed earlier. Thus, the more appropriate and practical driving and restraining forces and action options were selected and proposed for implementation. (See Appendix D)

Results and Discussion

In this section an effort is made to analyze and discuss the results of the study concerned with a diagnostic appraisal of the problems that Directors General encounter in the Ministry of Interior of the Government of Iran.

As it was mentioned earlier, the Directors General have the highest ranking position in the hierarchy of permanent civil servants in Iran. They are the field officials and actual implementors of plans and programs and have the potential for becoming Governors General, Deputy Ministers, and Ministers in the future. Thus, it is important to perceive them as key professionals in the Government of Iran, and especially in the implementation process of the national decentralization policy.

In the following an attempt is made to analyze the data according to the priorities of problems using force-field analysis. As was aforementioned, the perceived problems are prioritized according to their arithmetic means;

the higher the mean, the more significant the problem. The problems which are presented in the following are the 13 most important problems with means located above the grand total mean. (See Appendix C)

1. Existence of personal and administrative distance among the hierarchical levels of the Ministry

The most important problem, with a mean of 4.89 on a five-point scale, with one indicating little and five indicating greatest importance, was existence of wide personal and administrative distance among the hierarchical levels of the Ministry of Interior. Sixteen (89 per cent) of the Directors General indicated that this is a problem of greatest importance.

A number of restraining forces were described as contributing to this situation. One of the forces most often mentioned was the fear of the high-positioned executives of losing their control.

The respondents also suggested that individuals at the Deputy Ministerial level seem to have some apprehension in getting closer to Directors General, because closeness may lead to informal relationships and induce lack of seriousness by Directors General with regard to performance of their functions and effectiveness.

Another restraining force was the inclination to practice individualistic rather than participative management by high-positioned executives, some of whom are the product of the past administrative system and are thus likely to believe in the maintenance of an individualistic approach to management of public affairs.

To ameliorate this situation, an analysis of the driving forces indicated that existence of trust and the possibility for enhancing human relations and a sense of responsibility and productivity could be greatly instrumental in reducing the personal and administrative distance that exists in the Ministry of Interior.

2. Non-frequent selection of Directors General for higher positions such as Deputy Ministers and Governors General

With a mean of 4.78 on a five-point scale, the second most important problem was nonfrequent selection of Directors General for higher positions.

One of the restraining forces conducive to this issue was practicing nepotism and favoritism by individuals outside the Ministry of Interior. It was indicated that the influence of outsiders on the higher-positioned executives would affect them in selecting individuals from other organizations for positions of Governors General and Deputy Ministers. Thus, Directors General would rarely be selected

for such positions, even though they may have the appropriate experience and qualifications.

Another restraining force was lack of trust and confidence of superiors in the skill and competence of Directors General. Very few Directors General, however, agreed that lack of trust and confidence of superiors in the skill and competence of Directors General is a factor conducive to their nonfrequent selection for higher positions. Nevertheless, the studies concerned with Deputy Ministers' role perception and time use, which are considered in the next chapter, reveal that this is the most significant difficulty from the Deputy Ministers' point of view. Thus, nonselection of Directors General for higher positions could be partially attributed to the high-positioned executives' belief that Directors General do not possess the skill and competence that is required for functioning at Deputy Ministerial or Governors' General level.

An analysis of the driving forces suggested that there is a possibility for increasing the job experience of Directors General and enhancing their familiarity with regulations and administrative procedures. By strengthening the capacity of Directors General, they would be better prepared and equipped to accept the greater responsibility, which is usually associated with higher positions, and

more importantly, they would be trained according to the needs of the Ministry and the country.

Another driving force is the desire and interest of high-positioned executives to become more familiar with the characteristics and qualifications of Directors General by making an effort to get closer to their work and by involving them in a more participative endeavor for decision making.

3. Existence of salary and incentive imbalance between the private sector and the Ministry

Another important problem which received a great deal of attention was the prevailing imbalance of salary and incentives between the private and public sector. This issue, similar to the previous one, had a mean of 4.78 on a five-point scale and thus was given a ranking of two among the thirteen problems identified. Fifteen (83 per cent) Directors General perceived the problem to be of greatest importance and two (11 per cent) suggested that the problem is of considerable importance.

Among the restraining forces, limitations of Civil Service Codes with regard to salary and incentives for government employees were mentioned. A comparison between the public and private sectors revealed that the salary and incentives of employees at the top management level

in the private sector is about two or three times higher than those in the public sector. This imbalance has become more obvious in recent years partly because private industry economy has been skyrocketing. This situation has served as a positive force in attracting government employees to the private sector, which is usually associated with a better salary and incentive system.

Another restraining force was lack of congruity in the increment of salary and incentives and the high inflation in living expenses. A number of Directors General indicated that with the monetary support they receive they cannot cope with the high rising living costs, especially housing.

To ameliorate this problem, the possibility for examination of the Civil Service Codes with regard to salary and incentives of government employees within the context of the rising living costs exists. If such a positive force is increased, it will have mutual benefits for both the Government and its employees in such a way that a balance between the salary and incentives of the private and public sector as well as congruity between salary and living expenses will be conducive to less employee turnover and more organizational stability and effectiveness.

4. Lack of evaluation of subordinates
by Directors General

The fourth ranking issue with a mean of 4.76 was lack of evaluation of subordinates by Directors General. Fourteen (84 per cent) Directors General indicated the great importance of this problem in the Ministry of Interior.

One contributing restraining force mentioned was lack of trust and confidence of high-positioned executives in the evaluation work of Directors General of their own subordinates. According to Directors General, Deputy Ministers' skill and competence, due to their lack of confidence in Directors' General, usually interfere with their work. Directors General suggested that this situation is usually an artifact of distrust coupled with an individualistic approach in management of public affairs.

To rectify the situation, enhancement of a prevailing driving force, the willingness of Directors General to evaluate their subordinates, was mentioned. It was substantiated by the study that there were a great interest and proclivity on the part of the Directors General to perform this function without any intervention from the top.

Taking into consideration the Government policy of decentralization and Directors' General wishes to accept more responsibility and authority, delegating more

authority seems to be helpful in alleviating this situation.

5. Lack of independence of
Directors General

With a mean of 4.71, lack of independence of Directors General was ranked in fifth order. Twelve (71 per cent) Directors General indicated that this is a problem of greatest importance.

One restraining force which seemed to be conducive to the lack of independence of Directors General was lack of sufficient specialization and experience of Directors General.

Some of the Directors General felt that in some respects they were administratively controlled by Deputy Ministers. This control may be because of some other restraining forces, such as lack of trust of high-positioned executives in Directors General, or a sense of power-seeking by Deputy Ministers. These forces would all lead to an uninclined and unnecessary dependency on the part of Directors General upon the Deputy Ministers.

One of the driving forces mentioned was the Directors' General own willingness to improve the administrative environment of their job. There was a positive feeling toward improvement by acquiring more independence. They felt that since the Government was making an effort to decentralize the administrative functions and the

Ministry of Interior played an important role in its implementation, it is necessary to initiate this action from the Ministry by giving more independence to Directors General.

6. Directors General lack the authority to reward, punish, promote, and demote their employees

Two problems had a ranking of six according to their means ($M = 4.61$). The first problem was concerned with Directors' General lack of authority to reward, punish, promote, and demote their employees.

Among the restraining forces, Directors General mentioned lack of delegation of more authority to Directors General by Deputy Ministers, inclination of Deputy Ministers to maintain more power and control, and finally, lack of trust and confidence of Deputy Ministers in the expertise and competence of Directors General.

An analysis of the driving forces indicated that the Directors General believe that this situation could be ameliorated mainly because there is an inclination on the part of a number of Deputy Ministers and high-positioned executives to practice the principle of delegation of authority as a general government policy. Directors General also viewed their own proclivity and interest to evaluate the work of their subordinates as a positive force which could further aid in delegating more authority

to Directors General to reward, punish, promote, and demote their employees.

7. The Ministry of Interior lacks planning for determining training needs of its employees

The other problem which had a ranking of six was designated as the Ministry's lack of planning for determining the training needs of its employees.

An analysis of the Directors' General perceptions regarding the factors contributing to this situation indicated the existence of a number of restraining forces. One of the reasons given by Directors General was lack of faith of high-positioned executives in the role and value of education and training. The poor results of training from a number of training institutes and lack of participation of employees in training programs were also perceived as contributing to the Ministry's lack of planning for determining the training needs of its employees.

Directors General also indicated the existence of a number of driving forces, which, if strengthened, have the potential of ameliorating the existing problem. The desire of some employees to increase their work performance and overall effectiveness was viewed as a positive force which could be conducive to planning for assessing the training needs of the employees. Two other forces

which could be further instrumental in overcoming the problems were the high-positioned executives' wish to introduce new administrative methods and procedures through training and their inclination to strengthen the mentality of the employees in the Ministry of Interior.

8. Lack of mutual understanding and cooperation between Deputy Ministers and Directors General

The eighth-ranked problem with a mean of 4.50 was lack of mutual understanding and cooperation between the Deputy Ministers and Directors General. Ten (56 per cent) Directors General indicated the issue to be of the greatest importance and seven (39 per cent) mentioned the item to be of considerable significance.

This seems to be an important problem at a time when the Government is emphasizing and implementing a decentralization process, which is actually based upon group work, understanding, and cooperation at different levels of an organization.

Among the restraining forces which were mentioned, one was the prevalence of a competitive rather than a cooperative administrative environment. This competitiveness seems to be one of the sociocultural traits or characteristics of the Iranians (Gable, 1959) and is related to the individualistic attitudes and lack of group orientation often observed.

In spite of the above-mentioned restraining forces, there seemed to be a proclivity toward a more cooperative and group-oriented administrative atmosphere. There was also indication of a desire of top-positioned executives to better coordinate the work of General Divisions. This tendency was also apparent at the Directors' General level.

9. Lack of delegation of authority to those below the Directors General

With a mean of 4.44, lack of delegation of authority to employees below the Directors' General levels was prioritized as the ninth important problem by the Directors General in the Ministry of Interior.

A restraining force conducive to the existence of such a problem was mentioned to be lack of confidence of some of the Directors General in the skill and competence of their section heads and other subordinates. From the analysis of data, it was generally apparent that the same judgment and feelings that prevailed at the level of Deputy Ministers toward the Directors General were also in existence at the level of Directors General toward their own subordinates. Thus, lack of trust and confidence in the skill and competence of subordinates was a general restraining force that was prevalent both at the level of the Deputy Ministers and Directors General.

One group of Directors General suggested that lack of delegation of authority to the subordinates is in part a result of Directors General not possessing enough authority themselves.

In some cases, a general sense of possessiveness and a tendency to control was mentioned as factors inducing lack of delegation of authority to the subordinates.

Looking at this problem from a positive perspective, an inclination to emphasize delegation of authority as a general policy of the Ministry was mentioned as a driving force. Another driving force which would contribute to further delegation of authority to those below the level of Directors General seemed to be the tendency of Directors General to strengthen a sense of responsibility in their subordinates. This inclination, in addition to another driving force, the confidence and trust of some of the Directors General in the ability of their subordinates, seems instrumental in the betterment of the administrative environment of the Ministry of Interior.

10. Superiors' lack of information and knowledge about the functions of the Directors General

With a mean of 4.33, on a five-point scale, superiors' lack of information and knowledge about the functions of the Directors General had a ranking of ten among the thirteen most important problems in the Ministry of

Interior. Ten (56 per cent) Directors General felt that it was a problem of great importance, whereas six (33 per cent) perceived the problem to be of considerable importance.

With the exception of one, all Directors General suggested that the problem is partly due to the fact that Directors General from outside the Ministry of Interior are selected for the Deputy Ministerial positions. The fact that the Directors General are not from the Ministry of Interior means that they are not familiar and knowledgeable about the functions of the Directors General in the Ministry of Interior.

Existence of wide distance between the Deputy Ministers and Directors General was also perceived as a strong factor contributing to superiors' lack of knowledge about the functions of Directors General.

Another restraining force was lack of group meetings and communication among the Minister, Deputy Ministers, and Directors General. This seemed to further widen the distance that exists between the Deputy Ministers and Directors General and thus lead to superiors' lack of knowledge about functions and characteristics of Directors General.

In spite of the existing restraining forces, Directors General were unanimous that the problem could

be ameliorated since a number of driving forces exist. Two of the most important driving forces mentioned were inclination of Directors General to attract the attention of high-positioned executives to the functions and duties of General Divisions and the tendency of the high-positioned executives to increase their level of awareness and understanding of the duties and functions of the Directors General in the Ministry of Interior.

11. Existence of nepotism and favoritism in selection of Directors General

Existence of nepotism and favoritism in selection of Directors General was perceived by five (31 per cent) Directors General as being a problem of greatest importance. Ten (63 per cent) Directors General indicated the problem to be of considerable importance.

An analysis of the restraining forces showed that this problem persists because high-positioned executives practice favoritism and nepotism by employing nonspecialized individuals who do not have the appropriate educational and experiential backgrounds which are needed in the General Divisions. Another factor contributing to this problem was perceived to be lack of attention to the human resources needed in the General Divisions of the Ministry of Interior.

Directors General were optimistic that this problem could be partially reduced because of the following driving forces. Specialization of jobs at the level of Directors General, resistance on the part of a number of Directors General in accepting nonspecialized individuals, and finally, an increased inclination of specialized employees to be in charge of positions previously filled by nonspecialized employees, who are most frequently selected not based on their merit and qualifications but rather because of nepotism and favoritism.

12. Lack of consideration of job quality, functions, and qualification in selection of Directors General

With a mean of 4.19, lack of consideration of functions and qualifications of Directors General in their selection process was perceived to have a ranking of twelve among the thirteen most important problems in the Ministry of Interior.

An assessment of the restraining forces showed that existence of nepotism in selection of Directors General and unfamiliarity of superiors with functions, responsibilities, and role behavior of Directors General serve as factors which are conducive to the creation and maintenance of this problem.

In their overall evaluation, Directors General seemed optimistic that this problem could be ameliorated

mainly because superiors are willing and interested in improving the overall effectiveness of the administrative environment and have a proclivity toward selection of more qualified persons for the position of Directors General. Another driving force mentioned was the inclination of superiors to learn more about the functions, responsibilities, and role behaviors of Directors General.

13. Existence of bureaucratic red tape

The thirteenth problem with a mean of 3.89 was existence of bureaucratic red tape. With the exception of two, the rest of the Directors General agreed that this was an important problem and slowed down their work and effectiveness to a considerable degree. Eight (44 per cent) Directors General indicated the problem to be of great importance, and seven (39 per cent) suggested that the issue was of considerable significance.

Among the restraining forces, the existence of unnecessary administrative formalities and especially redundancies in administrative functions and activities were mentioned as impediment for effectiveness and efficiency.

Another important restraining force was the loyalty demonstrated by some of the employees toward maintaining old and traditional methods, philosophies, and management practices. This seemed to be partially caused by lack of

training and unfamiliarity with the new ideas and procedures in the management of public affairs.

One of the driving forces, which would lead to weakening or elimination of some of the restraining forces, was the inclination of some of the Deputy Ministers to delegate authority to Directors General, in addition to the tendency of some Directors General to deputize this authority downward to their subordinates.

In addition, the policy of decentralizing the administrative functions was viewed as a strong driving force in eliminating some of the unnecessary red tape, in an effort to vitalize the sense of novelty and intellectual curiosity in individuals so that they can search and adopt administrative philosophies and practices which lead to more expedient and efficient action in the management of public affairs in the Ministry of Interior.

In short, the thirteen most important problems confronted by Directors General in the Ministry of Interior could be conceptually and categorically reduced to three major and fundamental problem areas, namely, lack of motivation, lack of delegation of authority and responsibility, and finally, lack of training. Some of these problems are organizational in nature and seem to be related to an administrative system which is in the process of transition, whereas others seem to be more sociocultural and reflect

the administrative culture. All these problems are highly interrelated and constitute a chain reaction and a vicious circle, and induce an administrative environment which is not highly responsive to administrative and political decentralization.

A complete and comprehensive summary and discussion of these problems in conjunction with the findings from the studies of Deputy Ministers and Ministers will be presented later.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 5

¹Henry Mintzberg, The Nature of Managerial Work (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1973), p. 67.

²Kambiz Madanipour, Role Perception of Directors General of the Ministry of Interior: A Research Study Using Action Training and Research and Force-Field Analysis (Tehran: The State Organization for Administration and Employment, and Development and Resources Corporation, 1976).

³Neely D. Gardner, "An 'Aye' Vote for Action Training and Research: A Framework from out of the Past," Public Management, May, 1972, p. 38.

⁴Alfred J. Marrow, The Practical Theorist: The Life and Work of Kurt Lewin (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1969), p. 34.

⁵Neely D. Gardner, "Action Training and Research: Something Old and Something New," Public Administration Review, March/April, 1974, p. 106.

⁶Robert Chin and Kenneth D. Benne, "General Strategies for Effecting Changes in Human System," in Tomorrow's Organizations: Challenges and Strategies, edited by Jong S. Jun and William B. Storm (Brighton, England: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1973), pp. 310-330.

⁷Carl Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy (New York: Houghton-Mifflin, 1951).

⁸Neely D. Gardner, "Action Training and Research: Something Old and Something New," p. 107.

⁹Neely D. Gardner, Group Leadership (Washington: National Training and Development Services Press, 1974), p. 78.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 79.

¹¹Wendell L. French and Cecil H. Bell, Jr., Organization Development (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), pp. 84-85.

¹²Gardner, Group Leadership, p. 78.

¹³Milton G. Holmen, "Action Research: The Solution or the Problem," in Behavioral Problems in Organizations, edited by Cary Cooper (London, England: Prentice-Hall, 1978) (Forthcoming).

¹⁴Madanipour, Role Perception of Directors General of the Ministry of Interior, p. 4.

CHAPTER 6

THE DEPUTY MINISTERS: THE STUDY OF ROLE PERCEPTION AND EXECUTIVE TIME SPENDING OF DEPUTY MINISTERS OF THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN¹

To understand and foresee the needs and possible trends for future executives in Iran, it was thought best to develop an understanding of the work characteristics of present executives. In this instance, the operation of Deputy Ministers serves as the data base.

A study of Deputy Ministers is significant in the context of the present and future administrative environment of Iran predominantly because:

1. Deputy Ministers are at the level of decision-making and policy formulation and thus their actions are central in the present and future administrative environment of Iran;
2. Deputy Ministers provide a linkage between the Government's top decision makers and actual implementors (Directors General); and
3. Deputy Ministers are the potential candidates for future ministerial positions.

The study which is concerned with Deputy Ministers' role perception and their time use provides an effort to gain more understanding of the present and to provide insight into the future administrative environment of Iran as well as a means of predicting trends for future executives' dimensions and qualifications.

The objectives of the study were:

1. To examine Deputy Ministers' role perception in the context of their existing functions, responsibilities, expectations, and roles; and
2. To evaluate Deputy Ministers' use of time with respect to their functions, responsibilities, expectations, and roles.

What follows in the ensuing section is a:

1. Definition of role.
2. Discussion of key concepts related to role theory.
3. Role perception of Deputy Ministers.
4. Deputy Minister's use of time.

Theoretical Background

The review of the literature suggests that in some definitions a role is treated as an individual's definition of his situation. Sargent indicates, "A person's role is a pattern or type of social behavior which seems situationally appropriate to him in terms of the demands and

expectations of those in his groups."²

Other definitions have considered role as the behavior of actors occupying social positions. Davis, for example, defines role as the manner in which a person actually carries out the requirements of his position.³

He indicates that role is the dynamic aspect of states or office and as such is always influenced by factors other than the stipulations of the position itself.⁴

Katz and Kahn suggest that role refers to the recurring actions of an individual, appropriately inter-related with the repetitive activities of others so as to yield a predictable outcome.⁵

Luthans defines role as a position that has expectations evolving from established norms.⁶

Gross, Mason, and McEachern⁷ suggest that human behavior is influenced to some extent by the expectations individuals hold for themselves or which others hold for them. Furthermore, a person's location or position in social structures influences the kind of social relationships in which he is involved and the evaluative standards he or others apply to his behavior.

Even though these definitions and others presented in the literature suggest some fundamental differences, most of them share three basic commonalities. Most writers believe that individuals in (a) "social location" (b) "behave" (c) with reference to "expectations."

Most of the writers have used the role concept to embrace the normative elements of social behavior. People do not behave in a random manner, rather their behavior is influenced, to some extent, by their own expectations and those of others in the group, organization, and society in which they are participants.

Sherwood defines expectations as "what is supposed to be done by the man in the position."⁸ He also presents the sources of expectations for an executive in a government organization as: superiors, subordinates, congress, constituency and interest groups, other departments, peers, judiciary, the family, and the individual himself.⁹ These sources of expectations and others which prevail in the administrative environment surrounding the person in the position of leadership and decision making will influence or conduce him/her to behave as it is expected.

Due to the nature of the relationship of Deputy Ministers¹⁰ to the Minister, Directors General and to other factors in the internal and external environment, their role is most complex. The position trains the occupants for greater and even more complex responsibilities in the future. Therefore, Deputy Ministers should be looked upon as persons not only capable of performing the immediate tasks of significance, but also as individuals who have the potential of growing into greater and more complex responsibilities.

The role of Deputy Ministers in ministries and government organizations in Iran is pivotal in the policy-making process. Those occupying this role should not be seen as primarily patronage or political appointees. The position of a Deputy Minister is very often held by a person who has either risen through the civil service or who is an expert brought from other organizations. It is noteworthy that Deputy Ministers are not appointed totally and exclusively for their expertise, but rather because the ministers or the secretary general regards them as congenial, reliable, and trustworthy as advisors. Thus, the role of Deputy Ministers is similar to assistant secretaries in departments or bureaus of the United States government. This indicates that like their counterparts in the United States, the Deputy Ministers make an effort to appraise a policy proposal in terms of its technical, economic, and political feasibility, and advise and recommend actions to be taken by the minister or the ministry. The overall role the Deputy Ministers play in the policy-making process may be of three kinds.

First, when a proposal originates from the minister, the undersecretary plays an important role in getting directors general and experts to do research and staff work so that the proposal concerned may be thoroughly examined in terms of costs and benefits that would accrue if it were to be adopted. Secondly, a proposal may originate from a director general in which case the undersecretary has to determine whether it should be

modified, taking into account the views or predispositions of his minister, the availability of resources in a given year and the technical or practical difficulties involved in implementing the proposal or the project. Thirdly, policy proposals may emanate from the undersecretary himself.¹¹

In all three cases, a Deputy Minister has to consider the alternative ways of implementing proposals within the framework of both the ministry and government policy.

In short, the role of the Deputy Ministers is of crucial importance in the administrative system of Iran. Their responsibilities and duties are considerable. More importantly, they are potential candidates for higher positions with greater responsibilities such as ministerial jobs.

The first concern of this study is to address the significance of the Deputy Ministers' role in the administrative system of Iran, and the potential they have for becoming ministers in the future, as well as to examine their role perception within the context of their existing functions, expectations, responsibilities, and role.

A second concern of the present study is to examine Deputy Ministers' use of time in the context of their roles. The study attempts to find out how the Deputy Ministers distribute their time, and to what degree the distribution of time is compatible with perceived expectations and goals.

It is clear that time is a scarce executive resource and must be allocated with extreme care and discipline. Time is finite and the distribution of it among competing claims is assumed to have major consequences for accomplishment. Drucker, in this regard, indicates that time is a unique resource which is entirely irreplaceable and the supply of it is totally inelastic.¹² He continues:

Within limits we can substitute one resource for another, copper for aluminum, for instance. We can substitute capital for human labor. We can use more knowledge or more brawn. But there is no substitute for time.¹³

What is presently apparent in Iran is that the limitations of time have become more pressing. The ministries and government organizations have become larger in size and cover a wider scope of activities than before. The activities not only involve national affairs, but international as well. The volume of work has enlarged enormously and the number of decisions to be made have increased greatly, thus requiring more work time to be spent by individuals in the government, especially by those at the higher echelons of the administrative hierarchy.

With an increase in the size and function of government, the Deputy Ministers have comparatively more responsibilities and overall role complexities than before. The present ongoing developments in different spheres of the county have become evermore demanding. People have

become more educated and knowledgeable and in order to accept ideas and suggestions require more information. The burden of furnishing much of this information falls upon the Deputy Ministers.

Thus, as the administrative system of Iran has expanded, the actual supply of time of the executives has become limited in the context of the increasing demand.

Deputy Ministers are faced with such crucial questions as: How much time to allocate to organizational roles? How much time to devote to internal and external as well as formal and informal meetings and affairs? And finally, how to manage time to maximize present individual and organizational effectiveness without creating conflict and impediments for future activities? Most of the Deputy Ministers do not seem to have a very clear picture of how they spend their time and how they could possibly spend time in a more effective and efficient manner. Thus, in the present study an attempt is made to examine and evaluate Deputy Ministers' time use in the context of their functions, responsibilities, and roles. The methodology and the results are presented later in this section.

Methodology

Description of the Participants

The study sample included twenty-three Deputy Ministers selected from a list of 108 provided by State

Organization for Administration and Employment. The twenty-three were chosen on the basis of age, experience, education, and function.

The composition of the sample was as follows.

1. Age. In an effort to have a more heterogeneous and representative sample, participants were selected from different age groups. Age of the participants ranged from 37 to 57 years, with a mean of 47.5 years.

2. Experience. Attempts were made to include individuals with varying degrees of experience to see whether years of experience is related to how they perceive their roles. Participants had experiences ranging from ten to thirty-five years with a mean of 22.0 years in governmental positions.

3. Education. The educational degree achieved by Deputy Ministers was thought to be of great importance in providing insights into their administrative and managerial practices and perspectives. Thus, an effort was made to include Deputy Ministers with a range of academic degrees and levels. Four (20 per cent) of the Deputy Ministers had a Bachelor's degree in various fields such as law, education, and political science. Six (30 per cent) had a Master's degree in management, economics, agricultural engineering, electrical engineering, and public administration. The remaining ten (50 per cent) had obtained

doctoral degrees in the fields of political science, economics, rural sociology, philosophy, law, and public administration.

4. Functions. There was an effort to select Deputy Ministers with a variety of functional responsibilities. Four (20 per cent) of the Deputy Ministers were responsible for planning and project affairs; four (20 per cent) were involved in administrative affairs; three (15 per cent) had administrative and financial affairs functions; two (10 per cent) were in charge of social affairs; two (10 per cent) had the responsibility for parliamentary affairs; two (10 per cent) were responsible for development affairs; two (10 per cent) were responsible for research affairs; and one (5 per cent) functioned as the Deputy Minister for economic affairs.

Nineteen (95 per cent) of the Deputy Ministers worked for the Government as their principal career, and one (5 per cent) was an in-and-outer from professorship in the university to the government position and back to the academic world.

Fourteen (70 per cent) of the Deputy Ministers did not engage in any other type of professional or occupational activities for remuneration, whereas six (30 per cent) also taught part-time at a university.

In regard to their service outside the capitol, eleven (55 per cent) of the Deputy Ministers had served in different parts of the country. The range of the service was from two to seventeen years with a mean of 7.5 years.

Of the twenty-three participants selected, three were included in a pilot study, which was designed to modify and refine the questionnaire. The remaining (20 participants) comprised the main sample for the actual study.

Procedure

Following initial arrangements (phone contacts), data were collected using Structured Interview II (see Appendix E) during a single interview session at the office of the Deputy Minister.

During the interview session, which usually lasted between 30 minutes to 3-1/2 hours, with an average time of 2-1/2 hours, the interviewer asked the interviewee the 43 questions previously formulated, and recorded the information given in the presence of the interviewee. Immediately after each interview session, the interviewer would spend approximately one hour to refine his notes in order to capture the maximum data from the answers given by the Deputy Minister during the interview session.

The interviews were most often conducted in English; but in cases in which the interviewee expressed a preference to speak Farsi (the language of Iranians), the interview was conducted in Farsi. The information was then translated into English by the author.

Instrument

Based on the two major objectives of the study, forty-three questions were formulated and used in a structured interview. (Appendix E) The questions were designed to assess information in three areas: demographic data, information regarding executives' role perception, and data on executives' use of time.

Demographic data included information on the Deputy Ministers' formal title, age, educational background, profession, years of service in the Government, whether government service had been a principal career, location of service, and finally, information related to other types of professional or occupational activity for remuneration.

In assessing information regarding the role perception of Deputy Ministers, the following elements, essential to role analysis, were taken into consideration.

1. Identification of the key people/positions in the role space of the Deputy Ministers.
2. Identification of the messages (expectations, demands, etc.) that were coming from these key senders.

3. Identification of the Deputy Ministers' own expectations in the role.

From these three elements, 17 questions were formulated in an effort to assess Deputy Ministers' role perception.

In order to obtain data on executives' use of time, an additional 17 questions were formulated based on the following elements.

1. Identification of the number of hours the Deputy Minister spends to fulfill the expectations of others per week.

2. Identification of the percentage of the Deputy Minister's executive time per week spent on perceived roles, functions, and responsibilities identified in the first part of the study.

3. Identification of the Deputy Minister's management and leadership practices as demonstrated by time spent on various aspects of his work.

Results and Discussion

Analysis of Deputy Ministers' Executive Role Perception

Deputy Ministers play a vital role in Government Organizations. Being a Deputy Minister imposes many demands upon the individual as he tries to meet the expectations of public, superiors, and subordinates while he

carries out his many functions, responsibilities and roles. Thus, it is not appropriate to think of goals and objectives of Deputy Ministers in purely personal terms, since the role they perform is designed to achieve both personal and organizational goals.

Based on such an assumption, it was important to identify three significant analytical points in the present study:

1. Identification of the key people in setting expectations for the Deputy Minister's role.
2. Identification of the expectations (messages, demands) that come from the key people.
3. Identification of the Deputy Minister's own expectations (responsibilities) in the role.

What is most important for Deputy Ministers to do in the job?

For a number of Deputy Ministers, their role and the expectations accompanying it are highly ambiguous. This situation heightens conflict because it makes one demand about as legitimate as another. On one hand, a number of Deputy Ministers believe that no formal set of expectations exists. For these Deputy Ministers, the dominant set of expectations becomes whatever the Minister states it shall be. Thus, the parameters of the formal role depend on the disposition of the Minister. Under

these circumstances, Deputy Ministers perceive themselves as vice ministers.

Another position is that the Deputy Ministers occupy a formal role, ". . . according to the Royal decree from HIM."¹⁴ According to this perception, Deputy Ministers are officers of the ministries, and the expectations directed toward them should be organizational and not personal in nature. Within such a context, Deputy Ministers perceive themselves as the deputies of the ministries rather than vice ministers or deputy ministers.

The very existence of these conflicting perspectives suggests role ambiguity, and indicates that the Deputy Ministers cannot be perceived and treated as a homogeneous group.

Perception of expectations of others represented a range of opinions. The participants perceived influences coming from sources such as His Imperial Majesty, the Shahamshah, the Prime Minister, the first superior, father, wife, peers, and most often the Ministers. From a total of 20 Deputy Ministers, four (20 per cent) indicated HIM; three (15 per cent) mentioned peers and colleagues; two (10 per cent) mentioned their first superior; and eleven (55 per cent) stated that their Ministers were the most influential in affecting their behavior on the job.


What was apparent was the significant impact that Ministers had on setting expectations for Deputy Ministers. In the Deputy Ministers' role set, Ministers were understandably the key elements of influence, however, other individuals as well as institutional processes such as government policies, laws, regulations, and the Constitution were factors in setting up expectations for the behavior of the Deputy Ministers. Interestingly, the Directors General played a very insignificant role in setting expectations for Deputy Ministers as it is illustrated by broken line in Figure 2.

Expectations are set by Ministers within the framework of government policies and practices and with consideration of the nature of Deputy Ministers' positions. These expectations then flow down to Deputy Ministers as "formal administrative work" and "personal messages."

The formal administrative work and personal messages are fulfilled by handling and following up various managing and supervising activities and exercising responsibilities through assigning jobs to Directors General with whom Deputy Ministers spend most of their time. (See Figure 2)

When asked to indicate the common activities and responsibilities of their jobs, half of the Deputy Ministers perceived "managing and supervising" as their most

Figure 2: A Schematic Representation of Deputy Ministers' Role Perception



important activity. The next most important role perceived was "follow up and handling of various problems assigned by the superior," followed by "participation in the development of materials and data for policy and decision making in the organization."

Deputy Ministers were also asked to indicate the extent to which they perceive their activities as having a "specialist" or "generalist" nature. They rated individual activity of a specialist nature on assigned projects as occupying a rating of four on a five-point scale, on which a rating of one indicated activity of a specialist nature and five represented an activity of a generalist nature. This indicates that Deputy Ministers perceive their role not as a specialist but rather as a generalist.


In one of the questions, Deputy Ministers were asked to state the degree to which they believed they were working at their appropriate level of responsibility. They noted their opinions on a five-point scale, on which a rating of one indicated very little and five represented a high degree of time spent working at the proper level of responsibility. Results indicated that 14 Deputy Ministers (70 per cent) believed they were working at their maximum level of responsibility. Among these, two stated that in the past administration, as one went up the hierarchical levels of the organization, the time spent on administrative activities and the magnitude of responsibilities

were much less than what they are in the present administrative environment. If responsibility was perceived as a triangle, the apex signified the maximum amount of responsibility. Presently, respondents saw the triangle as having reversed its position and it is upside down. Thus, the Minister, and accordingly the Deputy Ministers, are located at the base of the triangle, connoting that their responsibilities have increased. Figure 3 is a schematic representation of the shift in responsibility as perceived by Deputy Ministers.

Further examination of the responses of those Deputy Ministers who were not working at the maximum level of their responsibility, indicated that there were a number of impediments which prevented them from doing so. One of the Deputy Ministers stated, "The mechanism is set up in such a way that I cannot perform my own role. We compromise with authorities (the Governors General) and therefore feel a lesser need to perform at our maximum level of responsibility."¹⁵ Other reasons given were: "Interference by people who want to pursue their personal goals; and time spent on minor and trivial problems."

Another set of responses which related directly to the previous answers involved the Deputy Ministers' rank ordering of four major difficulties they typically encounter. The most frequently mentioned problem was

Figure 3: The Responsibility Triangle



"lack of confidence in the competence and skill of subordinates." Five Deputy Ministers (25 per cent) ranked this as the most serious difficulty. Four (20 per cent) believed that "legal and/or formal requirements that make them uncomfortable about assigning responsibility and authority" as the most critical difficulty. Four Deputy Ministers (20 per cent) ranked "likelihood that necessary information vital to understanding operations will not flow to them" as the most notable and operationally damaging problem. Four of the Deputy Ministers (20 per cent) viewed "distrust in the intentions and loyalty of the subordinates" as the second most important impediment in the present administrative environment of Iran.

Ranking the expectations of Deputy Ministers of their own subordinates on a five-point scale, twelve (60 per cent) responded that they completely "expect subordinates to initiate action and not wait for direction." The mean of 4.28 indicated that the participants overwhelmingly approved of initiation of action by subordinates and rejected the idea that subordinates should wait for direction and order from the above.

In another question, Deputy Ministers' responses were indicative of their willingness to allow their subordinates to make decisions on their own. Deputy Ministers were asked if they "expect subordinates to deviate and

make decisions as they feel necessary." Seven Deputy Ministers (35 per cent) indicated that subordinates can deviate and make changes on their own. Six (30 per cent) felt that this depended upon the nature of the order. They stated that some orders need changes without consultation, and some need prior consultation with the superiors.

With regard to control of subordinates' time, nine Deputy Ministers (45 per cent) indicated that they expect subordinates to wholly control their own time, rather than be fully available to their superior. Five Deputy Ministers (25 per cent) took a middle position and stated that some subordinates need to be fully available to them, whereas others must control their own time and that this is very much contingent upon the nature of the job the subordinates perform.

When asked to indicate if they expect to have either "personal" or "organizational" loyalty from the subordinates, ten Deputy Ministers (50 per cent) stated that they expect to have complete "organizational" loyalty from their subordinates; whereas four (20 per cent) preferred to have both "personal" and "organizational" loyalty. Two (10 per cent) were at the other extreme and stated that "personal" loyalty is more important than "organizational" loyalty. A mean of 3.9 on a five-point scale, with one indicating "personal" and five representing "organizational"

loyalty, showed that most Deputy Ministers believed in the priority of "organizational" loyalty over "personal" loyalty. A number of Deputy Ministers stated that "personal" loyalty is included in "organizational" loyalty.

Analysis of Deputy Ministers' Use of Time

Having identified expectations and goals of Deputy Ministers, the second part of the study was concerned with the Deputy Ministers' time use in terms of the identified expectations and goals.

The principal question was concerned with "the total amount of time that a Deputy Minister devotes to work per week." Results indicated a wide range of responses. At one extreme, some Deputy Ministers devoted 84 hours of their time to work. Five Deputy Ministers (25 per cent) expressed that they work more than 70 hours per week. These participants were involved mainly in planning, projects and development affairs. The majority of the Deputy Ministers (65 per cent) stated that they work from 50 to 60 hours per week. These Deputy Ministers were basically involved in the administrative and financial affairs of ministries and government organizations.

At the other extreme were participants who indicated that they spend 42 to 45 hours per week to accomplish their jobs (10 per cent of the total Deputy Ministers).

The amount of time spent in the organization was negatively correlated with the amount of time spent outside the organization, performing other jobs such as teaching at universities.

Practically all Deputy Ministers working over sixty hours per week expressed an interest and desire in the reduction of the number of hours, specifically to 45 or a maximum of fifty hours per week. This suggestion was propounded mainly by Deputy Ministers who stated that they were working over eighty hours a week.

From the time control perspective, the participants were asked to indicate "what percentage of their total executive time they control." Results indicated that those who were in charge of administrative, financial, and research affairs had control over 70 to 95 per cent of their time, whereas those who were responsible for parliamentary affairs had less control over their time. Only about 40 to 55 per cent of their time was controlled by them.

With respect to either "the amount of time spent in contact and interactive situations" or "the amount of time spent working alone," findings indicated that Deputy Ministers in charge of administrative, financial, and parliamentary affairs worked more interactively with others than those who were in charge of research and general planning and development. Considering the percentage of time

that the participants spent on interactive contacts, the results showed that Deputy Ministers in administrative, financial, and parliamentary affairs had more interaction with their colleagues (10 per cent) and subordinates (15 to 40 per cent) than Deputy Ministers responsible for research and planning, who spent an average of 10 per cent of their time with their colleagues and from 10 to 20 per cent of their time with their subordinates. Taking into consideration all responses, 55 per cent of the executive time is spent on interactive contacts, whereas 45 per cent is devoted to working alone.

The results to a set of questions regarding the actual percentage of time spent on meetings with others and the desired percentage of time spent on meetings, showed that the majority of Deputy Ministers (65 per cent) felt that they should spend more time with the Minister, peers, and most importantly with subordinates. On the other hand, they desired a reduction in time spent on attending conferences and meetings outside the organization, which occupied approximately nine per cent of their present executive time, and meetings with outsiders on non-job-related matters that occupied about six per cent of their time.

In response to a question regarding the time spent on "reading publications," 50 per cent of the Deputy

Ministers indicated that they spent from zero to 5 per cent of their executive time on reading publications with the overall average of approximately 8 per cent. Results indicated a great interest by all Deputy Ministers to spend more time on reading. Most of them indicated a preference to spend an average of 12.5 per cent of their executive time on "reading publications" in an effort to enable them to be more effective and successful in meeting their executive responsibilities.

In terms of the amount of time spent on "thinking and reflecting," it was found that only 4.5 per cent of the Deputy Ministers' time was spent on such an activity. Four Deputy Ministers (20 per cent) indicated that they did not have time to think and reflect on various organizational matters. All participants suggested that if the government administrative work had to be done more effectively and decisions were to be made more constructively, there was a definite need for spending more time on thinking prior to fulfilling administrative functions and responsibilities.

With regard to time spent on various types of responsibilities, participants were asked to indicate an estimation of the average percentage of time they spend on a fairly standard list of responsibilities. All participants stated that "coordinating" and "planning"

constitute part of their activities and that they respectively occupy 17 and 16 per cent of their executive time. Eighteen Deputy Ministers (90 per cent) considered "supervising" and "negotiating," as significant part of their activities and stated that each activity occupied approximately 13 per cent of their executive time. Sixteen (80 per cent) indicated that they spend 12.5 per cent of their executive time on "interpretation" of administrative work.

Other activities and responsibilities which occupied a large proportion of the Deputy Ministers' executive time were: "personal activity" (11.5 per cent), "preparing procedures and scheduling" (9 per cent), and "public relations" (8 per cent).

In response to a question concerning "the time spent on carrying out the day-to-day work of the organization," the Deputy Ministers acknowledged that they spend an average of 67 per cent of their time on these matters. There was indication that they spend approximately 33 per cent of their executive time on "special or unique problems of an organizational nature."

With regard to unnecessary and time-consuming activities, there was an indication that an average of about 23 per cent of executive time is usually spent on activities that involved personal conflicts and grievances. A high proportion of participants (72 per cent) preferred

a reduction of time spent on such matters. However, five Deputy Ministers (25 per cent) perceived this matter of great importance and thought that the time spent on this activity is necessary for the effective functioning of the individuals and the organization. Nevertheless, results showed a significant willingness to reduce the percentage of time allocated to this activity from 23 per cent to approximately 9 per cent, in an effort to enable Deputy Ministers to spend more time on "activities that have organizational and system importance."

From the study on Deputy Ministers' executive role perception, a general pattern of result emerges.

The Deputy Ministers, in a dynamic and ever-changing environment, have a supreme significant role. The perceived role is apparently an amalgamation of a number of activities and responsibilities such as managing and supervising, following up problems, and participating in development of data for policy and decision making. Nearly all Deputy Ministers perceive themselves as having major responsibilities in the general management area. Only a small number of Deputy Ministers are occupied with policy planning/development.

The study also indicated that there is ambiguity in role perception of Deputy Ministers. On one hand, a number of Deputy Ministers believe that no formal set of

expectations exists and that the parameters of their roles are defined by the minister. Under these circumstances, Deputy Ministers perceive themselves as deputy or vice ministers. On the other hand, some Deputy Ministers view themselves as officers and deputies of the ministries.

Perhaps because of this ambiguity in role perception, there has been little effort to deal consciously with the commonalities in responsibilities that exist. The present study found that regardless of how Deputy Ministers perceive their roles--either as deputies or vice ministers or officers and deputies of the ministries--two major responsibilities, namely, managing and supervising, and policy planning and development run through most of their activities.

The study also indicated that the Deputy Ministers, in the duration of their professional career, are influenced by a number of sources which are instrumental in setting up expectations for their performance. What became evident was the significant impact that Ministers had on setting expectations for Deputy Ministers.

The expectations flowing from the superior and others, mostly in the form of formal administrative work and personal messages, in addition to the Deputy Ministers' own personal expectations constitute the goals and responsibilities of the Deputy Ministers.

Most of the Deputy Ministers were unanimous that they work at their maximum level of responsibility. Those who were not functioning at their maximum level of responsibility suggested a number of reasons such as compromising with authorities in order to avoid responsibility, interference by people who want to pursue their personal goals, and finally, spending time on minor and trivial problems which should be handled elsewhere in the organization.

Two of the major problem areas were lack of personnel and competent staff and routinization and bureaucratization. An assessment of the problems indicated that problems seem to be oriented downward and could have inhibiting effects on delegation of authority in the decentralization process.

Expectation and attitudes toward subordinates by the Deputy Ministers might be regarded as one key to more effective sharing of activity and team performance. An assessment of the expectation of Deputy Ministers of their immediate subordinates (Directors General) showed that Deputy Ministers, in general, seemed to be in favor of allocating responsibility to their immediate subordinates. Thus, they seemed to be in favor of the more participative approach to decision making.

In short, the study on role perception of Deputy Ministers showed that whereas role orientation of Deputy

Ministers is upward toward the superiors, the problems seem to be oriented downward toward the subordinates.

From the study of Deputy Ministers' use of time it became evident that Deputy Ministers devote a wide range of time to their many activities. Most Deputy Ministers were unanimous that they would like to reduce this time investment especially by reducing time spent in meeting with others outside the organization, and instead increase the time they spend with the Minister, peers, and most importantly their immediate subordinates (Directors General). Such a concern suggests that greater effort must be made to bring others into the management system to share the responsibilities.

From the time control perspective, Deputy Ministers vary greatly in the discretion they have over the use of their own time. Altogether, Deputy Ministers are in control of approximately 65 per cent of their executive time, but are interested in re-allocating time and gaining more control by spending more time on future-oriented planning activities of organizational consequence, and less time on time-consuming activities such as resolving personal conflicts and grievances that could be managed elsewhere in the organization.

With regard to time spent alone or in contact with others, there was indication that Deputy Ministers vary

greatly in the amount of time spent in contact with others, its types, and its frequency. The amount of time spent in contact with others is partly determined by the nature of work and position of the Deputy Ministers. Altogether, Deputy Ministers spend 40 per cent of their time alone and about 60 per cent of their executive time in interaction with others. Deputy Ministers spend only about 25 per cent of their interactive time (15 per cent of their total time) with subordinates. In the context of role relation, this becomes important since it indicates that Deputy Ministers do not regard their immediate subordinates (Directors General) as a significant element in their role relationship. The implication of this attitude is significant since it can be regarded as inhibiting effective delegation of authority.

While there seems to be a substantial interest in re-allocating the use of time, the Deputy Ministers seem somewhat ambivalent and uncertain as to the best way of time re-allocation. The majority feel that they spend most of their time working at the proper level of responsibility, that distribution of their time among executive activities is right, and that they would not appreciably shift the allocation of their time among interactive activities. This indicates that a high change orientation in time management among the Deputy Ministers seems somewhat unlikely in the very near future.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 6

¹Kambiz Madanipour, "Role Perception and Executive Time Spending of Deputy Ministers of the Imperial Government of Iran," paper presented at the conference on Deputy Ministers' role perception and time use, Tehran, Iran, 13 and 14 October 1976, Development and Resources Corporation.

²Stansfeld Sargent, "Concepts of Role and Ego in Contemporary Psychology," in Social Psychology at the Crossroads, edited by J. H. Rohrer and Mozafar Sherif (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951), p. 360.

³Kingsley Davis, Human Society (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1949), p. 90.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Daniel Katz and Robert Khan, The Social Psychology of Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966), p. 174.

⁶Fred Luthans, Organizational Behavior (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1963), p. 470.

⁷Neal Gross, Ward S. Mason, and Alexander W. McEachern, Exploration in Role Analysis (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1956), p. 319.

⁸Frank Sherwood, "An Introduction to Role Theory," unpublished mimeograph report, Development and Resources Corporation, 1976, p. 2.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰In this study, the term "Deputy Minister" refers to those individuals who occupy the second ranking position in the ministerial hierarchy and it also refers to other perceived terms such as the "deputy of the ministry," the "undersecretary," and the "vice minister" in a government organization.

¹¹Khalid B. Sayeed, "Policy-Making Process in the Government of Iran," in Iranian Civilization and Cultures, edited by Charles J. Adams (Montreal, Canada: McGill University, Institute of Islamic Studies, 1973), pp. 107-108.

¹²Peter F. Drucker, The Effective Executive (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1966), p. 26.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Frank Sherwood, "An Introduction to Role Theory," unpublished mimeograph report, Tehran: Development and Resources Corporation, 1976.

¹⁵Personal Communication.

CHAPTER 7

THE MINISTERS: A VIEW OF IRANIAN MINISTERS ON DECENTRALIZATION AND FUTURE TOP EXECUTIVES

Having studied the third level of the Government of Iran, the Directors General, and the second level, the Deputy Ministers, the author then conducted a study at the highest level of the Government structure, namely, the ministerial level.

The objectives of this study, which was designed to be complementary to the two previous studies, were to obtain a better understanding of the present decentralization policy of the Government and to foresee the possible trends for future Government top executives in Iran. More specifically, the study was designed to provide insight and understanding into the dimensions and qualifications of the future executives.

In the context of the present and future administrative practices, a study of Ministers is of great significance basically because:

1. The Ministers are at the top position of decision making and policy formulation.

2. The Ministers are directly involved in the implementation of decentralization policy.
3. The Ministers play a crucial role in selecting the future executives for the top Government positions.

What follows in the ensuing section is a study of Ministers preceded by a theoretical perspective on decentralization, which includes a discussion of the definitions and processes of decentralization.

Theoretical Perspective

Decentralization is not a novel idea in government. Territorial or provincial distribution of functional authority and the vertical allocation of power within the provincial government have been in existence all over the world for a long period of time.

In recent years, due to rapid progress and development, Iran's administrative structure and practices have not been responsive to the unprecedented needs of the country. Thus, a search for ways to achieve a more meaningful and rewarding government for the people and by the people has been launched in the form of decentralization. The desire for decentralization has been centered on the drive to participate in the decision-making process as one of the means of alleviating some of the Government's administrative problems.

The term "decentralization" refers to a wide range of organizational and political schemes ranging from delegation of authority to divisions within a ministry or an agency to complete autonomy in decision making for national authorities. It has many diverse meanings and it has been conceptualized and categorized in different manners.

Decentralization is defined by Beach as "placing the authority and decision-making power as possible to the level at which work is done."¹ This is a very broad definition and includes all types and kinds of decentralization.

Haider notes of decentralization as:

The transfer of authority from governments of large cities to governments of smaller sub-units within them, or the reduction of big governments to manageable proportions either by breaking them or by seeking devices to mitigate size and concentration.²

To Haider, decentralization involves a long shopping list of general reforms, both administrative and political, which are not mutually exclusive.³

Furniss has indicated that there are eight different ways in which governmental decentralization may be employed.⁴ These eight are grouped under three major categories: (1) Economic decentralization, which is comprised of industrial decentralization, and regional economic planning decentralization arises as a direct consequence of the expanded scope of governmental activity and presence. (2) Administrative decentralization, which consists

of administrative/internal decentralization, administrative/spatial decentralization, and administrative/functional decentralization, includes the transfer of administrative functions either downward in the hierarchy, spacially, or by problem. (3) Political decentralization, which covers legislative decentralization, corporate decentralization, and millennial decentralization, attempts "through greater individual and/or representational input into the decision-making structure to provide a host of benefits."⁵

One experience which should be drawn from all the aforementioned types of decentralization is that they are diverse and much attention should be paid to the different ways in which it has been conceptualized. The concept of decentralization not only has different definitions and aspects, but it also has various implementation processes and different degrees of power allocation.

According to Riggs, at one end of the continuum, delegation, which "involves the retention of central control but assigns responsibility for case decisions to subordinate personnel,"⁶ is located. At the other end, another pattern of decentralization, namely devolution in which "full responsibility for policy determination in regard to specified subjects is transferred to the recipient of authority," is situated.⁷ In comparison with delegation, in which the norms governing the exercise of authority are

exactly prescribed, devolution involves authorization to full freedom to choose policies; therefore, norms are not prescribed. If these two concepts comprise the two ends of a continuum, there is an intermediate position which involves only partial transfer of control with a reduction but not full surrender of authority, and a partial but not full prescription of norms. This type of decentralization is called derogation and is defined by Riggs as a "lessening or weakening of power, authority, and position."⁸

In considering the issue of decentralization, which is presently the most important national issue in the Government of Iran, a study at the ministerial level was conducted in the effort to gain more understanding and insight into the concepts and process of decentralization as perceived by the Government and a number of individuals deeply involved in its implementation.

Such an insight is significant in providing an understanding of the future administrative environment and the dimensions and qualifications of executives within it.

Methodology

Description of the Participants

The participants in the study were selected based upon the author's personal knowledge of individuals who were deeply and actively involved in the process of

decentralization, and had extensive knowledge and insight with regard to the dimensions and qualifications that are needed for the future executives in Iran.

The participants included five individuals: four were Ministers including Dr. Amouzegar, then the Minister of State and Head of the Resurgence Party, and later the Prime Minister of Iran. The fifth participant did not hold a ministerial office, but had served as a Deputy Minister. At the time of the study, he was the head of an important organization which was directly involved in the decentralization process.

Procedure

Following preliminary arrangements (telephone contacts), data was collected using Structured Interview III (Appendix F) during a single interview session at the office of the participants.

The duration of the interview ranged from thirty minutes to two hours, with an average of over one hour and fifteen minutes. During the interview session, the author asked the participant the seven open-ended questions previously formulated, and recorded the responses given in the presence of the interviewee. These responses were elaborated more by the author immediately after each interview session in order to capture all the information given by the participants.

The interviews were mostly conducted in Farsi (the language of Iranians), but in many instances the participants expressed their opinions and responses in English. All the information was ultimately translated into English by the author.

Instrument

The Structured Interview III (Appendix F) developed by the author consisted of seven open-ended questions which required the respondents to discuss each. The questions were designed based upon the objectives of the study and were to explore the following areas:

1. The concept and process of decentralization.
2. The future administrative environment.
3. The dimensions and qualification of the future top executives.

Results and Discussion

The Ministers have always played a pivotal role with regard to ministerial, national, and international policies in the Government of Iran. The significance of their role has become intensified in the last few years with the rapid economic, social, political, and administrative development in Iran. They have become more involved in the actual implementation of the development processes and they are moving away from the more ceremonial

role and image that was associated with the Ministers in the past administrative era. They are characterized as more active, conscious, and sensitive to issues of national interest and are responsible and accountable for selection and recruitment of the best qualified top Government executives. In short, they are at the highest level of the administrative system of Iran and play a fundamental and crucial role in the development of new Iran.

As it was mentioned earlier, administrative and political decentralization, which is being implemented simultaneously, is presently the major Government policy in Iran. Administrative decentralization is the function of the Government administration, whereas political decentralization belongs to the Resurgence Party. Both are intertwined in a sense that many of the top Government executives have the dual functions of contributing to both simultaneously.

Administrative and political decentralization, which emphasizes the democratic and participative approach to bringing people together, is both of great significance and very timely to Iran. Each topic constitutes a worthwhile study and needs to be explored in a more careful and methodical manner. In this thesis, both subjects are beyond the topic of our concern and we only deal with some of the aspects of administrative decentralization as it

relates to the future environment and future executives in Iran.

Among the Ministers who participated in the study, there was a feeling that the Government might not know exactly and precisely what decentralization means. One of the participants indicated that:

Decentralization is not 'conceptually' realized in the entire Government. Some of the Government Agencies, for instance, are going through decentralization by delegating some of the routine work to their General Offices in the Provinces.⁹

Another respondent indicated that "Lack of understanding of the meaning of decentralization and its process by the Government has caused a state of confusion among Government officials."¹⁰ He added, "It is actually a lip service and not actual activity and this is because administrative decentralization is not yet analyzed and systematically implemented."¹¹

It was also indicated that "The Government is not decentralizing with the true meaning of the term, but, rather it is 'relinquishing responsibility' to local Governments."¹²

Another participant expressed a different view with regard to understanding of decentralization by indicating:

The Government has the right definition of decentralization, which is to delegate authority to people for decision making; in other words,

have the decisions made at the levels which are closer to the field. But unfortunately, the practice of decentralization by some of the Government Agencies is not congruent with the definition and in fact there are some confusions and undoubtedly misunderstandings among the Government officials.¹³

Thus, he felt that the confusion and misunderstanding were created by the practice of the Government Organizations and not by the Government misconception of the term decentralization.

With regard to the process or processes involved in decentralization, one Minister mentioned that:

Decentralization should be considered for the totality of the Government and not just a part of it. It is an unhealthy endeavor to decentralize one ministry and at the same time try to maintain other administrative organizations centralized. This is somehow troublesome and creates policy discrepancies among ministries.¹⁴

This expression was also supported by another respondent who stated, "In any kind of implementation process there is need for a balanced coordination among all elements of the system. Thus, the policy of each element should be within the context of that system."¹⁵

What is apparent is that, although decentralization is in the process of being implemented, there are incongruity and imbalance in practices of decentralization, willingness to delegate authority, and tendency to accept responsibility among both high Government officials in the Capital and those in the Provinces. This imbalance

has contributed to the slow administrative progress and development.

It was indicated by one of the Ministers that "the people show resistance to accept the phenomenon of decentralization. It is difficult for people to assent and digest the idea."¹⁶ He continued:

Some high Government officials feel threatened to lose their control and prestige and are thus reluctant to delegate authority. This reluctance is also in part due to their lack of confidence in the skill and competence of their subordinates. In addition, socioculturally we have always had a family-oriented society based on a centralized system in which the head of the family decided for the children, creating more dependence.¹⁷

With regard to the process of decentralization and what should be done to ameliorate some of the difficulties in delegating authority, one of the Ministers stated:

What is needed is 'cultural training' to develop a new set of values and sociocultural norms. Therefore, in the process of decentralization there are two important steps: (1) to change the executives; (2) to train and prepare people to accept the new ideas and policies. More decisions would be made at the Provincial levels and their speed would be very much dependent upon the training of the executives. A training program is indispensable to effective decentralization and can prepare and educate people to develop a solid belief in the system. It is important that those who want to train others also participate in training programs so that they have a better conceptualization of the issues and problems.¹⁸

Training was mentioned as a unanimous choice for improvement and enhancement of the decentralization process by the Ministers. All indicated the vitality of

such a program for a more responsive administrative environment both in the present and in the future. In agreement with this statement, another participant indicated:

Decentralization must be done in a gradual and methodical manner. It must involve many processes and phases including the most important factor--training. Not only training for Public Officials, but also training for people who are accustomed to a deep-seated traditional culture. If both participate in training programs, Public Officials would be more willing to delegate authority and recipients will be more inclined to accept the responsibility of making decisions.¹⁹

Another Minister also endorsed the idea of training by stating:

One of the important points in decentralization is that people must have a full understanding and commitment to decentralization. They should make a deliberate and conscious effort to create a more responsive and better environment both from quality and quantity point of view. In order to create this kind of environment, one of the fundamental and significant prerequisites is good planning to gradually educate and train people for a constructive environment.²⁰

From the above-mentioned expressions, it is evident that "training," especially in the form of action training and development, plays a vital and fundamental role in constructing the infrastructure and foundation of a decentralized administrative environment in the new Iran. The significance of training is realized by the top Government Officials and there seems to be a willingness on the part of the Government to adopt a number of training programs in order to improve the administrative environment. These

training programs, according to one of the participants, should be in accordance with the phases of the decentralization process, which are comprised first of capacity building, and second of quality development.²¹

With regard to the phase of decentralization, one of the Ministers strongly advocated that, due to lack of education and expertise, decentralization should include the following phases: (1) partial delegation in which training plays an important role in educating and preparing people for participation; and (2) full delegation during which people have become mentally ready and more competent to accept responsibility for decision making in the decentralization process.²²

In short, it seems that training is unanimously suggested as the most important means for building the foundation for the administrative infrastructure of the future Iran.

With regard to the future Government environment, it was suggested that because of the nature of the development activities that are taking place in Iran, the next few years will be very crucial in a sense that the solid future infrastructure must be developed. One of the respondents suggested:

For the next ten years we are within the 'historical present time.' We must be very careful and cautious; if not, we will confront a number of problems. It is a transitional period

which could be called 'the period of trial and error.' After a smooth and gradual process for building the infrastructure for both administrative and political decentralization in terms of policy, capacity, and functions, then in the following years we should be concerned with the question of 'quality,' which leads to having a complete Iranian model of decentralization around the year 2000.²³

Most of the participants foresaw a gradual and methodical decentralization process in the near future years of 1978 to 1988. These are the years of orientation to new education, new values and ideas and a new administrative culture. From the years 1988 to 2000, according to some of the Ministers, attention will be gradually diverted to the quality of work, Provincial independence, short- and long-term planning and a more coordinated and integrated national administrative system.

At the present time and in the future years, a number of problems impede or, at least, slow down the implementation of national decentralization policy. Some of these problems have been in existence for a long period of time and some have emerged within the context of the decentralization effort. These problems identified by the Ministers are categorized and discussed in the following.

1. Sociocultural problems. These are the problems which were mentioned earlier within the context of the past and present administrative environment of Iran. It was mentioned by most of the participants that these

obstacles are, and for some time will be, impeding the endeavors for administrative amelioration. Until the society adopts another set of values and beliefs, these problems will slow down the process of development and progress.

2. Educational problems. Lack of education was suggested to be directly associated with the overall slowness of progress. It was mentioned that people are not generally familiar with the concepts and processes of decentralization and that their perceptive capacity has not yet fully developed. Thus, it takes them a longer period of time to conceptualize and understand new ideas and policies. As one of the Ministers suggested, "Since we have about 55 per cent illiteracy, participation by people is difficult because they are basically not cognizant of what is involved in decentralization."²⁴

3. Organizational problems. Among organizational problems, partial decentralization of Government Organizations was indicated to be a problem which leads to imbalance and policy inconsistency.

Another problem was lack of coordination and cooperation among the Government Agencies and Provinces. The autonomy of Provinces, which is the concerted effort of decentralization, would probably cause independent planning and decision making, leading to a more self-reliant environment, but could at the same time be conducive to

creating lack of cooperation and collaboration with other Government Agencies and Provinces.

Other organizational problems mentioned were lack of manpower, mainly in the Provinces and cities, lack of national welfare facilities, and legal constraints which make delegation of authority for decentralization difficult.

With regard to the kind of organizational structure which will be appropriate for the future, it was indicated that the pyramidal organization structures of the Government would not be appropriate and responsive to the needs of the society, especially within the context of decentralization. One of the Ministers indicated that the Government should reduce its complex structure and let some of the Organizations be independent. Thus, a flatter organization structure is desirable.²⁵

It was also suggested that the same organization structure would not be appropriate for all Provinces, rather, each Province should have a model contingent upon its own situation, needs, and demands. One of the participants noted:

In the future, the modular form of structure is more relevant. Each structure should be relatively self-sufficient and should be able to formulate and execute its policies and yet be openly susceptible to national patterns.²⁶

From the responses given, it became apparent that the trend for organizational structure is to move from the pyramidal and hierarchical organization structure to a flatter, project-oriented structure in the future.

In response to a question concerned with the specialist or generalist dimension of the future executive, there was unanimous agreement that the generalist executive will be more responsive and better able to cope with the country's rapid developments. One Minister stated, "We do not deprecate the value of specialists, but the more complex the environment, the more is there need for generalists."²⁷ It was suggested that at the top level of Government there is a pervasive need for executives who have broader perspectives and views with one or more areas of specialization. In their decision-making process, they should be able to consider a number of different aspects and areas, even though they might be outside of their area of specialization and expertise. In short, they should be able to act upon a broad and diversified knowledge.²⁸

Two of the participants, although approving the generalist executive for the future, indicated:

It is not a question of either a generalist or a specialist, since a combination of both will be more responsive to the future administrative environment. We need more specialists in the near future and more generalists in the future. As we get closer to the year 2000, the demand for a generalist executive will become more intensified.²⁹

It was also suggested that the executive of the future should know both the art and science of management and administration.³⁰

Taking into consideration all the responses, the executive as a generalist seemed to be more appealing to the ministers predominantly because the higher the level of administration, the more pervasive is the need for someone who has a broad perspective and an integrative ability.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 7

¹Dale S. Beach, Personnel: The Management of People at Work (London: The McMillan Company, 1970).

²Donald Harder, "The Political Economy of Decentralization," American Behavioral Scientist, 15 (September-October, 1971):109.

³Ibid.

⁴Norman Furniss, "The Practical Significance of Decentralization," The Journal of Politics, 34 (November, 1974):960.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Fred W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964), pp. 341-342.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Personal Communication.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Personal Communication.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ibid.

CHAPTER 8

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION OF THE STUDIES OF THE DIRECTORS GENERAL, DEPUTY MINISTERS AND MINISTERS

From the study of Ministers it became quite evident that decentralization is presently the major national issue in the Government of Iran. The Ministers suggested that decentralization must become the foundation upon which the modern state of Iran will rest if her economic, social, political, and administrative aspirations are to be realized.

While decentralization is recognized as a highly valued and desired aspiration by a large number of Ministers, Deputy Ministers, and Directors General, they have become increasingly aware of the difficulty and ambiguity in conceptualizing decentralization, lack of clarity of goals and objectives, and the problems of implementing it on a national level.

The study of Ministers indicated that decentralization as a concept and as a Government policy is perceived in diverse manners. One of the Ministers suggested that by decentralization the Government means relinquishing

responsibility by delegating some of the routine work to the General Offices in the Provinces. Decentralization was also defined as "giving local Governments authority for their local decision-making processes." Finally, decentralization was defined by one Minister as "a process in which authority for decision making is delegated to people so that decisions are made at the levels which are closer to the field and the source of information."

An examination of the above-mentioned definitions or concepts of decentralization, in conjunction with the findings of the three studies conducted by the author, points out that the difficulty and ambiguity and lack of consensus regarding the concept of decentralization are partly due to the fact that different aspects of decentralization are considered. Some think of decentralization as including administrative decentralization, whereas others consider decentralization mainly in political and/or economic terms. The findings of the study of Ministers showed that all these considerations are included under the rubric of the generic term decentralization, and have thus contributed to ambiguity and lack of consensus regarding its meaning and its processes.

In spite of the diversity of opinion regarding the definition of decentralization and its processes, there was a general consensus that decentralization should

be a combination of both administrative and political decentralization with the goal to involve people more in the affairs of the Government. There was also agreement that decentralization must be gradual and methodical and must involve the totality of the Government and people through a normative-reductive manner.

The concept of delegation of authority and responsibility runs throughout all the different definitions and kinds of decentralization. Delegation is concerned with assignment of work to a subordinate. In its most basic sense it is "the organization process by which authority and responsibility are shifted from one point to another."¹ In short, delegation is giving the authority and responsibility to lower echelons in the organization, who are closer to the source of information, to make decisions. Thus, delegation is crucial to effective decentralization.

Delegation is a complex and multistyle phenomenon and the degree of authority and power shared with a subordinate cannot be evaluated and described without detailed scrutiny of an organization, its people, and their values, attitudes, and behaviors.

The study of Directors General showed that one of the major problems in the present administrative environment of the Ministry of Interior is lack of delegation of authority. The study showed that most superiors make their

own decisions without an explanation to subordinates. This, according to Heller,² corresponds to a fairly authoritarian and centralized mode of decision style in which the participative approach to decision making is missing. It became further evident from the study of Deputy Ministers' role perception and time use that lack of delegation of authority by the superior to the subordinate is not exclusive to the Ministry of Interior, but is more widely prevalent in the entire administrative environment of Iran. The existence of a centralized and fairly authoritarian decision style was also substantiated by Rowe.³

An examination of the restraining forces which contribute to lack of delegation of authority indicated that lack of delegation was manifested in different forms such as lack of authority to evaluate subordinates, and lack of a general sense of independence especially with regard to rewarding, punishing, promoting, and demoting employees.

Lack of delegation of authority to perform the above-mentioned functions seemed to be related to a number of factors, some of which are sociocultural and some of which are related to human dimensions in an organization. One of the most outstanding factors was Deputy Ministers' lack of confidence and trust in the skill and competence of Directors General, especially for jobs they had not done before, and, therefore, had no experience and/or expertise.

It became apparent, from the study of Deputy Ministers' role perception and the study of Directors General, that lack of trust in the skill and competence as well as intentions and loyalty of subordinates is not only exhibited by Deputy Ministers towards their immediate subordinates, Directors General, but that some Directors General have the same attitudes toward their own subordinates. This suggests that the problem does not reside in the position or the person per se, but rather is a manifestation of the sociocultural value. What seems clear is that such attitudes must be regarded as inhibiting effective delegation of authority and responsibility.

Another contributing factor mentioned by the Directors General was the existence of administrative and personal distance between Deputy Ministers and Directors General and Deputy Ministers' lack of familiarity with the Ministry of Interior, its employees, and their functions, responsibilities and qualifications. This lack of familiarity often seemed to be conducive to fear of failing on the part of the superior and was usually manifested by maintaining control. It was suggested that some Deputy Ministers feel that they are responsible to the Minister and are thus conscious and hesitant to delegate authority and responsibility to their subordinates. Actually, this is a fear that they might lose their credibility and accountability if damage is done by subordinates.

A number of Directors General suggested that authority is not delegated by the higher-positioned executives because of a general sense of possessiveness and fear of losing control. This suggests that risk is involved in delegating a task, especially when the task is delegated for the first time. Associated with the fear of losing control is the implicit attitude that if subordinates learn too much, they might become rivals and competitors.

Another reason for lack of delegation of authority was that the individualistic rather than the participative mode of decision making and management is still more prevalent in Iran and that there is still a general absence of participative group work and cooperation in administrative affairs. Pursuing an individualistic mode of management was partially associated with the failure to understand the advantages of successful delegation of authority by superiors to subordinates and seems to be related to a culture that has not reinforced group work, cooperation and collaboration.

Deputy Ministers suggested that lack of delegation of authority can be attributed to two main factors. Lack of trust in the intentions and loyalty of subordinates and in their general skill and competence to perform the delegated tasks, and existence of legal and/or formal

regulations and requirements which make assigning responsibility and authority to subordinates difficult.

Lack of delegation of authority and maintenance of control by Deputy Ministers might also be related partially to their own expectations of their role. The results of the study on role perception of Deputy Ministers showed that most of them perceived "managing and supervising" as their most important activity followed by the next most significant activity which was "following up and handling of various problems assigned by the superiors."

One of the findings that emerged from the study of Directors General was that they are not delegated the authority to evaluate their subordinates and that there is interference in performing this task by the Deputy Ministers. From the study of Deputy Ministers' time use, it became apparent that there is a substantial commitment to evaluation and inspection with Deputy Ministers spending between eleven to sixteen per cent of their total executive time on such activities. Thus, the problem of Directors General might be attributed, in part, to the role perception of Deputy Ministers, in the sense that they view evaluation and inspection as important and legitimate activities within their roles.

From the study of Deputy Ministers, it also became apparent that there is ambiguity in role perception.

Since there is no specific job description, some Deputy Ministers perceive themselves as Deputy or Vice Ministers, whereas others view themselves as Deputies of Ministries. In addition to this role ambiguity, one of the findings which emerged from the study of Directors General showed that there is a personal and administrative distance between Deputy Ministers and Directors General, and that Deputy Ministers are generally unfamiliar with the functions, qualifications, and responsibilities of the Directors General. Considering the Deputy Ministers' role ambiguity and their unfamiliarity with the functions and responsibilities of Director General, these may be partially accountable for their lack of willingness to delegate authority and responsibility to Directors General. They might be reluctant to delegate authority and responsibility because their own functions and responsibilities are not clearly stated and designated, and they are not familiar with the qualifications, functions, and responsibilities of Directors General to know what can be delegated.

Attitudes toward subordinates must be regarded as one key to more effective sharing of activity in a situation in which authority and responsibility are delegated. Data from the study of Deputy Ministers' time use showed that they spend twenty-five per cent of their interactive time (fifteen per cent of their total executive time) with

Directors General. This is a rather high percentage compared to the proportion of time Deputy Ministers spend on other activities, however, evidence showed that Deputy Ministers do not consider Directors General as a significant element in their role relationships. They also feel that the incapacity of their subordinates is a significant problem. These attitudes, in addition to the general lack of trust in the intentions, loyalty, skill and competence of their immediate subordinates, seem to have an inhibiting effect on effective delegation of authority and responsibility and may create problems in building effective management collaboration and restrict lateral communication with subordinates, both of which are needed and essential for effective decentralization.

In addition to the restraining forces which prevented Deputy Ministers from delegating authority to Directors General, there were a number of factors which also contributed to Directors' General reluctance to accept authority and responsibility for the delegated tasks.

One of the reasons Directors General did not seem to accept and facilitate delegation of authority was fear of responsibility. This fear was more evident when Directors General were not familiar with the functions of their jobs, were not aware, or at least, clear about the

expectations of their superiors, and did not have the appropriate education, expertise and specialization that was needed for performing the delegated tasks.

Fear to accept responsibility for delegated tasks seemed especially associated with the fear of failure and fear of criticism and punitive action on the part of the superiors. Fear of criticism seemed to be conducive to discouraging initiative, inducing resentment, and destroying a subordinate's self-confidence. Fear of failure seemed to be related to fear in the past, criticism by the superiors, or failure to receive the variety of tasks needed to build up experience and therefore self-confidence. This further suggested that lack of self-confidence might well be the reason why some Directors General avoid delegation.

Lack of positive incentive by the superiors emerged as another factor contributing to Directors' General avoiding delegation. It became apparent from the present studies that subordinates need some system of reward and incentive for acceptance and successful completion of delegated tasks. A great lack seemed to be praise or recognition on the part of the superior who made the delegation originally. It was suggested that some superiors systematically avoid praise with the thought that this will lead to the subordinates asking for a raise or a closer and friendlier relationship that will inhibit efficiency.

Data from the study of Directors General indicated that performance and effectiveness of some Directors General in the Ministry of Interior are low and they avoid accepting and performing delegated tasks partly because of lack of motivation.

An analysis of the restraining forces showed that lack of motivation seems to be due to a multitude of factors. Existence of discrimination and favoritism in selection of Directors General for higher positions, as well as lack of an objective system of job evaluation were suggested as demotivating factors. Nepotism and favoritism seemed to be related to the high-positioned executives' interest and proclivity to work with someone with whom they are familiar and acquainted. Where this might have some functional value and utility for the high-positioned executives, it deters from the motivation of subordinates to perform at their maximum level of efficiency, because this situation suggests that personal connection and favoritism are involved and considered in selection and promotion, rather than merit and qualifications of the individual.

Insufficient salary and incentives, as well as lack of any other kind or form of external reward, further seemed to reduce the extrinsic motivation of the Directors General to perform well. The magnitude of this problem

and its effects on the attitude, mentality, and motivation of the Directors General becomes even more apparent and real when we consider the existence of a drive and force to move to other public and especially private sectors which offer more in terms of external rewards in the form of high salaries and incentives coupled with inflation and increase in living expenses.

In addition to insufficient salary and incentives and favoritism in selection, lack of promotion of Directors General to higher positions and a heavy system of control, which was usually manifested by keeping track of Directors' General attendance in the Ministry, as well as existence of an administrative and personal distance between Deputy Ministers and Directors General, further reduced their prestige and their internal motivation to perform well.

In short, lack of motivation seemed to deter from effective performance of a number of Directors General in the Ministry of Interior because some of the intrinsic and extrinsic motivational forces were not in existence.

In addition to the above-mentioned factors, which contribute to difficulty in delegating authority and responsibility, the difficulty could also be partly attributed to the family orientation within the context of the Iranian culture. The Iranian family for centuries has

been centered around the father as the head of the family who assumes responsibility for the welfare of the family members and fosters prolonged and dependent relationships. As a result, attitudes are engendered that limit the initiative and potentiality of individuals in accepting responsibility. The validity of this kind of family orientation and its effect on behavior was confirmed by a number of Ministers, Deputy Ministers, and Directors General. They suggested that we have a centralized mode of thinking partly because of a family orientation in which decisions have been made for the children.

In short, the difficulty in delegating authority and responsibility seems to inhibit effective decentralization to a great extent. Results of the three studies showed that lack of delegation of authority and responsibility could be partly attributed to sociocultural values, partly to human and organizational factors, and in part to legal constraints. The present studies indicated that the problem is related to superiors' lack of delegation of authority and responsibility to subordinates, as well as the subordinates' avoiding delegation.

In addition to delegation of authority, one of the areas that received considerable attention, especially by Ministers, was training. Most of the Ministers were unanimous that training is needed in order for decentralization to take place.

The term training does not refer to the typical academic classroom training. It refers rather to training that takes place in the office, on the street and in the village, wherever Government employees carry out their tasks.

The Ministers emphasized the need for such training and suggested that it is indispensable for effective decentralization. One of the participants suggested that "cultural training is needed to develop a new set of values and sociocultural norms."⁴ This meant training on a societal basis that will include not only the training of the executives for decentralization, but also training that will prepare and educate people to have a solid belief system to participate in the Government and its affairs.

Whereas training was viewed as indispensable to the effectiveness of decentralization, analysis of the data from the Directors General study showed that one of the problems is lack of an adequate training system.

A number of factors seemed to be conducive to lack of an adequate training system. These factors include: lack of support for training by both high-positioned executives as well as trainers, poor results of training programs, lack of qualified trainers, facilities, equipment and an environment for training, lack of utilization and implementation of training by either high-level public

officials and trainees for enhancement of performance on the job, and finally, lack of incentive for participating in training programs which is usually time-consuming but has little intrinsic or extrinsic value.

The findings of the present study were substantiated by a recent report which indicated:

Training in Iran is not correlated; it is not a system. Support for training is half-hearted, particularly for the public sector. Many high-level public officials really do not believe in training; they pay lip service only. They do not believe in training because training has not been well done. Too much training has been by rote. Often training has been imported as though it were a piece of goods rather than the highly intangible and fragile product of research and analysis of need, designed to meet that particular need, with subject matter and method expressed in the Iranian idiom. There is obviously no intention to promote training for the sake of training alone. There are signs that this may have been the practice where individuals seem to collect training credits as a boy scout collects merit badges, without regard to enhancement of performance on the job, preparation for promotion or individual career development.⁵

In short, the three studies which were concerned with the top three levels of the Iranian Government made it clear that Iran intends to attain development goals unprecedented in magnitude in a very short period of time. In an effort to attain these goals, a solid administrative infrastructure is needed.

The present studies showed that the present administrative environment is not entirely responsive to the needs of Iran and is not adequate for coping with

the country's rapid economic, social, political, and administrative developments. Two major problem areas, namely, lack of delegation of authority and responsibility, and lack of an adequate training system for executives and the people, as well as some of the organizational, sociocultural, and legal problems, were discussed.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 8

¹Frank P. Sherwood, "Basic Terminology," in Phase I Report: Iran Public Sector Project, Tehran: Development Resources Corporation (May, 1975), p. 38.

²Frank A. Heller, Managerial Decision Making (London: Tavistock, 1971), p. xvi.

³Alan J. Rowe, "How Do Senior Managers Make Decisions?" Los Angeles Business Economics (Winter, 1977): 17-20.

⁴Personal Communication.

⁵Henry Reining, "Manpower Development, Education, and Training," in Phase I Report: Iran Public Sector Project, Tehran: Development and Resources Corporation (May, 1975), pp. 140-141.

CHAPTER 9

THE FUTURE TOP EXECUTIVES OF IRAN

The pervasive and unprecedented economic and social aspirations and development goals have shown that the existing administrative environment is not responsive to the needs of the present Iran and have thus been forcing fundamental changes in the administrative environment of Government and in the dimensions and qualifications of executives within it.

Based on the insights gained from the three studies conducted by the author as well as the new trend, there is indication that the administrative environment of the future will be qualitatively different from the past and present administrative environment predominantly because of the emergence of new workloads, problems, and decision processes under the new policy of decentralization.

These changes pose major challenges for executives at different levels of the Government hierarchy, but especially for the three top-level executives considered in this thesis, namely, Directors General, Deputy Ministers, and Ministers.

In the present thesis, the past and present administrative environment of Iran and the dimensions and qualifications of executives within it were considered. We began by analyzing the job of Directors General by examining their problems within the context of their work and decision-making process. A further study of the Deputy Ministers' role perception and time use in conjunction with the Ministers' study on the goals and processes of decentralization further suggested that to accommodate the changes that are brought about by the policy of decentralization in the Government, corresponding changes will have to be made in the administrative environment and in the dimensions of executives within it.

In the following, first we will attempt to forecast the future administrative environment of Iran, which will affect future executives. The future administrative environment will be discussed in terms of required skills and capabilities of executives. In the second section, an attempt will be made to discuss the general as well as the specific skills that will be an asset for the effective Government executives in the future.

The Future Administrative Environment

To understand the dimensions and qualifications of Government executives and their development in the future, an understanding of the administrative

environment in which they are likely to perform seems essential. From the insights gained from the studies of Directors General, Deputy Ministers, and Ministers, and the emerging trend in the Government, the future administrative environment of Iran can be characterized as one which is comparatively more committed to decentralization and moves rapidly towards its attainment on a national scale. This suggests that the public administrative environment of the future will be qualitatively different from the past administrative environment which was characterized as mainly centralized and inflexible in administrative functions, and different in magnitude from the present administrative environment in which decentralization is in an embryonic stage of development.

The future administrative environment of Iran will thus be a decentralizing administration, one in which administrative functions are delegated more readily and frequently, and one in which there is a more pervasive dispersal of concentrated national operations from the capital, Tehran, to other cities and municipalities.

There would be an increase in the delegation and redelegations of administrative authority and responsibility to the responsible points of competence and operational knowledge closest to the people to be served, with concomitant accountability. This will be conducive to

simplification of rigid administrative controls on performance accompanied by further realization of centralized constraints on the great volume of subordinate managerial actions.

Dispersal or decongestion involves the rather simple physical dispersal of offices and personnel from the center (Tehran) to the field (non-Tehran).

Provincial governments will be strengthened by the transfer of greater authority to draw up, coordinate, and supervise local projects to provincial governors and governor-generals.¹

The technical and administrative capacity of provincial government will be improved and provisions for greater financial and manpower resources will be made.

The program in regional development will also aim at the gradual transfer of responsibilities of executive departments from the center to local branches.²

From the foregoing it is evident that the plan in Tehran is to retain those functions of the central Government which have leadership implications for the whole system and to transfer to other localities those that are operational and are directed to the performance of a single defined task within the entire system.

Considering the great commitment to decentralization, the administrative environment of the future will necessitate a change in the organizational structures of the Government. What seems quite likely is that the

pyramidal, hierarchical, and vertical organizational structure will not die out completely in the very near future to give way to a completely horizontal organizational structure. Rather, a horizontal structure will develop in conjunction with the pyramidal structure of the past and the present structure.

Thus, as Sherwood³ has suggested, one might look to a time in the future when executives in the Government will have substantial imperatives to operate in horizontal fashion in their inter-organizational and intra-organizational relationships and at the same time revert to rather vertical behaviors in their own organizations. This suggests that organizations become more complex in structure and demand more adaptability and flexibility in behavior of executives within them.

The horizontal structure will probably consist of an interlaced web of tension in which control is rather loose, power somewhat diffused, and centers of decision comparatively more plural in nature. Decision making will gradually and slowly become a process of multilateral brokerage, both inside and outside of the Government. Thus, Government will move closer to collegial, consensual, and consultative modes of decision making. This suggests that public management will be practiced not solely as a system of authority, but rather as a resource to achieve agreed-upon objectives and goals.

In a decentralizing administrative environment, more decisions will concern novel and unstructured situations which have no relationship to past decisions. Rather than relying on historical experience, judgment, and past program for solving familiar problems, there would be a gradual shift to rational analysis, anticipation, and pervasive use of specialist experts and techniques for coping with novel decision situations. With these decision processes, the information for decisions, which is presently based, predominantly, on a one-way top down-flow of information, will gradually give way to a two-way interactive communication channel in which Directors General as professionals can communicate more freely to Deputy Ministers and Ministers.

Expanding governmental concerns with the welfare of the people will bring about more interaction between Government and the society. This means that under the policy of decentralization, local governments will operate within an expanded geographical area. Thus, decision-making perspectives will be further broadened to include consideration of more sociocultural variables.

In the future there would also be a trend toward merging Government organizations and their related agencies with the aim of preventing dispersion in the basic organizational structure. As was pointed out in a recent report:

. . . ministry organization is marked by a proliferation of discrete agencies with relatively narrow missions. Many broad functions of Government which are organically intertwined in their subject matter are split into separate ministries; and there are strange assignments and admixtures of other functions which violate principles of commonality and functional unity.⁴

The scattered responsibility for essentially inter-related sectors of public affairs is conducive to over-centralization in decision making, complicates decentralization to the regions by multiple, diverse, and potentially conflicting program mandates, aggravates problems of program development and control, and places a heavy burden of coordination on the top levels of Government and further magnifies the role of central staff offices.

Considering that coordination of activities of ministries is of crucial significance in the decentralization effort, it is expected that in the future, reorganization of the basic ministerial structure may gain more saliency and importance. Rather than organizing activities by subjects, they will be structured around the purposes of Government in designing a modern and advanced society. This means that Iran will gradually begin to move toward adoption of the principle of organizing activities around strategic goals. Under such a system, each ministry will have a mission of sufficient scope which covers a major sector of national purpose and can establish comprehensive policy directions and resolve policy

conflicts without burdening the coordinating powers of top leadership. This would allow top-positioned executives to coordinate and supervise activities and participate more actively in the significant task of policy formulation.

In short, what seems quite likely in the future is that the present decentralization effort will be continued more expediently and rapidly on a national level by delegating more authority and responsibility to those closer to the field of decision making and by a more pervasive and expanded dispersal of concentrated national operations from the capital to other cities and municipalities.

The Future Top Executives of Iran

There have been only sporadic efforts to study the dimensions of the government executives' role and their qualities and skills specifically and systematically. Even when such an attempt has been made, there has been a quest for stereotypic and general traits, qualities, and skills without attention to the functions and responsibilities of the executives. This mode of study assumes that all executives in all positions and all cultural and organizational settings have the same dimensions for effective execution of their functions and responsibilities.

Considering that the effectiveness of the executives will be in part attributed to their functions and task requirements,⁵ in this section an attempt is made to discuss the dimensions of future top executives of the Government of Iran not only based on the general characteristics they should have, but also based on the specific skills they should possess in order to perform their functions, responsibilities, and roles more expediently and efficiently. This approach suggests that one should consider not only the more general and less situation-specific characteristics of the executives, but also the more specific skills and characteristics that are contingent upon the functions, responsibilities, and role behavior of executives at different levels of the organization hierarchy.

The general dimensions for the effective future executives are depicted in a Wheel developed by the author and is called "The General Dimensions Wheel of Future Executives." The future executive is located at the center of the Wheel with all general dimensions surrounding him. The general dimensions are considered within the context of leadership behaviors, value orientations, decision-making behaviors, knowledge, and personal qualities.


Following the discussion of the general dimensions, the Model of Specific Dimensions for the Future Top Executives, which is constructed by the author and represents the more specific dimensions of Ministers, Deputy Ministers, and Directors General in the Government of Iran, will be considered under the categories of human, technical, perceptual, conceptual, and integrative skills.

The General Dimensions of Future Top Executives

The foregoing discussion of the future administrative environment of Iran indicated that a novel administrative environment is emerging. This new environment requires new kinds of executives who are qualitatively different from the past and present executives. They are able to cope with the complexity of factors and forces in the society, and are capable of accepting and adapting to change according to social, economic, and political advances.

In the complex administrative environment of the future, executives will be faced with a number of factors such as individual needs, organizational and environmental factors, and task or function requirements.⁶ These factors call for a certain set of general dimensions which, as shown in the Wheel (Figure 4), consist of certain leadership behaviors, value orientations, decision-making behaviors, knowledge and skills, and personal qualities.

Figure 4: The General Dimensions of the Future Top Executives of Iran



Leadership behaviors. The future executives will deal with a highly complex Government organizational structure. The structure of Government, as was aforementioned, will not be exactly hierarchical and pyramidal, but rather more horizontal and less vertical. With a modification in the structure of the Government, there would be a change in the environmental forces. Thus, the style by which they will be governed will have to be more consensual, collegial, and conclusive. This suggests that management will have to be practiced less as a system of authority and more as a resource in an organizational system to achieve desired results.

Future executives will realize that other Government employees will be more inclined to take authority from agreed-upon objectives and the nature of work than from the dictation of an authoritarian superior. This means that executives will have to use a modified concept of authority that will enable personnel to exercise self-commitment and self-control for the achievement of agreed-upon goals instead of emphasizing processes.

The future executive in such a collegial environment will have social understanding and respect for people and will try to preserve and develop human dignity. Cognizant of people as the most valuable asset of the organization and concern with their welfare, the future

executives will be more responsive to their needs, drives, motives, and feelings.

Because inter-organizational as well as intra-organizational relations will come to play a more significant role in a decentralizing administrative environment, the effective future executives will endeavor to build an environment of cooperation, in which each person helps other members to accomplish mutual goals and objectives. They will encourage both climates of efficiency and satisfaction.

In order to achieve the goals of the organization, the top-positioned executives will rely more on motivating their subordinates by establishing and maintaining a motivational environment. They will be a continuous supplier of motivational rewards and/or punishments. They will be sensitive to motivational needs and differences of individuals, and will be able to respond to these appropriately. They will inspire confidence and build morale in their subordinates and offer them recognition for their efforts.

The future executives will have to be creative if they are to maintain their positions of responsibility. Since most of the decisions will be novel in the context of a decentralizing administrative environment, they have to rely more heavily on divergent modes of thinking for solving individual and organizational problems.

The effective future executive will have the ability to listen creatively. Creative listening requires a discipline for concentration, open-mindedness, flexibility, and time.

Value orientations. The value orientations of the effective future executives will move away from the traditional and conservative perspective to a more novel and liberal attitude and belief system. Cognizant that the administrative environment is not always a stable and certain setting, the future executives who have a tendency to take calculated risk will be more effective.

Considering that time will be an extremely scarce resource, the effective executives of the future will have a better concept of time, and will value it more. Thus, they would be more careful with its proper allocation.

The future executives will have comparatively more tendency to accept responsibility for both success and failure. Since they will perform their roles in a decentralizing administrative environment, they will be more effective if they have the inclination to share responsibility with their superiors, peers, and especially subordinates.

Executives of the future will be much more aware of the organizational complexities which demand tremendous physical and mental energies. They will be cognizant that

continuous work leads to physical and mental exhaustion and lack of effectiveness. To prevent physical and mental fatigue, the future executives will have the foresight to prepare themselves by taking more vacations and creating more balance between their diverse activities. This suggests that the effective executive of the future will have different value orientations and attitudes toward life, which centers around the philosophy that physical and mental exhaustion is detrimental to personal and organizational effectiveness.

Decision-making behaviors. In the future, executives, because of their own educational backgrounds and more knowledgeable and skillful subordinates, are likely to make better decisions. The factual basis upon which their decisions are based will be broader and the number of variables and perspectives included in the decision process larger.

The increased environmental forces will demand the utilization of acquired general knowledge of all facets. Thus, although the future environment will be highly complex and intricate, because of availability of more sophisticated tools for decision making, the future executives will be better equipped to deal with such environmental complexities.

The future executives, because of a decentralizing administrative environment and their own educational backgrounds and their value orientations and attitudes, delegate more authority and responsibility to their subordinates for making decisions. This suggests that there would be a shift from a centralized decision style to a more participative style in which a superior delegates a decision to his subordinates.

Delegation of authority as well as responsibility will be more frequent and pervasive because the top-positioned executives will be more cognizant of the values of delegation of authority and the contribution of those they work with and those they lead.

As decisions are delegated, more time will be saved and the top-positioned executives will be better able to allocate their time to such significant activities as policy making.

The future executives, by delegating authority, will also improve the morale of the subordinates. Those who are given the delegated tasks will, quite likely, obtain more satisfaction from making their own decisions. This autonomy promotes identification with the organization and its goals and objectives.

The future executives in their process of decision making will consider past as well as future implications

of decisions, by including all contingencies which may affect the decision.

In their decision-making process, they will rely upon a participative rather than individualistic approach to decision making. Depending upon the nature of decisions, there is a likelihood for more consultation with others and especially those closer to the field.

Knowledge and skills. Executives of the future will be more educated than their predecessors, and will have comparatively more exposure to diverse areas of government administration. They will be cognizant not only of national issues but also international concerns.

The effective executives of the future will probably be primarily from high educational institutions with some specialization coupled with extended knowledge in unrelated fields of interest. They will reflect the Renaissance man who has a broad perspective and who is knowledgeable in many subject areas. They have a knowledge of inter- and intra-organizational relationships and complexities, and are able to play diverse roles of a generalist.

The future executives will have a skill for innovation and a talent for formulating novel ideas. They will be articulate and an advocate of horizontal and lateral communication.

Personal qualities. The future executives will be individuals with great intelligence and mental ability. The capable executive must work closely with other individuals and within highly complex situations which demand a keen intellect to quickly re-evaluate the situation and adjust to it.

The future executives will have dedication and commitment to work. By dedicating and committing themselves, the future executives will enjoy more fully the functions and responsibilities they perform and when this dedication becomes modified toward solidness, a greater fidelity appears in them.

The future executives will have a sense of intellectual curiosity. They will learn more by reading publications and reports written by their subordinates and others outside the organization. This intellectual curiosity coupled with open-mindedness and flexibility would lead to development of more pertinent policies and more innovative approaches to management and leadership.

The future executives will be alert, observant, and open to novel experiences. They will be flexible and able to modify their styles of action, not only with respect to themselves but also with regard to those they supervise. They will be able to provide each department or task unit with the type of management style required.

Thus, the effective executives of the future will be those who have flexibility and adaptability and who are not locked into a particular discipline and a fixed mode and style of thinking, and look at change as a creative, thought-provoking and dynamic way of management.

A Model for Specific Dimensions of Future Top Executives

In the previous section, the general dimensions of the future executives within the decentralizing Government of Iran were considered. In this section, an attempt is made to discuss some of the specific dimensions of future top executives in the context of their roles, responsibilities, and functions in a decentralizing administrative environment.

The dimensions suggested for the Ministers, Deputy Ministers, and Directors General in the Government of Iran are based on the insights gained from the three studies conducted by the author, as well as the trend and literature. The relationship between the specific dimensions of future top executives and the studies are presented in the Grid in Figure 5. The Model for the specific dimensions of executives is also based on a study of the trend in the Government of Iran as well as a review of literature.

Figure 5: A Grid Representing the Relationships of the Three Studies to the Specific Dimensions of the Future Top Executives

| | | HUMAN SKILLS | TECHNICAL SKILLS | PERCEPTUAL SKILLS | CONCEPTUAL SKILLS | INTEGRATIVE SKILLS |
|---------------------------|-------------------|--|--|---|---|---|
| THE FUTURE TOP EXECUTIVES | MINISTERS | <p>Top executives should be sensitive to the welfare of their employees.</p> <p>Top executives are most often unaware of issues and problems of individuals at the lower echelons.</p> | <p>Specialists with technical skills are greatly needed for field officials and Directors General.</p> | <p>There is a need for perceptual skills with regard to the world as well as our own views.</p> <p>Decentralization process requires a great deal of perceptual skills.</p> | <p>There is a need to train ourselves so that we can have a more conceptualized system of thinking.</p> <p>Top executives have to have a sense of precepts and concepts.</p> <p>Decentralization process requires a great ability for conceptual skills.</p> <p>There is a need for more understanding of concepts and terms.</p> | <p>Top executives should have the ability to integrate many different factors for formulation of a decision.</p> <p>Decentralization process embodies scattered information, thus, there is a need for an integrator.</p> |
| | DEPUTY MINISTERS | <p>Deputy Ministers should spend more time with their Directors General.</p> <p>The Ministers should be more available to the Deputy Ministers and overall Ministry.</p> | <p>There is a great need for specialization at the level of the Directors General.</p> <p>There is lack of confidence in the competence and skills of the Directors General.</p> | <p>Deputy Ministers need to spend more time on reading publications and reports to strengthen their perceptual ability.</p> | <p>Deputy Ministers, among other things, should be thinkers.</p> | |
| | DIRECTORS GENERAL | <p>There is a great need for enhancement of human relations and trust.</p> <p>There is a need for group-oriented work.</p> | <p>The Directors General should have technical training and background.</p> <p>The Directors General should get familiarized with the newest methods and techniques in their respective functions and responsibilities.</p> <p>The Directors General should participate in specialized conferences and seminars.</p> | | | |


The dimensions of the future top executives, namely, human, technical, perceptual, conceptual, and integrative, are constructed by the author into a Model called "A Model for Specific Dimensions of the Future Top Executives" (see Figure 6). Similar to the general dimensions, these dimensions are also interrelated and interdependent. Nevertheless, some of the skills are more closely related to the particular position of the executives.

In order to be effective, future executives of Iran must either possess these specific dimensions or they must develop them, since they will become increasingly significant for effective performance in the future.

The Model, as its schematic representation is presented in Figure 6, consists of a trapezoid which is divided into three triangles, each delineating a specific dimension, namely, technical, perceptual, conceptual. The trapezoid itself represents the integrative skill for all three levels of the Government hierarchy. The human skill is represented by the circle encompassing the trapezoid. It suggests that human skill is of equal importance for executives at all levels of the Government hierarchy in the future decentralizing administrative environment of Iran.

As the Model represents (see Figure 6), the dimensions for effective administration are contingent on

Figure 6: A Model for the Specific Dimensions of the Future Top Executives of Iran



the position of the executives and the functions, responsibilities, and role behaviors associated with it. Thus, at lower levels, there is more need for technical skill. However, as one moves up the organization hierarchy, the perceptual, conceptual, and integrative skills become increasingly more important with the need for policy decisions and broad-scale action.

The change in relative importance of specific skills suggests that at the level of Directors General there is more need for specialists; however, as one moves up the ministerial level, the need for generalists becomes much more pressing.

In the following the specific dimensions for effective future executives and their relation to the findings of the studies and the previous research will be considered.

Human skill. Research by Boddewyn,⁷ Copeman,⁸ Katz,⁹ and Mintzberg,¹⁰ suggested that in the future administrative environment, there is more need for human or social skill, which is concerned with the ability directly used in getting things done through a number of people. It suggests working with people rather than with objects.

Human skill is needed to manage and lead the work of subordinates, to relate to superiors and peers within the organization, and to work with others outside the agency.

The future executives with highly developed human skill will be cognizant of their own attitudes, beliefs and behaviors and those of others. By being open and flexible, they accept the existence of different opinions, perceptions, and philosophies and learn to appreciate them. Executives who possess this kind of skill will endeavor to create an atmosphere of consensus and security in which people feel free to express their opinions and ideas by encouraging them to participate in the decision-making processes and by being sensitive to their needs and motivations.

With regard to the relative importance of human skill, Katz¹¹ indicated that it is highly needed at all levels of the organization hierarchy.

The findings of the present studies indicated the importance of human skill at all levels of the administrative hierarchy in the Government of Iran, and thus provide further support for Katz.

As it is presented in the Grid in Figure 5, a number of Ministers suggested that top executives are most often unaware of the problems of the individuals at the lower echelons. They indicated that top executives should be sensitive to the needs and welfare of their employees and should reward them for good performance.

The data from the study of Deputy Ministers on role perception and time use showed the need for more

interaction and association on a human level throughout the Government hierarchy. Deputy Ministers suggested that they should spend more time especially with the Directors General. They further indicated that Ministers should also be more available and accessible to Deputy Ministers and the Ministry.

Directors General also substantiated the need for an executive who has human skill. They indicated the tremendous need for enhancing human relations, trust, and a sense of cooperation among executives at all levels of the Government. They indicated the urgent need for someone who can be group- and person-oriented and can take into consideration the human problems of the subordinates.

The findings of the three studies in conjunction with the work of Katz further substantiate the importance of human skill for future executives at all three levels of the Government hierarchy, namely, the level of Directors General, Deputy Ministers, and Ministers. It suggests that whereas human skill is equally important at all levels, the context of its application differs from one level to another. The Directors' General human skill will be important within a departmental and/or interdepartmental context, whereas the human skill of Deputy Ministers gains more importance in an inter-divisional and inter-ministerial context. Ministers' human skill will be a great asset in

inter-ministerial, national, and international situations. Thus, as the application of human skill moves further and further from the level of Directors General towards the level of Ministers, the context becomes broader and wider.

Technical skill. The review of literature, Brunson,¹² Katz,¹³ and Parsons,¹⁴ indicated that technical skill which implies an understanding and proficiency in a specific kind of activity, particularly one involving methods, procedures, or techniques, is greatly instrumental in effective administration, especially for those who serve as experts or specialists in an organization. Katz¹⁵ suggested that at lower levels of administrative responsibility, the principal need is for technical and human skills.

The data from the three studies conducted by the author indicated that technical skill and competence are greatly needed at the level of Directors General in the Government of Iran. It was suggested by Ministers that specialists with technical skill are needed more at the lower echelons, especially at the level of Directors General. Deputy Ministers indicated that one of the major problems is lack of sufficient specialization and technical competence of Directors General. Most Directors General, cognizant of the importance of this skill in effective administration, also suggested that there is a great need

for technical training in their respective functions and responsibilities.

The data thus supported Katz's suggestion that technical skill is greatly needed for the lower levels of administrative responsibility. The need for technical skill was stressed especially by the Directors General. As the Grid in Figure 5 indicates, Directors General concerned themselves mostly with human and technical skills which seemed to have great priority for them.

In short, since Directors General are policy advisors, field officials, and serve as articulators between policy-formulating and implementing bodies as well as chief administrators and coordinators of different departments, their technical skill becomes of utmost significance in the future decentralizing administrative environment of Iran.

Perceptual skill. Research by Brunson,¹⁶ Rowe,¹⁷ Shull, Delbecq, and Cummings,¹⁸ indicated that perception or perceptual skill is highly valuable to effective administration and decision-making processes and will become increasingly important in the next decade. In a recent study, Rowe¹⁹ found that both American and European managers consider perception as the most important characteristic of an effective decision maker.

The perceptual skill involves the abilities to absorb knowledge, to understand the environment, and to interpret its forces. Thus, perceptual skill is basically concerned with learning, judging, and understanding processes.

The future executives will be in an administrative environment in which novel decisions based upon unfamiliar information should be made. They will not rely upon habits, tradition, intuition, and past experiences and practices. They will, on the other hand, rely upon their perceptual skill such as the sense of communication, values and objectives, priorities, participation, involvement, and commitment. Thus, in order to be effective in their decisions and plans, they have to be perceptive.

The data from the three studies indicated that perceptual skill is greatly needed, especially in the future administrative environment. One of the respondents mentioned, "We need perceptual skill so that we can manage our own situation and the situations around ourselves more effectively and expediently."²⁰ Another respondent stated that Government executives should develop their perceptual skill because at the present time the ability to perceive the decentralization process has been inhibiting its rapid progress. There were indications that as executives move to higher positions, there is more need for perceptual

skill predominantly because the higher the executives rise in the ministerial structure, the more of a nonverbal communicating world they face, and their jobs become less structured and more complex. Thus, they must have perceptual skill so that they can see through and understand important indirect messages that are conveyed to them.

Conceptual skill. Conceptual skill, which includes the ability to put together all perceived information and messages and to understand the relationships among them, provides a positive impetus for the success of decisions and induces more effective coordination in various parts of the Government.

The data supported the suggestion made by Katz²¹ that conceptual skill grows in importance as one moves up the hierarchical ladder. The studies also indicated the tremendous need for executives who have conceptual skill, especially in the context of the decentralizing administrative environment.

A number of respondents indicated the great need for conceptualization of the decentralization process as well as an understanding of precepts and concepts. It was suggested that "we have to be trained so that we can have a more conceptualized system of thinking."²²

Thus, conceptual skill becomes increasingly critical as executives move up the organizational hierarchy

in the Government of Iran. This suggests that future Ministers may lack technical skill and still be effective if they have subordinates who possess technical abilities. However, if they do not have conceptual skill, the success of the whole organization may be in jeopardy.

Integrative skill. The review of literature by Lawrence²³ indicated that effective future executives will be administrators who are able to integrate all the conceptualizations of different issues, interests, and policies together to formulate decisions and plans which are in accordance with the national goals and objectives.

Executives who have an integrative ability will recognize how the various functions of the agency are contingent upon one another, and how changes in one area may affect other areas. This type of skill, according to Katz, grows in importance as one moves up the hierarchical ladder in an organization.

The importance of the integrative skill, especially for those at the highest level of the Government of Iran, became evident from the data. A number of respondents suggested the need for executives who have the ability to integrate especially within the context of the decentralizing administrative environment. Within such a context, in which decisions and information are geographically as

well as functionally dispersed, there is need for top executives who have a broad visual perspective of the relationship and are problem solvers and divergent flexible thinkers. They should have a broad perspective of the relationship of the organization to the Government as a whole, and the interrelationships among the political, social, and administrative forces of the entire nation as well as international factors.

Summary and Conclusion

From the foregoing discussion on the specific skills of the future Government executives of Iran, it would appear that at lower levels of Government administration, namely, the level of Directors General, the primary need will be for human and technical skill, mainly because Directors General serve as experts and specialists to Deputy Ministers who are more concerned with decision making and policy formulation. As Figure 6 illustrates there is less need for perceptual and conceptual skills at the level of Directors General.

At the level of Deputy Ministers and Ministers, technical skill becomes less significant, while the need for perceptual and conceptual skills will be increased. At the Ministerial level, integrative skill becomes of utmost significance because Ministers are at the position of being concerned with internal affairs of the Government

as well as its relation to the political, sociocultural, and economic aspects of the nation and the world.

Whereas the relative importance of the technical, perceptual, conceptual, and integrative skills vary as a function of the position of the executives and the associated function, responsibilities, expectations and role behaviors, human skill, which is the ability to work with others, is essential to effective administration at all levels of the administrative hierarchy.

As the Model (see Figure 6) indicates, as one moves from the level of Directors General to the Ministerial level, there is a change of focus from a specialist to a generalist administrator. This suggests that whereas the specialists might have an understanding and proficiency in a specific kind or area of activity, the generalists need to have a broader understanding and knowledge of the field which will enable them to act in ways which advances the overall welfare of the government and the people. The Model, thus, suggests that skills should be complementary at different levels of the Government hierarchy.

In short, the Model implies that in the future, executives should not be selected and recruited merely based on the possession of the more general dimensions mentioned in the General Dimensions Wheel for Future Top Executives, but also based on the more specific dimensions

which vary as a function of the executives' functions and responsibilities.

Implication of the Model for Action

The Model for the Specific Dimensions of the Future Top Executives implies that significant advantages and values may result from reconsidering the recruitment of executives in Government Ministries and Organizations, from revising procedures for selecting future executives, and from redefining the objectives of executive development programs.

The Model suggests that in addition to the more general dimensions considered in the General Dimensions Wheel, effective future executives should be selected and recruited on the basis of the more specific skills that are associated with their positions, functions, responsibilities, and role behaviors. Furthermore, programs for executive development should be more closely geared to developing and enhancing the more specific skills rather than imparting information and knowledge in the form of abstract theories that are not related to the more specific functions of the executives. In other words, training and development in the future should be related more specifically to executives' functions, responsibilities and roles and be more concerned with enhancement of

performance on the job, preparation for promotion or career development.

Executives Recruitment

The Model for the Specific Dimensions of the Future Top Executives suggests possibilities for the creation of public executives at different levels of the Iranian Government hierarchy, with complementary skills. Thus, the technical skills of the Directors General will be complementary to the more conceptual and integrative skills of the Ministers and Deputy Ministers. This suggests that Directors General as professional and experts in the field will complement the skills of the Ministers and Deputy Ministers who assume a more generalist position.

The human, technical, perceptual, conceptual, and integrative skills for the future top Government executives should be considered both at the entry point as well as during the mid-career period. The technical skills should be emphasized more at the entry point since it will involve abilities and skills learned prior to recruitment, even though it could be further developed on the job.

Executive Selection

The Model for the Specific Dimensions of the Future Top Executives suggests that executives should not be selected merely on the basis of their apparent

possession of a number of general dimensions, but on the basis of their requisite skills for the specific level of responsibility involved.

Considering that some tests have differing results when applied to performance on the job, this Five-Skill approach makes testing as the only basis in selection unnecessary since it suggests procedures that make it possible to examine the executive's ability to manage the actual problems and situations on his job. These procedures, which indicate what an executive can do in a specific situation, are the same for selection and for measuring development and will be described in the following section on developing executive skills.

At the entry level, the Government should pay more attention to the technical skills that the person brings to the organization as well as his interest and willingness to learn more about the principles, structures, and processes that are within his area of specialty.

In assessing technical skills, one should be concerned with performance on field assignments which encompass utilization of specialized knowledge, analytical ability within that specialty, and facility in the use of the techniques for the specific discipline.

In order to select a person for a higher position, other skills, namely, perceptual, conceptual, and

integrative, assume more importance than technical skills. With regard to these skills, a person could be evaluated based on his past performance in different job assignments under divergent supervisions as well as his academic achievements.

The selection of the integrator at the entry point should be based on the occupants' competence in the areas of greatest uncertainty absorption who has an orientation toward organizational goals rather than parochial goals. Since the role of the integrator also involves working across different government organizations and Ministries, he should be knowledgeable about the areas with which he would have contact, capable of crossing attitudinal barriers, and able to speak the languages of the different specialties.

Thus, what is suggested is that multimeasures should be used in selecting executives for different levels of the Government. The procedures should involve use of some valid tests designed to assess human, technical, perceptual, conceptual, and integrative skills as well as performance on the job.

Developing Executives' Skills

The Model for Specific Dimensions of the Future Top Executives is based on the assumption that the four skills can be developed even though some executives might

have greater ability or aptitude in certain skills. Thus, executives who have strong aptitudes and abilities can improve their skills further through practice and training and those who lack the natural ability can improve their performance and effectiveness. This skill conception, therefore, implies learning by doing and resembles more closely the attitude prevalent in the administrative environment of Britain.

Action training and development,²⁴ which according to Gardner²⁵ is training designed to help responsible persons comprehend and translate program concepts into operational reality and to give specific skills and knowledge to executive job responsibilities and carry out new policies, should be central to training for executive developments, especially since it emphasizes learning by doing. Or, according to Foy, action learning is learning by experience through solving a real problem where there is a real need for a solution.²⁶

Human skill. Human skill has been highly valued and recognized in different organizations. There are many different approaches to the development of human skill which are based upon disciplines such as psychology, sociology, and anthropology. To be effective, some of these approaches require technical specialists and experts who are knowledgeable and competent in application of

appropriate methods. Nevertheless, future executives must also be able and willing to develop their own human skill, which becomes of increased significance in a decentralizing administrative environment. The future executives must develop their own personal point of view toward human activity, so that they can recognize the feelings and sentiments that they bring to the organization, have an attitude about their own experiences which will enable them to re-evaluate and learn from them; develop ability in understanding what other people by their actions and words are trying to communicate to them; and develop ability in successfully communicating their ideas and attitudes to others.²⁷

Human skill should be developed by either formal or informal training. One method which has had good results is "coaching" of subordinates by superiors. This method requires superiors with high quality of competence in human relations and skills.

Another method is the use of cases complemented with role playing. This method also requires a skilled instructor and organized sequence of activities. In using this method, one must be aware of the applicability and appropriateness of cases to the situation and the organization. In these training programs cases should be selected by trainers who have an in-depth knowledge of

and familiarity with the situation and especially the organization culture.

Technical skill. Development of technical skill especially at the level of Directors General assumes great importance. Development of technical skill should involve long-term and short-term training and education in the principles, structures, and processes of the individuals' specialty, coupled with actual practice and experience on the job.

Technical skill should be developed by formal rather than informal training prior to entry into the organization. However, the development of this kind of skill should continue while the person is on the job by participating in training programs which are specifically designed to up-date the technical skill of the participants. With regard to this kind of skill, the relevance of the content of such training programs to the functions of the participants is of great importance.

Taking the decentralization process and its requirements for novel technical skills into account, it seems more appropriate for each government ministry and organization to design its own technical training programs so that it can respond more effectively to the specific needs of the organization. Only when a particular technical skill is demanded by a number of Government

organizations, should participants from different Organizations participate in one training program.

Perceptual skill. The perceptual skill, which involves the ability to absorb knowledge, to understand the environment, and to be aware of and to interpret its forces, is basically concerned with learning, judging, and understanding processes.

Perceptual skill involves developing the ability to recognize the sentiments which one brings to a situation as well as developing an ability to understand what others by their actions and implicit or explicit words try to communicate.

A knowledge and understanding of cues, such as facial expressions, posture, gestures, tone of voice, spatial distance, rate of speech, errors, eye contact, and touch, could be greatly instrumental in the development of top executives, some of whom are confronted with a nonverbal communicating world. Developing the skill to perceive subtle cues could further increase the information base on which they are to act upon.

The perceptual skill can be developed by some without formalized training. Others can be individually "coached" by their immediate superiors by assigning a particular function or responsibility and responding with statements that will be designed to prompt and make one sensitive to subtle cues and implications.

Conceptual skill. As was aforementioned, conceptual skill which assumes more importance as one moves up the Government hierarchy, involves the ability to see the entire enterprise as a whole. It includes the ability to see the relationship between various functions and parts in an organization and to generalize from these situations to others.

Taking into consideration that development of conceptual skill depends on the particular cognitive style,²⁸ "coaching" and "job rotation" can be used especially at the Directors' General and experts' levels. Through such a job rotation program,

Directors General can achieve personal development and acquire broader perspective. Development takes place because they must develop new knowledge and skills. By looking at administration and management from a different perspective, within a changed environment and by interfacing with different people, the Directors General become more versatile in outlook and more aware of a wider variety of problems.²⁹

Special assignment which involves interdepartmental problems could also be used in developing conceptual skill especially for Directors General and executives at lower levels of the Government hierarchy.

Integrative skill. The integrative skill, which involves the ability to look at functions and responsibilities across different organizations in the Government as well as the entire environment, is concerned with

coordinating the processes across the interdependent department of the Government within one ministry and across a number of ministries and government organizations.

Within an educational and training context, the integrative skill can be developed by presenting a series of detailed descriptions of specific complex situations in which the individual is asked to set forth a course of action which responds to the underlying forces operating in each situation and which considers the implications of this action on the various functions and parts of the government organizations and its total environment.

Since an integrator needs to be capable of understanding different values and attitudes, crosses attitudinal barriers, and sees things from different perspectives and points of view, job rotation and role playing could also be instrumental in his development.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 9

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¹⁰Henry Mintzberg, The Nature of Managerial Work (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1973).

¹¹Katz, "Skills of an Effective Executive," pp. 33-42.

¹²Richard W. Brunson, Jr., "Perceptual Skills in the Corporate Jungle," Personnel Journal 51 (January, 1972):50.

¹³Katz, "Skills of an Effective Executive," p. 34.

¹⁴Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Societies (New York: The Free Press, 1960).

¹⁵Katz, "Skills of an Effective Executive," p. 37.

¹⁶Brunson, Jr., "Perceptual Skills in the Corporate Jungle," p. 50.

¹⁷Alan J. Rowe, "How Do Senior Managers Make Decisions?" Los Angeles Business and Economics (Winter, 1977): 17-20.

¹⁸Fremont A. Shull, Jr., Andre L. Delbecq, and L. L. Cummings, Organizational Decision Making (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970), pp. 37-41.

¹⁹Rowe, "How Do Senior Managers Make Decisions?" p. 20.

²⁰Personal Communication.

²¹Katz, "Skills of an Effective Executive," p. 42.

²²Personal Communication.

²³Paul R. Lawrence, "New Management Job: The Integrator," Harvard Business Review 45 (November-December, 1967):142-151.

²⁴Milton G. Holmen, "Action Research: The Solution or the Problem," in Behavioral Problems in Organizations edited by Cary Cooper (London, England: Prentice-Hall, 1978) (Forthcoming).

²⁵Neely D. Gardner, Group Leadership (Washington: National Training and Development Services Press, 1974), p. 78.

²⁶Nancy Foy, "Action Learning Comes to Industry," Harvard Business Review 55 (September-October, 1977):158.

²⁷Katz, "Skills of an Effective Administrator,"
p. 40.

²⁸Mike Driver and Alan J. Rowe, "The Influence of Cognitive Style on Decision Making," in Behavioral Problems in Organizations, edited by Cary Cooper (London, England: Prentice-Hall, 1978) (Forthcoming).

²⁹Neely D. Gardner, "Training Plan: State Organization for Administration and Employment," Unpublished mimeograph report, Tehran: Development and Resources Corporation, August 19, 1977.

CHAPTER 10

RECAPITULATION

The present study was initiated with one main purpose and a number of more peripheral interests. The main purpose was to construct a model for the dimensions of effective top executives, namely, Directors General, Deputy Ministers, and Ministers in the future decentralizing administrative environment of the Government of Iran. This was viewed as significant in identification, selection, and recruitment of the appropriate manpower, which is of paramount interest in the present and future Iran.

Based on the thesis that the behavior of executives as well as their dimensions needed for effective execution in a decentralizing government administrative environment is a function of a number of factors such as personal, administrative, environmental and task, attempts were made to gain insight into these factors. Thus, three studies were conducted at three levels of the Government hierarchy: namely, levels of Directors General, Deputy Ministers, and Ministers.

Whereas each study was conducted to provide data for the main study, each of the three studies had a specific and defined purpose and constituted an entity.

The study of Directors General was predominantly concerned with an appraisal of problems faced by Directors General in the Ministry of Interior. It provided data on the interpersonal relations of Directors General with their superiors and subordinates, their problems, and their overall role perceptions.

The study of Deputy Ministers was primarily concerned with their role perception and time use within the context of their functions, responsibilities, expectations, and roles. This study gave further insight into Deputy Ministers' role perceptions, expectations, values, their attitudes toward participation, trust, and cooperation, their personal and interpersonal relations with their superiors and subordinates, their functions and responsibilities, and finally, their management styles and communication modes.

The study of Ministers was designed to assess their views on the concept and process of decentralization in the present and future Iran, the nature of the future Government administrative environment, and the dimensions that are required for effective top executives in the future Government of Iran.

The methodology for the three studies consisted primarily of interviews at the office of the participants. Action training and research with the analytical tool of

force-field analysis as a method for problem solving was used as a methodology in appraising the problems confronted by Directors General in the Ministry of Interior.

In addition to the three aforementioned studies conducted by the author, an evolutionary examination of the past and present Government administration was done in order to find the trend and foresee the future administrative environment. Since the dimensions of effective executives could not be examined in a vacuum and out of the context of the administrative environment of the country in which executives are likely to operate, such an evolutionary study was perceived as essential and insightful to the overall purpose of the main study.

In addition to the three studies and the evolutionary examination of the Government administrative system, the dimensions of effective top executives, especially within the administrative context of the United States and Britain, were examined by a thorough review of the literature.

Thus, the dimensions foreseen for effective top executives in the future Government of Iran were based on three studies conducted in Iran, as well as an evolutionary study of Iran's Government administration, and a review of literature.

As was previously mentioned, each study provided data that was of interest and significant within the context of the study as well as within the major study.

Using action training and research in conjunction with force-field analysis, thirteen problems emerged as the most important confronted by Directors General in the Ministry of Interior. These problems with their order of priorities are presented in the following:

1. Existence of a distance among the hierarchical levels of the Ministry.
2. Nonfrequent selection of Directors General for higher positions such as Deputy Ministers and Governors General.
3. Existence of a salary and incentive imbalance between the private sector and the Ministry.
4. Lack of evaluation of subordinates by Directors General.
5. Lack of independence of Directors General.
6. Lack of authority to reward, punish, and promote and demote their employees.
7. The Ministry of Interior lacks planning for determining training needs of its employees.
8. Lack of mutual understanding and cooperation between Deputy Ministers and Directors General.
9. Lack of delegation of authority to those below the Directors General.

10. Superiors' lack of information and knowledge about the functions of the Directors General.
11. Existence of nepotism and favoritism in selection of Directors General.
12. Lack of consideration of job quality, functions, and qualifications in selection of Directors General.
13. Existence of bureaucratic red tape.

The thirteen problems were conceptually and categorically reduced to three major problem areas: namely, lack of motivation, lack of delegation of authority, and lack of training. Analysis showed that a number of the problems are organizational in nature and reflect the administrative culture, whereas others seem to be related to the sociocultural values and legal constraints. Each problem area and their relationships were discussed in detail.

The results of the role perception of Deputy Ministers indicated that there is ambiguity in role; however, nearly all Deputy Ministers viewed themselves as generalist and perceived themselves as having major responsibilities in the general management area. The study showed that whereas role orientation of Deputy Ministers is upward toward the superiors, the problems seem to be oriented downward toward the subordinates.

The study on Deputy Ministers' time use showed that they spend a large percentage of their time in general management and policy planning. They showed a great interest in re-allocating time and gaining more control by spending more time on future-oriented planning activities of organizational consequence, and less time on activities such as resolving personal conflicts and grievances that could be managed elsewhere in the organization.

The results of the study of Ministers in conjunction with the trend emerging in the Government of Iran showed that Iran is taking wide strides toward greater progress in the decentralization effort by delegating authority and responsibility to the lower echelon of the Government administration, namely, Governors General, Governors, and field Directors General.

With regard to the dimensions for effective future executives, there was evidence that the executive as a generalist is viewed as more qualified for top executive positions, predominantly because the higher the level of administration, the more pervasive is the demand from someone who has a broad horizon and perspective.

An examination of the historical evolution of the Iranian Government environment in conjunction with the three other studies showed that the future administrative environment will be a decentralizing administration, one

in which administrative functions are delegated more frequently and readily, and one in which there will be a more pervasive dispersal of concentrated national operation from the capital, Tehran, to other cities and municipalities.

It was suggested that in the context of decentralization a horizontal organization structure will develop in conjunction with the pyramidal structure and Government will move closer to collegial, consensual, consultative, and participative modes of decision making. Decisions will concern novel and unstructured situations which have no relationship to past experiences and decisions, and will be broadened to include more sociocultural variables.

The complex decentralizing administrative environment of the future will require new kinds of executives who are qualitatively different from the past and even the present executives. In order to be effective, they should possess a number of general dimensions as well as a number of dimensions that are more specific to their functions, responsibilities, expectations, and role behaviors.

The general dimensions that are viewed as having less situation-specificity were briefly outlined in a Wheel called "The General Dimensions Wheel of Future Top Executives" under the following categories: leadership

behaviors, value orientations, decision-making behaviors, knowledge and skills, and personal qualifications.

On the ground of the entire data base it was proposed that the effective executives of the future should have the following leadership behaviors.

Their style of leadership should be more consensual, collegial, and consultative. This means that they have to use a participative approach to management that will enable personnel to exercise self-commitment and self-control for achievement of agreed-upon goals. Because inter-organizational and intra-organizational relations will become important in the context of the decentralizing administrative environment, the effective future executives will have to create an environment of trust, cooperation, and participation. They should also develop a motivational environment and inspire and build morale. Altogether the effective executives in the future decentralizing Government environment of Iran should be change agents who are both task- and people-oriented and are able to manage complexity and ambiguity.

The value orientations of effective executives should consist of a belief in the value of taking calculated risk, of accepting and sharing responsibility, and of using time wisely. This kind of value orientation will be instrumental in inducing success for Directors General, Deputy Ministers, as well as Ministers.

With regard to the decision-making behaviors, it became apparent from the data base, that the effective executives of the future are individuals who delegate authority and responsibility for decision making and emphasize consultation more readily and frequently. Their decisions will be based on more information as well as a broader perspective which consider a number of contingencies in the decision process.

As far as knowledge and skills are concerned, the effective future executives should be more educated and should have more exposure to diverse areas of administration. Thus, whereas they might be specialized in one or two areas, they should have a broad perspective. Viewed within the context of the administrative orientation of Britain and the United States, these suggest that in the future decentralizing administrative environment, the idea of the effective executives as either "specialists" or "generalists" is too simplistic, since a combination of both will be more conducive to effective execution. However, depending on position and its associated functions and responsibilities, there would be a need for one dimension more than the other.

Considering that administration is partly an art, this suggests that the personal qualifications of the executives rather than their special techniques assume

importance. Based on the data base in this study, it is suggested that the effective executives of the future will be persons who are intelligent, curious to learn and take challenge, open to novel experiences, dedicated and committed to work, alert, observant, flexible, adaptable, and willing to change and be changed.

As the main concern of this dissertation, a Model was constructed by the author for the more specific dimensions of Directors General, Deputy Ministers, and Ministers within the context of a decentralizing administrative environment. In this Model, it was suggested that effective executives of the future should possess five skills: namely, human, technical, perceptual, conceptual, and integrative, which vary in magnitude contingent on the particular position of the executive and the functions and responsibilities associated with it.

Similar to their counterparts, the Executive Class in the British system and the Permanent Civil Servants in the United States in the administrative environment of the United States, the Directors General are permanent civil servants, policy advisors, and implementors of decisions. Due to the nature of their positions, they are the professionals and specialists. Such specialization suggests that effective Directors General should have a high level of technical knowledge and expertise related

to the specialization of their jobs within the particular ministry in which they operate. Thus, the most important specific skill needed for Directors General is technical skill, which consists of functional dimensions that imply understanding and proficiency in a specific area of activity which is connected with the factual, analytical, and technological facets of the administrative process. This, however, does not imply that effective Directors General should not possess perceptual, conceptual, and integrative skills and abilities.

The Deputy Ministers and Ministers are generalists who seem to be more effective if they have a broad perspective and integrative ability. In contrast to Directors General, they need less technical skills and more perceptual, conceptual, and integrative skills.

Thus, as the Model (Figure 6) shows, at the level of the Directors General the primary skill needed is technical and there is a lesser need for the other kinds of skills presented in the Model. As we move up the hierarchical structure to the level of Deputy Ministers and Ministers, there would be a reduction in the significance of the technical skill and an increase in perceptual, conceptual, and integrative skills.

Thus, the initial opening question of whether there is a need for more specialists or generalists at the

three levels of Government hierarchy is answered. In the future decentralizing administrative environment, administration would be an art as well as a science. This suggests that training and experience and specialized knowledge of procedures in addition to knowledge of the substantive field of specialization will become increasingly important at different levels of the Government administration. Ministers and Deputy Ministers will be more effective as generalists who have a broad-based perspective and knowledge, a liberal education, and an integrative ability augmented by a number of other more specific skills and general characteristics. Directors General will be more effective as professionals and specialists who possess high levels of technical skills that are related to their particular positions in the Ministry, and their functions, responsibilities, expectations, and role behavior. The high demand for technical skills does not imply lack of importance of other specific and general dimensions. It simply indicates that the technical skills are proportionally more important than other skills.

Whereas possession of all the specific and general skills is a utopia, a combination of them can be greatly instrumental in inducing a productive and effective government environment, which will be more responsive to

the unprecedented economic, social, political, and administrative aspirations and goals for development in Iran.

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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

STRUCTURED INTERVIEW I

APPENDIX A
STRUCTURED INTERVIEW I
OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS

1. What are the things about your job that you like and would like to maintain and enhance?
2. What types of situations create the greatest difficulty for you?
3. What problem situations are encountered by most Directors General that they would like to have changed?
4. If you had the authority and power to make any changes you wished in the Ministry of Interior what actions would you take?
5. What are the most important contributions Directors General could make to the improvement of the Ministry?
6. What type of action in the part of their superiors would make the work of Directors General more productive and effective?
7. What actions could Directors General take that could most improve the morale and commitment of the Ministry employees?

APPENDIX B

OPINION SURVEY FORM

APPENDIX B

OPIION SURVEY FORM

1. Directors General like their job functions in the Ministry of Interior.

| Opinion \ Degree of importance | Very Unimportant | Unimportant | Neutral | Important | Very Important | |
|--------------------------------|------------------|-------------|---------|-----------|----------------|--|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
| Agree | | | | | | |
| Disagree | | | | | | |

Comment:

2. Directors General do not have the required authority to excise their functions and responsibilities in the Ministry of Interior.

| Opinion \ Degree of importance | Very Unimportant | Unimportant | Neutral | Important | Very Important | |
|--------------------------------|------------------|-------------|---------|-----------|----------------|--|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
| Agree | | | | | | |
| Disagree | | | | | | |

Comments:

3. Delegating more authority to the levels below the level of Directors General is essential.

| Opinion \ Degree of importance | Very Unimportant | Unimportant | Neutral | Important | Very Important | |
|--------------------------------|------------------|-------------|---------|-----------|----------------|--|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
| Agree | | | | | | |
| Disagree | | | | | | |

Comments:

4. It is beneficial to give more independence to offices of Directors General and, in return, request more responsibility.

| Opinion \ Degree of importance | Very Unimportant | Unimportant | Neutral | Important | Very Important | |
|--------------------------------|------------------|-------------|---------|-----------|----------------|--|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
| Agree | | | | | | |
| Disagree | | | | | | |

Comments:

5. Lack of trust of Top executives in Directors General has created difficult situation for decision-making processes at the Directors' General level.

| Opinion \ Degree of importance | Very Unimportant | Unimportant | Neutral | Important | Very Important | |
|--------------------------------|------------------|-------------|---------|-----------|----------------|--|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
| Agree | | | | | | |
| Disagree | | | | | | |

Comments:

6. Lack of independence of Directors General has caused delay in decision-making processes in the Ministry of Interior.

| Opinion \ Degree of importance | Very Unimportant | Unimportant | Neutral | Important | Very Important | |
|--------------------------------|------------------|-------------|---------|-----------|----------------|--|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
| Agree | | | | | | |
| Disagree | | | | | | |

Comments:

7. Some of the administrative methods and procedures related to personnel, procurement, and services do not allow work to be accomplished faster.

| Opinion \ Degree of importance | Very Unimportant | Unimportant | Neutral | Important | Very Important | |
|--------------------------------|------------------|-------------|---------|-----------|----------------|--|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
| Agree | | | | | | |
| Disagree | | | | | | |

Comments:

8. Recruitment of Directors General in the Ministry of Interior should be conducted in such a way that all job quality and functions can be taken into consideration.

| Opinion \ Degree of importance | Very Unimportant | Unimportant | Neutral | Important | Very Important | |
|--------------------------------|------------------|-------------|---------|-----------|----------------|--|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
| Agree | | | | | | |
| Disagree | | | | | | |

Comments:

9. The existing imbalance of salary and bonuses between the private sector and the Ministry of Interior weakens the chance of attracting experts to the Ministry.

| Opinion \ Degree of importance | Very Unimportant | Unimportant | Neutral | Important | Very Important | |
|--------------------------------|------------------|-------------|---------|-----------|----------------|--|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
| Agree | | | | | | |
| Disagree | | | | | | |

Comments:

10. One of the problems of Directors General in the Ministry of Interior is lack of sufficient funds to complete projects.

| Opinion \ Degree of importance | Very Unimportant | Unimportant | Neutral | Important | Very Important | |
|--------------------------------|------------------|-------------|---------|-----------|----------------|--|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
| Agree | | | | | | |
| Disagree | | | | | | |

Comments:

11. To reward the fine work of Directors General in the Ministry of Interior, it is better and more motivating to select them for higher positions (Deputy Ministers or Governors General).

| Opinion \ Degree of importance | Very Unimportant | Unimportant | Neutral | Important | Very Important | |
|--------------------------------|------------------|-------------|---------|-----------|----------------|--|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
| Agree | | | | | | |
| Disagree | | | | | | |

Comments:

12. More authority should be delegated to Directors General so that they can reward, punish, promote, and/or demote their subordinates.

| Opinion \ Degree of importance | Very Unimportant | Unimportant | Neutral | Important | Very Important | |
|--------------------------------|------------------|-------------|---------|-----------|----------------|--|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
| Agree | | | | | | |
| Disagree | | | | | | |

Comments:

13. One of the most effective ways to assess the qualifications of an individual for promotion is by job evaluation which must be done by the immediate superior.

| Opinion \ Degree of importance | Very Unimportant | Unimportant | Neutral | Important | Very Important | |
|--------------------------------|------------------|-------------|---------|-----------|----------------|--|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
| Agree | | | | | | |
| Disagree | | | | | | |

Comments:

14. Qualifications of an individual are not taken into consideration in selection and promotion. In most cases, individuals are not assigned to their proper position of expertise.

| Opinion \ Degree of importance | Very Unimportant | Unimportant | Neutral | Important | Very Important | |
|--------------------------------|------------------|-------------|---------|-----------|----------------|--|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
| Agree | | | | | | |
| Disagree | | | | | | |

Comments:

15. In order to find out educational needs and training insufficiencies in the Ministry of Interior, it is necessary to forcast educational and training needs of employees annually.

| Opinion \ Degree of importance | Very Unimportant | Unimportant | Neutral | Important | Very Important | |
|--------------------------------|------------------|-------------|---------|-----------|----------------|--|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
| Agree | | | | | | |
| Disagree | | | | | | |

Comments:

16. There is no preplanning for most jobs in the Ministry of Interior.

| Opinion \ Degree of importance | Very Unimportant | Unimportant | Neutral | Important | Very Important | |
|--------------------------------|------------------|-------------|---------|-----------|----------------|--|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
| Agree | | | | | | |
| Disagree | | | | | | |

Comments:

17. The present personal distribution is not based on the quality and quantity of functions of departments in the Ministry of Interior.

| Opinion \ Degree of importance | Very Unimportant | Unimportant | Neutral | Important | Very Important | |
|--------------------------------|------------------|-------------|---------|-----------|----------------|--|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
| Agree | | | | | | |
| Disagree | | | | | | |

Comments:

18. Removing some of the Directors General from their positions has not been done in an appropriate administrative manner, and has, thus, led to job insecurity, tension and discouragement.

| Opinion \ Degree of importance | Very Unimportant | Unimportant | Neutral | Important | Very Important | |
|--------------------------------|------------------|-------------|---------|-----------|----------------|--|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
| Agree | | | | | | |
| Disagree | | | | | | |

Comments:

19. Occupying positions of Directors General by unskilled and inexperienced individuals has created some problems.

| Opinion \ Degree of importance | Very Unimportant | Unimportant | Neutral | Important | Very Important | |
|--------------------------------|------------------|-------------|---------|-----------|----------------|--|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
| Agree | | | | | | |
| Disagree | | | | | | |

Comments:

20. Most experts in the Ministry of Interior lack the courage to speak out their opinions regarding the existing problems.

| Opinion \ Degree of importance | Very Unimportant | Unimportant | Neutral | Important | Very Important | |
|--------------------------------|------------------|-------------|---------|-----------|----------------|--|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
| Agree | | | | | | |
| Disagree | | | | | | |

Comments:

21. Considering the functions of the Ministry of Interior and the principle of "decentralization," there is no need for existence of some of the Departments; therefore, it is necessary either to eliminate or merge some of them.

| Opinion \ Degree of importance | Very Unimportant | Unimportant | Neutral | Important | Very Important | |
|--------------------------------|------------------|-------------|---------|-----------|----------------|--|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
| Agree | | | | | | |
| Disagree | | | | | | |

Comments:

22. The existing system of control has decreased the prestige of Directors General in the Ministry of Interior.

| Opinion \ Degree of importance | Very Unimportant | Unimportant | Neutral | Important | Very Important | |
|--------------------------------|------------------|-------------|---------|-----------|----------------|--|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
| Agree | | | | | | |
| Disagree | | | | | | |

Comments.

23. Arranging informal meetings with participation of Deputies and Directors General would help develop mutual understanding and cooperation and solve some of the problems

| Opinion \ Degree of importance | Very Unimportant | Unimportant | Neutral | Important | Very Important | |
|--------------------------------|------------------|-------------|---------|-----------|----------------|--|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
| Agree | | | | | | |
| Disagree | | | | | | |

Comments:

24. Superiors' knowledge and information about the functions of Directors General is a necessity if improvement is sought.

| Opinion \ Degree of importance | Very Unimportant | Unimportant | Neutral | Important | Very Important | |
|--------------------------------|------------------|-------------|---------|-----------|----------------|--|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
| Agree | | | | | | |
| Disagree | | | | | | |

Comments:

25. Using warmer and friendlier attitudes and behavior in day-to-day interactions coupled with an effort to decrease the administrative distance between the Deputy Ministers and Directors General would increase output.

| Opinion \ Degree of importance | Very Unimportant | Unimportant | Neutral | Important | Very Important | |
|--------------------------------|------------------|-------------|---------|-----------|----------------|--|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
| Agree | | | | | | |
| Disagree | | | | | | |

Comments:

| Opinion \ Degree of importance | Very Unimportant | Unimportant | Neutral | Important | Very Important | |
|--------------------------------|------------------|-------------|---------|-----------|----------------|--|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
| Agree | | | | | | |
| Disagree | | | | | | |

APPENDIX C

TWENTY FIVE PROBLEMS AND THEIR PRIORITIES

25. Using warmer and friendlier attitudes and behavior in day-to-day interactions coupled with an effort to decrease the administrative distance between the Deputy Ministers and Directors General would increase output.

11. To reward the fine work of Directors General, it is better and more motivating to select them for higher positions (Deputy Ministers or Governors General).

9. The existing imbalance of salary and bonuses between the private sector and the Ministry of Interior weakens the chance of attracting experts to the Ministry of Interior.

| | Very Un- important | Un- important | Neutral | Important | Very Important | Number | Weight | Intensity | Mean | Rank Order |
|----------|-----------------------|------------------|---------|-----------|-------------------|--------|--------|-----------|------|------------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | | | | | |
| Agree | | | | 2 | 16 | 18 | 88 | 88 | 4.89 | 1 |
| Disagree | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | | | 1 | 2 | 16 | 18 | 86 | 86 | 4.78 | 2 |
| Disagree | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | | | 1 | 2 | 16 | 18 | 86 | 86 | 4.78 | 2 |
| Disagree | | | | | | | | | | |

13. One of the most effective ways to assess the qualifications of an individual for promotion is by job evaluation which must be done by the immediate superior.

4. It is beneficial to give more independence to offices of Directors General and, in return, request more responsibility.

12 More authority should be delegated to Directors General so that they can reward, punish, promote and/or demote their subordinates.

| | Very Un- important | Un- important | Neutral | Important | Very Important | Number | Weight | Intensity | Mean | Rank Order |
|----------|-----------------------|------------------|---------|-----------|-------------------|--------|--------|-----------|------|------------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | | | | | |
| Agree | | | | 3 | 14 | 17 | 81 | 81 | 4.76 | 4 |
| Disagree | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | | | | 5 | 12 | 17 | 80 | 80 | 4.71 | 5 |
| Disagree | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | | | 1 | 5 | 12 | 18 | 83 | 83 | 4.61 | 6 |
| Disagree | | | | | | | | | | |

15. In order to find out educational needs and training insufficiencies in the Ministry of Interior, it is necessary to forecast educational and training needs of employees annually.

23. Arranging informal meetings with participation of Deputy Ministers and Directors General would help develop mutual understanding and cooperation and solve some of the problems.

3. Delegating more authority to the levels below the level of Directors General is essential.

| | Very Un- important | Un- important | Neutral | Important | Very Important | Number | Weight | Intensity | Mean | Rank Order |
|----------|-----------------------|------------------|---------|-----------|-------------------|--------|--------|-----------|------|------------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | | | | | |
| Agree | | | 1 | 5 | 12 | 18 | 83 | 83 | 4.61 | 6 |
| Disagree | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | | | 1 | 7 | 10 | 18 | 81 | 81 | 4.50 | 8 |
| Disagree | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | | | 1 | 8 | 8 | 17 | 80 | 80 | 4.44 | 9 |
| Disagree | | | | | | | | | | |

24. Superiors' knowledge and information about the functions of Directors General is a necessity if improvement is sought.

19. Occupying positions of Directors General by unskilled and inexperienced individuals has some problems.

8. Recruitment of Directors General in the Ministry of Interior should be conducted in such a way that all job quality and functions be taken into consideration.

| | Very Un- important | Un- important | Neutral | Important | Very Important | Number | Weight | Intensity | Mean | Rank Order |
|----------|-----------------------|------------------|---------|-----------|-------------------|--------|--------|-----------|------|------------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | | | | | |
| Agree | | | | 7 | 10 | 17 | 78 | 74 | 4.11 | 10 |
| Disagree | | | | 1 | | 1 | 4 | | | |
| | | | | | | 18 | 82 | | | |
| Agree | 1 | | 1 | 9 | 5 | 16 | 65 | 65 | 4.06 | 11 |
| Disagree | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | | | 1 | 1 | 12 | 14 | 67 | 60 | 3.75 | 12 |
| Disagree | | | 1 | 1 | | 2 | 7 | | | |
| | | | | | | 16 | 74 | | | |

7. Some of the administrative methods and procedures related to personnel, procurement, and services do not allow work to be accomplished faster.

1. Directors General like their job functions in the Ministry of Interior.

20. Most experts in the Ministry of Interior lack the courage to speak out their opinions regarding the existing problems.

| | Very Un- important | Un- important | Neutral | Important | Very Important | Number | Weight | Intensity | Mean | Rank Order |
|----------|-----------------------|------------------|---------|-----------|-------------------|--------|--------|-----------|------|------------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | | | | | |
| Agree | | | | 7 | 8 | 15 | 70 | 62 | 3.44 | 13 |
| Disagree | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 8 | | | |
| | | | | | | 18 | 78 | | | |
| Agree | 2 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 16 | 52 | 52 | 3.25 | 14 |
| Disagree | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 14 | 50 | 46 | 3.07 | 15 |
| Disagree | | | | 1 | | 1 | 4 | | | |
| | | | | | | 15 | 54 | | | |

17. The present personnel distribution is not based on the quality and quantity of functions of departments in the Ministry of Interior.

10. One of the problems of Directors General in the Ministry of Interior is lack of sufficient fund to complete projects.

18. Removing some of the Directors General from their positions has not been done in an appropriate administrative manner, and has, thus, led to job insecurity, tension, and discouragement.

| | Very Un- important | Un- important | Neutral | Important | Very Important | Number | Weight | Intensity | Mean | Rank Order |
|----------|-----------------------|------------------|---------|-----------|-------------------|--------|--------|-----------|------|------------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | | | | | |
| Agree | | | 3 | 5 | 7 | 15 | 64 | 52 | 2.89 | 16 |
| Disagree | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 12 | | | |
| | | | | | | 18 | 76 | | | |
| Agree | 1 | | | 6 | 6 | 13 | 55 | 43 | 2.68 | 17 |
| Disagree | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 12 | | | |
| | | | | | | 16 | 67 | | | |
| Agree | | | 1 | 6 | 5 | 12 | 52 | 40 | 2.67 | 18 |
| Disagree | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 12 | | | |
| | | | | | | 15 | 64 | | | |

16. There is no pre-planning for most jobs in the Ministry of Interior.

14. Qualifications of individuals are not taken into consideration in their selection and promotion. In most cases, individuals are not assigned to their proper position of expertise.

6. Lack of independence of Directors General has caused delay in decision-making processes in the Ministry of Interior.

| | Very Un- important | Un- important | Neutral | Important | Very Important | Number | Weight | Intensity | Mean | Rank Order |
|----------|-----------------------|------------------|---------|-----------|-------------------|--------|--------|-----------|------|------------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | | | | | |
| Agree | | | 4 | 7 | 3 | 14 | 55 | 40 | 2.22 | 19 |
| Disagree | | | 1 | 3 | | 4 | 15 | | | |
| | | | | | | 18 | 70 | | | |
| Agree | | 1 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 14 | 54 | 39 | 2.17 | 20 |
| Disagree | | | 2 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 15 | | | |
| | | | | | | 18 | 69 | | | |
| Agree | | 1 | 1 | 7 | 3 | 12 | 48 | 33 | 2.06 | 21 |
| Disagree | | | 2 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 15 | | | |
| | | | | | | 16 | 63 | | | |

21. Considering the functions of the Ministry of Interior and the principle of "decentralization," there is no need for existence of some of the departments, therefore, it is necessary either to eliminate or merge some of them.

2. Directors General do not have the required authority to exercise functions and responsibilities in the Ministry of Interior.

22. The existing system of control has decreased the prestige of Directors General in the Ministry of Interior.

| | Very Un- important | Un- important | Neutral | Important | Very Important | Number | Weight | Intensity | Mean | Rank Order |
|----------|-----------------------|------------------|---------|-----------|-------------------|---------|----------|-----------|------|------------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | | | | | |
| Agree | | | 1 | 6 | 5 | 12 | 52 | 30 | 1.67 | 22 |
| Disagree | | | 3 | 2 | 1 | 6 18 | 22 74 | | | |
| Agree | | | 1 | 6 | 4 | 11 | 47 | 25 | 1.56 | 23 |
| Disagree | | | | 3 | 2 | 5 16 | 22 69 | | | |
| Agree | | | 1 | 4 | 6 | 11 | 49 | 23 | 1.28 | 24 |
| Disagree | | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 7 18 | 26 75 | | | |

5. Lack of trust of top executives in Directors General has created difficult situation for decision-making processes at the level of Directors General in the Ministry of Interior.

| | Very Un- important | Un- important | Neutral | Important | Very Important | Number | Weight | Intensity | Mean | Rank Order |
|----------|-----------------------|------------------|---------|-----------|-------------------|--------|--------|-----------|------|------------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | | | | | |
| Agree | | | 1 | 6 | 2 | 9 | 37 | 14 | 0.93 | 25 |
| Disagree | | | 3 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 23 | | | |
| | | | | | | 15 | 60 | | | |
| Agree | | | | | | | | | | |
| Disagree | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | | | | | | | | | | |
| Disagree | | | | | | | | | | |

APPENDIX D

PROBLEMS, DRIVING FORCES,
RESTRAINING FORCES,
AND
ACTION OPTIONS

1. How can we incorporate warmer and friendlier attitudes and behavior in our day-to-day administrative approach in an effort to decrease the distances among the hierarchical levels of the Ministry of Interior and increase the output?

Driving Forces:

A. Enhancing trust.

Action options:

1. Organizing monthly meetings with the presence of Deputy Ministers and Directors General.
2. Using an open-door policy for Directors General to meet the top executives.
3. Establishing special training and general management sessions to upgrade the knowledge of Directors General.
4. Trying to solve personal problems of employees by Directors General.
5. Rewarding employees by Directors General at the right time and elimination of administrative discrimination.

B. Enhancing human relations.

Action options:

1. Organizing group meetings to discuss and exchange ideas with the participation of the top executives and Directors General.
2. Organizing informal meetings (group luncheon) of top executives and Directors General.
3. Paying attention to the non-administrative problems of Directors General.
4. Informal calls of Directors General on their employees in an effort to solve some of their problems by close and direct communication.

- C. Increasing a sense of responsibility and proclivity to do the job.

Action options:

1. Establishing a system of monthly report giving and receiving.
2. The top executives' utilizing results obtained by Directors General.
3. Establishing an appropriate system of reward and punishment which is based upon the evaluation of Directors General.

Restraining Forces:

- A. Fear of top executives of losing their control.

Action options:

1. Organizing monthly group sessions to help the top executives know Directors General better.
2. Emphasizing the use of participative decision making to reach better quality decisions.

- B. Fear of obtaining less output because of friendlier relations thus taking the functions not seriously.

Action options:

1. Using more humanly procedures incorporated with assessment of the job of Directors General to motivate them to increase the output.
2. Establishing a system of report giving and receiving.

- C. Complying with the principle of individualistic management by high-positioned executives.

Action options:

1. Emphasizing more on delegation of authority by the Minister of Interior.
2. Emphasizing more on group-oriented work.

2. How can we use the experienced executives (Directors General) of the Ministry for higher positions (Deputy Minister's and Governor's General)?

Driving Forces:

- A. Inclination of Directors General toward obtaining higher positions.

Action options:

1. Selecting the top executives from qualified Directors General.
 2. Giving priority, with regard to promotion, to Directors General in the case of equal qualifications.
 3. Offering scholarship to Directors General to study local and municipal policies of advanced countries.
- B. Job experience and familiarity with the regulations and administration of the nation as well as the Ministry of Interior.

Action options:

1. Establishing special training sessions in an effort to increase the knowledge of Directors General regarding the national regulations and laws.
 2. Setting management experience in the Ministry of Interior as a selection qualification for higher positions.
- C. More familiarization with characteristics and qualifications of Directors General by the top executives.

Action options:

1. Organizing monthly group sessions with the participation of the top executives and Directors General.
2. Publishing views and articles of Directors General in publications of the Ministry of Interior.
3. Presenting monthly report by Directors General to superiors about actions taken.

Restraining Forces:

- A. Nepotism and influence used by individuals outside of the Ministry of Interior.

Action options:

1. Establishing and complying with qualifications when selecting individuals for high positions.
2. Taking into consideration the length and years of experience in the Ministry of Interior as a qualification for promotion.

- B. Lack of trust and confidence of superiors in the skill and competence of Directors General.

Action options:

1. Frequent consultation of Directors General with superiors.
2. More familiarization with characteristics of Directors General by superiors.
3. Studying continuously for the purpose of informing Directors General about the latest advanced methods of management and administration.

- C. Not considering deserved Directors General for promotion to higher administrative echelons.

Action option:

1. Selecting deserved Directors General for high positions.

3. How can we eliminate the salary and pension imbalance which exist between the private sector and the Ministry so that experts can be attracted and absorbed to the Ministry?

Driving Forces:

- A. Tendency to attract manpower expertise.

Action options:

1. Reexamining the Civil Service Codes in an effort to improve the present salary and bonus system with consideration of increasing level of living expenses.

2. Providing for the financial welfare of employees of the Ministry of Interior (such as housing).
 3. Delegating more authority to Directors General so that they can provide financial reward to subordinates and therefore motivate them to work.
- B. Tendency to stop manpower expertise from moving out the Ministry of Interior to another job.

Action options:

1. Delegating more authority to Directors General so that they can provide financial reward to subordinates and therefore motivate them to work.
2. Cooperating and helping employees in getting living and housing facilities.
3. Reviewing the Civil Service Codes in regard to increase salary and bonuses according to the increase of level of living expenses.
4. Stopping discrimination and injustices and promoting deserved Directors General.
5. Establishing job stability by setting regulations in an effort to stop favoritism and unlawful influences.

Restraining Forces:

- A. Limitations of Civil Service Codes in regard to salary and bonuses.

Action option:

1. Reviewing the Civil Service Codes in an effort to improve the present salary and bonus system with consideration of increasing level of living expenses.
- B. Lack of congruence in the increment of salary and bonus level of the public sector and the increment in the living expenses.

Action options:

1. Increasing appropriately the salary and bonuses of employees of public sector in accord with the increasing level of living expense.

2. Providing facilities such as housing, housing loans, medical insurance, and scholarships.

4. How can a superior determine the qualifications of an individual for promotion?

Driving Forces:

- A. Tendency and ability of the superior for assessment because of their closeness to the subordinate.

Action options:

1. Assessing subordinates in alternate and continuous terms.
2. Familiarizing Directors General with the newest and advanced methods of employee evaluation.
3. Informing individuals at the high echelons of the Ministry about the importance of the evaluation.
4. Paying attention by individuals at the high echelons to the evaluation done by Directors General and taking its results into consideration.

- B. A deeper sense of responsibility of the superior to the subordinate.

Action options:

1. Delegating more authority to Directors General so that they can reward and punish their subordinates.
2. Taking into consideration the results of evaluation of employees done by Directors General when giving grades, bonuses, over time, and overall rewards.
3. Establishing a report giving and receiving system.

Restraining Forces:

- A. Direct control of subordinates by superiors.

Action options:

1. Organizing monthly meetings with the participation of

Deputy Ministers and Directors General in an effort to bring these levels of management closer to each other.

2. Preparing regulations for the purpose of evaluating employees by their immediate superiors.

B. Lack of trust and confidence of top executives in Directors General evaluation of employees.

Action options:

1. Establishing a system of report giving by Directors General to the high-positioned executives.
2. Participation of Directors General in conferences and seminars, and presentation of reports from seminars to the top executives.

5. How can we give more independence to general offices and, in return, ask for more responsibility?

Driving Forces:

A. Inclination to use decentralization as a general policy.

Action options:

1. Delegating authority related to provinces and cities to Governors General and Governors.
2. Determining more carefully the duties of each general office in a clear and direct manner.

B. The Directors' General sense of necessity to improve jobs.

Action options:

1. Examining reviewing and familiarizing Directors General with the problems.
2. Familiarizing the Directors General with the newest methods and inventions in their respective duties.
3. Eliminating the overlapping or interfering duties of the general offices.

C. Sensing more responsibility by Directors General.

Action options:

1. Establishing a constructive system of reward and punishment on the basis of appropriate evaluation of the work of Directors General.

Restraining Forces:

A. Lack of sufficient specialization and experience of Directors General.

Action options:

1. Providing Directors General with theoretical and practical education and training.
2. Placing individuals in positions that are appropriate to their fields of study and experience.

B. Lack of trust of top executives in Directors General.

Action options:

1. Organizing group discussions with the participation of top executives and Directors General once a month.
2. Organizing educational and training programs and offering scholarships in areas related to the work of Directors General.
3. Publishing the articles written by Directors General in the publication of the Ministry of Interior.

C. Power-seeking of high-positioned executives.

Action options:

1. Organizing monthly meetings with the participation of the top executives and Directors General for the purpose of discussing problems and reducing the distance between them.
2. Executing more perfectly the principle of decentralization and delegation of authority by top executives to Directors General.

6. How can be more authority delegated to Directors General for rewarding, punishing and promoting their employees?

Driving Forces:

- A. Inclination to emphasize the principle of delegation of authority as a general policy.

Action options:

1. Delegating more authority to Directors General from the top executives so as to enable them to reward and punish appropriately.
2. Organizing group meetings with the participation of high-positioned executives and Directors General with the purpose of knowing the Directors General and creating a sense of trust in them.
3. Training Directors General in advanced methods of management and public administration related to their job for the purpose of enhancing their power to make better decisions.

- B. Inclination of Directors General to evaluate the work of employees.

Action options:

1. Delegating authority to Directors General to evaluate employees under their supervision and to use the results in rewarding or punishing them.
2. Legislating laws and regulations that will give Directors General the authority to reward and punish employees under their supervision.

Restraining Forces:

- A. The excess work of the top executives which leads to their lack of attention to delegate authority to Directors General in matters concerned with rewarding, punishing, and promoting employees.

Action options:

1. Delegating more authority to Directors General by the top executives.

2. Revising the present system of reward and punishment and delegating authority to reward and punish to general offices.

B. Power-seeking of high-positioned executives.

Action options:

1. Organizing group meetings with the participation of the top executives and Directors General with the purpose of familiarizing the top executives with the Directors General.
2. Organizing educational seminars with the participation of Directors General in new principles of management and administration for upgrading their level of knowledge.

C. Lack of trust and confidence of the top executives in expertise and specialization of Directors General.

Action options:

1. Organizing educational and training conferences and seminars for Directors General for the purpose of upgrading their knowledge and understanding of administration.
2. Evaluating employees and giving a careful attention to providing timely reward and punishment and maintaining neutrality.

7. How can we determine training deficiencies and training needs of the Ministry employees?

Driving Forces:

A. Inclination to increase the output of employees.

Action options:

1. Utilizing the results obtained by Directors General in their evaluation of training needs.
2. Establishing a system of report giving and receiving.
3. Establishing training programs for the needed expertise.

4. Developing an evaluation system by experts which is based upon the assigned functions of Directors General.
5. Giving more priority to those employees who have passed specific training programs in relation to their expertise.

B. Inclination to strengthen the mentality of employees.

Action options:

1. Establishing trust in employees by organizing educational and training sessions in administration which will bring their knowledge up-to-date.
2. Offering scholarships to employees.
3. Assigning administrative responsibilities to employees and receiving reports on activities done.
4. Securing employees' job and salary.
5. Giving opportunity to all employees to verbalize their opinions.

C. Presence of new methods and procedures in administration.

Action options:

1. Determining the educational and training needs of the Ministry of Interior.
2. Providing tests for measuring the knowledge and understanding of employees regarding new issues in management and administration.
3. Establishing programs for needed skills.

Restraining Forces:

- A. The top executives' lack of faith and awareness of the role of education and training.

Action option:

1. Establishing special educational and training programs and assessing the participants and submitting the results to the high officials.

- B. Lack of desired output of training institutions in training employees of the government.

Action options:

1. Upgrading the contents of training programs for employees.
2. Increasing the possibilities for education and training and control and execution of these programs.
3. Careful evaluation of educational and training programs.
4. Emphasizing more on practice rather than theory.

- C. Monotony and simplicity of jobs.

Action option:

1. Familiarizing employees with recent and advanced administrative procedures.

- D. Heavy work load and lack of manpower in some general offices which result in lack of participation of employees in training programs.

Action options:

1. Providing needed manpower.
2. Dividing work correctly among individuals.

8. How can we develop some group discussion sessions with the participation of Deputy Ministers and Directors General in an effort to create more understanding and cooperation?

Driving Forces:

- A. Inclination of Directors General to present administrative problems.

Action options:

1. Creating a constructive competition among the Directors General via a logical and correct evaluation of their performances by the high-positioned executives.

2. Paying more attention to the problems of Directors General and trying to solve these problems via a system of report giving and receiving.
 3. Developing confidence and trust in Directors General that discussing problems frankly would not endanger their administrative positions.
- B. Need for more coordination among general offices felt by Directors General.

Action options:

1. Preparation of an annual publication by each general office which will present all the yearly activities.
2. Establishing bi-annual seminars with the participation of Deputy Ministers and Directors General, during which each Director General will present the performances and views of his/her office to others.
3. Arranging meetings with participation of Directors General, their Deputies, and Heads of sections to exchange ideas about functions of departments and their communication with each other.

Restraining Forces:

- A. Lack of cooperation of general offices with each other.

Action options:

1. Strengthening human relations among employees in the general offices.
 2. Diagnosing and determining the job limits of the general offices by the high-positioned executives, in such a way that each general offices can determine its limit for cooperation with other general offices.
 3. Eliminating existing discrimination in an effort to create more cooperation between the departments.
- B. Excess work of the top executives and Directors General.

Action options:

1. Delegating authority from the top executives to lower

levels.

2. Complying with the principle of decentralization.
3. Providing the Deputy Ministers and Directors General with a personnel that meets their quantitative as well as their qualitative needs.
4. Dividing jobs appropriately among the employees.

9. How can we delegate more authority to the levels below the Directors' General level?

Driving Forces:

- A. Inclination to put more emphasis on delegation of authority as a general policy.

Action options:

1. Dividing work by considering the ability and experience of employees.
 2. Establishing educational and training sessions which will prepare employees to accept more responsibility.
 3. Considering the appropriateness of employees' expertise and specialization with their duties, and attempting to bring these specialization and expertise up-to-date.
- B. Confidence and trust of Directors General in the ability of employees from lower levels.

Action options:

1. Familiarizing the Directors General with the ability and specialization of employees under their supervision.
2. Referring jobs that are appropriate to the specialization of employees.
3. Examining and reviewing the results of work referred to employees and presenting solutions for problems by Directors General.

- C. Inclination to strengthen the sense of responsibility in subordinates by Directors General.

Action options:

1. Completing delegation of authority in certain areas to employees by the Directors General.
2. Expecting complete responsibility when authority is delegated by Directors General.
3. Establishing a system of report giving and receiving and implementing the results from the reports.

Restraining Forces:

- A. Lack of confidence of Directors General in the skill of lower level employees.

Action options:

1. Organizing monthly meetings with Directors General and their employees in general offices.
2. Organizing employees scholarships that are appropriate to their duties.
3. Offering employees scholarships that are appropriate to their duties.
4. Rewarding and punishing employees at an appropriate time.

- B. Possessiveness of Directors General.

Action options:

1. Organizing monthly meeting with the participation of Directors General and their employees in an effort to acquaint them with each other.
2. Upgrading the knowledge and specialization of employees via specialized-training sessions.
3. Establishing an evaluation system which subordinates can assess Directors General by filling out opinion survey forms.

10. How can we increase superiors' information and knowledge about the functions of Directors General in an effort to improve the administration of the Ministry of Interior?

Driving Forces:

- A. Inclination of Directors General to attract the attention of the top executives to the duties of general offices.

Action options:

1. Establishing a system of report giving and receiving.
 2. Preparing an annual publication by each general office for presenting the yearly activities.
 3. Organizing monthly group meetings with the participation of Deputy Ministers and Directors General.
- B. Inclination of the top executives to increase their level of understanding and awareness regarding the duties of the general offices.

Action options:

1. Establishing a system of report receiving by top executives from the Directors General.
2. Preparing a monthly report of the activities that have taken place by the Directors General and sending it to the top executives.

Restraining Forces:

- A. Not selecting Directors General of the Ministry of Interior for positions in higher echelons.

Action options:

1. Establishing requirement and qualifications for selection of the top executives of the Ministry of Interior and consideration of equal qualification.
2. Participation of Directors General in specialized conferences and seminars inside and outside of the country for the purpose of upgrading their knowledge.

- B. Lack of group meetings between the Directors General and the top executives.

Action options:

1. Organizing group discussion meetings once a month.
2. Executing the principle of delegation of authority from the top executives and Directors general in order to reduce the work load.

- C. Existence of an administrative distance between the top executives and Directors General.

Action options:

1. Gathering informally by Deputy Ministers and Directors General.
2. Upgrading Directors' General level of knowledge through self-education and participation in specialized conferences and seminars.
3. Sending Directors General to other countries in order to provide them with up-to-date learning experiences.

11. How can we stop positioning favorite and non-experts at the level of Directors General?

Driving Forces:

- A. Resistance of Directors General in accepting non-specialized individuals.

Action options:

1. Rejecting unskilled individuals by Directors General in an effort to prevent the reduction of work output.
2. Necessitating the use of job qualifications by the top executives indicated in job classifications.

- B. Specialization of jobs at the level of Directors General.

Action options:

1. Recruiting employees with consideration of their specialties in an effort to reduce the possibility of giving specialized jobs to non-specialized employees.

2. Training of non-specialized workers in their respective jobs.
- C. The inclination of specialized employees to be in charge of positions filled by non-specialized employees.

Action options:

1. Organizing monthly seminars by employees (either specialized or non-specialized).
2. Publishing employees' articles in publications of the Ministry of Interior in an effort to enhance their self-image.

Restraining Forces:

- A. Desolving some of the general offices of the Ministry of Interior for the purpose of executing the principle of decentralization which causes an overabundance of manpower.

Action options:

1. Distributing the personnel in the general offices with the consideration of their specialties and experiences.
 2. Training of non-specialized employees in their respective jobs in order to upgrade their specialization.
- B. Favoritism and influence of the top executives in employing specialized individuals who have an educational level that is not appropriate to the duties and responsibilities of the general offices.

Action options:

1. Giving careful consideration to qualifications of individuals in selection and recruitment.
 2. Selecting the personnel of each unit with the supervision of the Director General through examination and interviews.
- C. Lack of attention to the human resources needed for general offices in respect to specialization and educational levels during employment and transfer of personnel.

Action options:

1. Paying more attention to the manpower needs of the

general offices during employment and transfer.

12. How can we recruit or select Directors General so that all job quality and functions can be taken into consideration?

Driving Forces:

- A. Inclination of the top executives to recruit those with high qualifications for positions of Directors General.

Action options:

1. Section Heads' showing their skills and qualifications.
 2. Placing individuals in positions that are congruent with their educational background and experience.
- B. Regular evaluation of the performance of individuals at the lower echelons.

Action options:

1. Having meetings with individuals who are positioned at lower levels than the level of Directors General.
2. Utilizing the results of the evaluations.

Restraining Forces:

- A. Existence of favoritism and nepotism in the Ministry of Interior.

Action option:

1. Selecting individuals for Directors' General positions by a specific committee.
- B. Lack of knowledgeable and expert candidates for Directors' General positions.

Action options:

1. Training individuals for specific positions.
2. Basing promotions on the successfully passing specific educational programs.

13. How can we change some of the administrative methods and procedures related to personnel, procurement and services in an effort to expedite work?

Driving Forces:

- A. Inclination to facilitate and expedite work by Directors General.

Action options:

1. Familiarizing employees with the latest methods related to their jobs.
 2. Placing skilled individuals in appropriate jobs.
 3. Reviewing and simplifying the internal laws and regulations of the Ministry of Interior in an effort to expedite the decision-making processes and improve the quality of administrative work.
 4. Preparing better standard forms for all matters possible.
- B. Inclination to delegate authority to Directors General, with an aim to eliminate unnecessary administrative ceremonies and formalities.

Action options:

1. Performing the routine administrative jobs by telephone (whenever this would be feasible).
 2. Avoiding administrative red tape.
 3. Changing methods of performing different jobs in an effort to improve them.
- C. Developing cooperation between serving departments and other ones.

Action options:

1. Arranging meetings with participation of service-giving and service-receiving offices, with a will to discuss and settle their problems.

2. Taking into consideration all existing standards precisely when service-giving departments offer service to service-giving departments in an effort to eliminate discrimination.

Restraining Forces:

- A. Presence of unnecessary administrative formalities and red tape.

Action options:

1. Omitting unnecessary formalities.
 2. Performing administrative jobs and duties in an amicable manner and friendly contacts.
- B. Loyalty demonstrated by senior employees towards old and traditional methods.

Action options:

1. Acquainting senior employees with new methods, through educational seminars.
 2. Publishing articles in the publications of the Ministry of Interior on the subjects of new methods and practices.
 3. Developing more cooperation between experienced- and less-experienced individuals in an effort to create the tendency in experienced-individuals to familiarize themselves with new methods and to give more experience to young employees.
- C. Presence of non-specialized employees.

Action options:

1. Providing training for non-specialized employees in their relative duties and jobs.
2. Persisting on utilizing specialized employees in the relative departments as much as possible.

APPENDIX E

STRUCTURED INTERVIEW II

APPENDIX E

STRUCTURED INTERVIEW II

1. What is the formal title of your position?
2. Age
3. Education
4. Profession
5. Years of experience in government
6. Is government services regarded as a principal career?
 - a. Yes_____.
 - b. No_____.
 - c. In-and-out_____.
7. If government service is not a principal career, what is it?
8. In your government service, have you served outside Tehran?
If so, how many years?
9. Do you engage in any other type of professional or occupational activity for remuneration?

The following questions concern role definition:

10. Identify the five positions or people whose statements of expectations are frequent enough and sufficiently influential to affect your behavior in your job.
 - a.
 - b.
 - c.
 - d.
 - e.

11. Whom of the five, identified above, do you consider as having the most effect on the way in which you act in your role?
12. What kind of communication (statement of expectations) do you receive from this most influential person?
13. Whom of the five, identified above, do you consider as having the least effect on the way in which you act?
14. What type of communication (statement of expectations) do you receive from the least influential person?
15. With whom of the five, identified above, do you spend the least time?
16. What in general is the nature of the activity or activities involved?
17. With whom of the five do you spend the least time?
18. What in general is the nature of the activity or activities involved?
19. Who are the five people with whom you spend the largest amount of time during the average working week?
20. What do you consider your most important responsibilities?
 - a.
 - b.
 - c.
 - d.
 - e.
21. How do you rank these responsibilities from the most to the least important one?
 - a.
 - b.
 - c.
 - d.
 - e.

22. Followings are common activities and responsibilities of the executive, indicate the one that is most characteristic of your job and the one that is least characteristic. Then, place other alternatives in terms of their relevance to your job.

- a. ___ Individual activity of specialist nature on assignend projects.
- b. ___ Participation in the development of materials and data for policy and decision making in the organization.
- c. ___ Follow up and handling of various problems assigned by your superior.
- d. ___ Managing and supervising a particular progress or activity within the organization.
- e. ___ Working with groups and individuals outside your organization (may be inside or outside government).

23. In a 5-point scale, in which one represents a very little and five a very high degree of time working at the proper level, to what degree do you believe you are working at your appropriate level of responsibility?

1 2 3 4 5

24. If the answer to the above question is at 4 or less, then specify the things you do that cause you to feel you are working below your level.

- a.
- b.
- c.
- d.
- e.

25. Rate the four items below according to their importance, from the most serious difficulty to the least serious difficulty.

- a. ___ Likelihood that necessary information vital to understanding operations will not flow to you.
- b. ___ Distrust in the intentions and the loyalty of the subordinate(s).
- c. ___ Lack of confidence in the competence and skill of subordinates.
- d. ___ Legal and/or formal requirements that make you feel uncomfortable about assigning responsibility and authority.

26. Considering the following questions, what are your expectations of your subordinates?

a. Expect subordinate to follow directions (1) ---expect subordinate to initiate action and not wait for directions (5).

1 2 3 4 5

b. Expect subordinate to control his time (1) ---expect subordinates' time to be fully available (5).

1 2 3 4 5

c. Expect subordinate to follow orders as given (1) ---expect subordinate to deviate and make changes as he feels necessary (5).

1 2 3 4 5

d. Expect personal loyalty of subordinate (1) ---expect organizational loyalty from subordinate which does not always mean personal loyalty to you as superior (5).

1 2 3 4 5

e. Expect subordinate to give you support (1) ---expect to give support to your subordinate (5).

1 2 3 4 5

The following questions concern use of time:

27. Think of a typical week of work and of the five most time-consuming activities in which you engage. Please indicate how many hours you spend on each of these items.

| <u>Activities</u> | <u>Time</u> |
|-------------------|-------------|
| a. | a. |
| b. | b. |
| c. | c. |
| d. | d. |
| e. | e. |

28. Considering question 20, in which you were asked to identify your most important responsibilities, what percentage of time in the average week is devoted to it?

- a.
- b.
- c.
- d.
- e.

29. Considering question 28, what percentage of time would be desired to spend?

- a.
- b.
- c.
- d.
- e.

30. Considering the following types of executive responsibilities, please indicate your estimate of the average percentage of time you spend on each in the average week.
- a. ___ Inspecting and investigating
 - b. ___ Planning
 - c. ___ Preparing procedures and scheduling
 - d. ___ Coordinating
 - e. ___ Interpreting
 - f. ___ Supervising
 - g. ___ Personnel activities
 - h. ___ Public relations (external relations)
 - i. ___ Negotiating
 - j. ___ Other
31. What do you feel is the total amount of time you devote to your work per week?
32. What percentage of the total do you feel you control?
33. Think in terms of two broad categories: (a) the amount of time spent in contact and interactive situations and (b) the amount of time spent working alone, please indicate the percentage of time you spend on each in the average week.
- a. ___
 - b. ___
34. Please indicate the percentage of time that you think you spend on each of the following items:
- a. ___ Attending conferences inside organization
 - b. ___ Attending conferences outside organization
 - c. ___ Meeting with superior(s)
 - d. ___ Meeting with peer(s)
 - e. ___ Meeting with subordinate(s)
 - f. ___ Meeting with outsiders on matters directly related to the job
 - g. ___ Meeting with outsiders on non-job-related matters
 - h. ___ Others

35. Please indicate, from the following list, what percentage would enable you to be most effective and successful in meeting your executive responsibilities.

- a. ___ Attending conferences inside organization
- b. ___ Attending conferences outside organization
- c. ___ Meeting with superior(s)
- d. ___ Meeting with peer(s)
- e. ___ Meeting with subordinate(s)
- f. ___ Meeting with outsiders on matters directly related to the job
- g. ___ Meeting with outsiders on non-job-related matters
- h. ___ Others

36. Please indicate roughly the percentage of time you think you spend on each of the following items:

- a. ___ Reading and answering mail
- b. ___ Reading publications
- c. ___ Thinking and reflecting
- d. ___ Travel time in working day
- e. ___ Other

37. Please indicate what percentage would enable you to be most effective and successful in meeting your executive responsibilities:

- a. ___ Reading and answering mail
- b. ___ Reading publication
- c. ___ Thinking and reflecting
- d. ___ Travel time in working day
- e. ___ Other

38. What percentage of time do you spend on each of the following categories:

- a. ___ Time spent carrying out the day-to-day routines of the organization
- b. ___ Time spent in dealing with special or unique problems of an organizational nature that require executive attention

39. Please indicate, from the following items, what percentage of time do you spend on each:
- a. ___ Time spent on activities that have organizational and system importance
 - b. ___ Time spent on activities that involve individuals, personal conflicts, and grievances
40. Considering the same items, what would you consider an ideal distribution of time between the two:
- a. ___ Time spent on activities that have organizational and system importance
 - b. ___ Time spent on activities that involve individuals, personal conflicts, and grievances
41. If you were able to make one change in the organization that would enable you to improve your effectiveness as an executive, what would it be?
42. If you could make a change in the use of your executive time that you would regard as most important, what would it be?
43. What are the forces that you feel keep you making that change?

APPENDIX F

STRUCTURED INTERVIEW III

APPENDIX F

STRUCTURED INTERVIEW III

OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS

1. What does the Government mean by the process of decentralization?
2. How have you perceived this process?
3. How many phases do you think are involved in the process of decentralization in Iran?

Taking into consideration the process of decentralization, please answer the following questions:

4. What kind of Government environment would Iran have in the:

| | |
|----------------|-------------|
| a. Near future | b. Future |
| 1978-1988 | 1989-2001 |
| (2537-2547) | (2548-2560) |
5. What kinds of problems do you foresee in the future?
6. What kinds of organizational structures are more appropriate in the future of the Government of Iran?
7. Which executive, either specialist or generalist, is more important at the top echelons (Ministers', Deputy Ministers', Governors' General, Deputies' Governor General, and Directors General) of the Government of Iran in the future?